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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL  
RAPPROCHEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GREEK-
TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS 
 
 
 
Kotelis, Andreas 
PhD, Department of Political Science  
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Esra Cuhadar 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
The current study provides an in-depth analysis of four distinct cases of 
rapprochements that took place between Greece and Turkey. Two of these cases 
concern successful rapprochements, while the other two concern unsuccessful 
rapprochement cases. The goal of the study is to examine the factors that shaped the 
outcome of the rapprochement, and discuss which the main preconditions for a 
successful rapprochement are. The study examines a number of independent 
 iv 
 
variables, which derive mainly from the International Relations literature, as well 
as, other similar studies. The methodology employed in order to examine the 
explanatory power of these variables is structured-focused case comparison which 
was first proposed by Alexander George, coupled with process-tracing.      
The research concludes with a comparison of allfour rapprochement cases 
that are based on the following three different axes; a contrast of the pre-
rapprochement periods, an evaluation of the impact of the process on the 
rapprochements’ definitive indicators, and an assessment of the impact of each 
independent variable on the outcome of the rapprochement. Of the 8 independent 
variables that are put to test, it is 'leadership' and 'state identity' that are observed to 
be causing variation on the dependent variable across all four cases. On the 
contrary, the GRIT strategy did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement in 
any of the cases discussed. 
Keywords: Greek-Turkish relations, rapprochement 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 BAŞARILI YAKINLASMANIN ÖN 
KOŞULLARI: YUNAN – TÜRK YAKINLAŞMA 
ÇABALARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ 
 
 
 
Kotelis, Andreas 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Esra Çuhadar 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
Bu çalışma, Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında yaşanan dört ayrı yakınlaşma 
durumunun derinlemesine bir analizini sunmaktadır. Söz konusu yakınlaşmalardan 
iki tanesi başarılı, diğer iki tanesi ise başarısızdır. Çalışmanın amacı, yakınlaşmanın 
sonucunu şekillendiren faktörleri incelemek ve başarılı bir yakınlaşma için gereken 
ön şartların neler olduğunu tartışmaktır. Çalışma Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürünün 
yanı sıra benzer çalışma alanlarının literatürlerindeki bir takım bağımsız 
değişkenleri incelemektedir. Anılan değişkenlerin açıklayıcı gücünü incelemek için 
 vi 
 
kullanılan metot “süreç-izleme”nin yanı sıra ilk olarak Alexander George tarafından 
önerilen “yapısal-odaklanmış durum karşılaştırması”nı kullanmaktadır. 
Araştırma üç ayrı eksen üzerine yapılandırılmış dört yakınlaşma durumun 
tümünün karşılaştırılması ile sonuçlanmaktadır; yakınlaşma öncesi durumların 
karşılaştırılması, sürecin yakınlaşma göstergelerine olan etkisinin değerlendirilmesi 
ve herbir bağımsız değişkenin yakınlaşmanın sonuçlarına olan etkisinin 
değerlendirilmesi. Dört yakınlaşma durumunun tamamında, test edilen toplam sekiz 
bağımsız değişkenden ikisi, liderlik ve devlet kimliği, bağımlı değişkenin de 
değişmesine neden olmuştur. Öte yandan GRIT stratejisi tartışılan vakaların 
hiçbirisinde yakınlaşmanın sonucunu etkilemiştir.. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, yakınlaşma 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Identifying the Phenomenon 
International relations is, indeed, an exciting field. Newly emerging issues, 
such as globalization, transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation pose fresh 
challenges to IR scholars who try to develop models and theories in order to 
analyze and understand these phenomena. In a constantly changing world, the 
research focus of the field has broadened considerably and currently covers a much 
wider agenda. That is not to say that the focus of some of the most persisting issues 
in the field of international relations has diminished. For instance, questions 
regarding the ways states interact, why they choose to cooperate, or, on the 
contrary, why they end up competing or fighting against each other, continue to 
cause heated debates and attract scholarly interest. The answers to these questions 
vary considerably not only because the scholars examining them depart from one 
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another in theoretical approach, but, even more importantly, because they are highly 
dependent on the scholars’ perceptions about how the world works and, particularly, 
what the driving forces behind states’ actions are.    
The current dissertation discusses the phenomenon of “rapprochement”, a 
notion not that popular in the field and, certainly, one of the least well-defined ones. 
As it will be discussed in detail later on, the rapprochement process is characterized 
by an era of improvement in relations between a dyad of states. 
    
 
1.2. The Main Problematique 
The definition of a rapprochement case, or a rapprochement process, is not 
standardized by scholars. Typically rapprochement involves two states, which more 
than likely have common borders (e.g. Turkey and Greece), but might also be two 
regional players without a shared borderline (e.g. Turkey and Israel), or two global 
powers (e.g. USA and China). In addition, and more often than not, the 
rapprochement process is defined by a key event, which marks an important 
positive development in the relations between the two states. The nature of the 
positive development varies across cases and includes a variety of actions. The 
general pattern, however, is that rapprochement is inaugurated by smaller 
developments in dyads where relations are quite strained and visa-versa.    
Given the diversity in the literature regarding rapprochement, there is a need 
to provide a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, this is not 
the main theme of the current research. Even though a working-definition is 
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provided, the main focus of the study is to understand the contributing factors 
leading to the success or failure of a rapprochement process. As such, the research 
question is: “What are the preconditions for successful rapprochement?” 
In order to answer the research question the study will compare four 
rapprochement cases. All selected cases concern the same dyad, Greece and Turkey, 
and, hence, deal with the long lasting Greek-Turkish conflict. The cases selected 
spread across almost 80 years. Two of the cases concern successful rapprochement 
processes, during the 1930s and after 1999, while the other two concern 
unsuccessful rapprochements, in the early 1950s and in 1988.  
 
1.3. A Brief History of the Greek-Turkish Relations 
Greece and Turkey are two states that are strongly connected not only by 
geography but also by history. Especially after the rise of nationalism in the 
Balkans, the two nations perceived each other as enemies, and fought a number of 
wars which further exacerbated the feelings of enmity and mistrust. Such feelings 
are so strong that some scholars have supported the following: 
…the Greek-Turkish differences – the objective conflict of interest – are but 
the tip of the iceberg. What has made these differences impervious to a 
settlement are (a) the weight of history, mainly imagined history based on 
chosen glories and traumas that are buttressed by their respective national 
narratives, (b) coupled with their chosen collective identities which are built 
on slighting and demonizing the other party (Heraclides, 2011: 7). 
In general, Greek-Turkish relations are a well-studied subject and have 
attracted the attention of scholars not only from these two countries but, also from 
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outside countries (for instance see Clogg, 1983; Bertrand, 2003, Ker-Lindsay, 
2007). It is important to note that the specific characteristics of the conflict amplify 
the interest of scholars who, on occasion, point to the unique characteristics of the 
Greek-Turkish relations. There are two most notable examples in this regard. The 
first is Hercules Millas (1991: 22), who noted that:  
By a rare and perhaps unique coincidence, each nation had fought against 
the other for national recognition. The Greeks first, then a century later the 
Turks, fought for liberation, each perceiving the other as an obstacle and a 
menace.      
The second is from Ambassador Bolukbasi (2004), who suggested that the 
Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean constitute a unique case in International 
Law due to the regions’ unique geographical consideration, as well as, its complex 
and singular structure.1 
Looking at the relations between Turkey and Greece over the last decades it 
is hard to imagine that these two Mediterranean countries have, at times, been 
strong allies. Nevertheless, there have been periods when relations between the 
Turkish and Greek states had reached a level of cooperation that is not usually 
observed within international relations. On the other hand, after 1955 and especially 
after 1974, relations between Greece and Turkey significantly deteriorated, while a 
number of newly emerging issues further complicated the situation and reduced the 
chances of mutually accepted solutions to be found. Furthermore, the prolonged 
                                                         
1 It must be mentioned in this case that Bolukbasi’s ideas are heavily influenced by the arguments 
and positions of the Turkish State concerning the Greek-Turkish conflict in the Aegean Sea. 
 
2 It must be stressed at this point that unlike Armstrong’s evaluation, it is the duration rather than the 
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stalemate, especially after 1974, contributed to the slow, yet steady, crystallization  
of maximalist positions on both sides, which pose a considerable obstacle to 
dialogue.      
Today the Greek-Turkish conflict includes a number of bilateral issues 
which, at their simplest, can be grouped into three different sets: the Aegean issues 
(i.e. disputes related to the seabed, the air, the waters and the exercise of rights upon 
them) the Cyprus issue, (although an international conflict it has severely affected 
bilateral relations), and, finally, the issues concerning the minorities’ rights and 
well-being (for a more elaborate and largely impartial presentation of the issues 
constituting the Greek-Turkish conflict see Heraclides, 2010).       
 
 1.4. Organization of the Study 
 The following chapter, the “Literature Review”, addresses some of the 
questions that were posed in this introduction. The purpose of the literature review 
is two-fold. First is to provide a better understanding of the “rapprochement” 
phenomenon with the help of a number of examples from other cases. This also 
helps underline some of the main indicators of the rapprochement process. In 
addition, the difference between rapprochement and other phenomena is discussed, 
and a coherent working definition of the term is provided. The second purpose is to 
look into the IR theories and research that can inform the current study in terms of 
identifying independent variables that can be used later on to explain what makes a 
rapprochement successful.  
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The third chapter, “Methodology”, provides a detailed account of the 
research design used. The main method this study employs is a structured focused 
case comparison and process tracing. Another contribution of the Methodology 
chapter is that it provides a codebook of the dependent and independent variables, 
and provides a roadmap, or guideline, for what kind of information the study ought 
to focus on during the analysis of each case.  
Chapters four, five, six, and seven, examine and analyze each of the case 
studies in depth. The case studies are presented in chronological order; hence, 
chapter 4 focuses on the 1930s, chapter 5 on the early 1950s, chapter 6 on the 
Davos process and, finally, chapter 7 on the rapprochement that was initiated in 
1999. The discussion of each case follows a similar framework. Each chapter 
includes a brief historical background, an overview of the reasons leading to the 
rapprochement, the main incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement, a 
discussion of the indicators and the assessment of the rapprochement.  
Chapter eight provides a comparative assessment of all the cases. The 
comparison is based upon three axes. First, the pre-rapprochement periods are 
compared, in order to explore whether the processes preceding the rapprochement 
are important for the outcome of the rapprochement process. Second, the study 
compares the four cases in terms of the process’ indicators. Finally, but most 
importantly, the comparison of the four case studies focuses on the independent 
variables. Each of the independent variables is examined across each case and its 
overall impact on the outcome of the rapprochement process is assessed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Relations between states are rarely stable. More often than not, interstate 
relations range from close cooperation and strategic partnership to rivalry and 
catastrophic war. Even among the same actors, across time, relations can suffer 
serious fluctuations. It is not rare to see the relations between the same two states 
improve or deteriorate, depending on a variety of conditions. The questions of why 
this changeability exists, and even more importantly how can positive 
transformations be supported and negative downfalls avoided, are some of the most 
intriguing ones in the fields of international relations and conflict resolution.  
The current study aims at developing a better understanding of Greek-
Turkish relations especially by focusing on one particular aspect of this 
relationship: the rapprochement processes. In the following pages the theoretical 
background for the concept of rapprochement will be established through an 
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elaborate review of the literature. Second, the current chapter provides a framework 
within which the rest of this thesis is based. Lastly, in this chapter I develop a set of 
independent variables that could play a role in determining the success or failure of 
the Greek-Turkish rapprochement processes, which will then be assessed in the 
following chapters. 
 
2.2. Conceptualization 
Even though the literature on rapprochement is abundant most of the work 
mainly focuses on case studies. Very few – if at all – do scholars provide a 
theoretical background of the term. In most cases, the meaning of rapprochement is 
taken for granted. Researchers do not provide explanations of what their perception 
and understanding of rapprochement is. Specifically, description of the process and, 
most importantly, the key aspects of the relationship’s progression, meaning the 
areas where the rapprochement has mainly touched upon, vary significantly across 
cases.  
The lack of clear cut definitions brings a degree of uncertainty to the 
discussion, which is also exacerbated by the existence of other –in this case well 
defined– terms in the literature. The meanings of these alternative terms seem to 
overlap with that of rapprochement. In order to distinguish rapprochement from 
other similar terms this study, first of all, proposes a new definition of 
rapprochement and, then, discusses how rapprochement is different from other 
similar concepts. In the following pages I examine a number of case studies and 
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extract the key points of a rapprochement process as a first step towards creating a 
comprehensive definition of rapprochement.  
In most cases rapprochement is understood as the process of normalization 
of relations between two parties. However, the very understanding of normalization 
is not concrete. In a number of cases rapprochement is taken to mean the 
resumption of diplomatic relations between two states. For instance, accounts of the 
Brazil-Cuba rapprochement of 1986, is considered as the beginning of the 
recommencement of diplomatic envoys from one country to the other, even though 
unofficial meetings and other cultural relations had started before that (see for 
example Nazario, 1986). Resuming diplomatic relations, although limited to cases 
where the states had broken diplomatic communications, is also mentioned in other 
cases of rapprochement as the first step towards establishing better communication 
between two states.  
Nonetheless, it is quite obvious that there are cases of rapprochement where 
the states involved did not have broken diplomatic channels to begin with. These 
cases mainly involve states whose relations had been frozen for a period of time, 
such as in the case of the India-US rapprochement in the late 1990s. The 
transformation of the relations between the United States and India is quite 
interesting because it involves a great shift in the behavior of these two states which 
for six decades had been characterized by frosty relations, enmity, mistrust and 
unwillingness for cooperation (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007). As such, this case is 
similar to the Greek-Turkish rapprochements, or at least the last one in 1999.    
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Other scholars describe rapprochement as a remarkable improvement in the 
relations between two states, just as the new era of relations between England and 
China from circa 1927 and 1931 (Fung, 1983). The case of the Sino-British 
rapprochement is also remarkable because it refers to a process of negotiation that 
two states entered into in order to explore the possibilities of cooperation in a newly 
forming environment, meaning the changes in China’s politics. Indeed, the 
rapprochement is marked by the successful outcome of the aforementioned 
negotiations that prepared the ground for further cooperation. In this sense, the 
Sino-British rapprochement shows that, first of all, process is important and, more 
importantly, that literature on negotiations could be useful in order to understand 
the outcome of a rapprochement process. 
In most cases rapprochement is characterized by an increasing level of 
cooperation and goodwill that develops between conflicting parties, as that which 
has developed in between Greece and Turkey since 1999 (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). 
However, it should not be assumed that these changes happen automatically, or 
within a short period of time. Most examples show that in a process of 
rapprochement, while the main focus is on multilevel cooperation and building 
stronger ties, the process itself is often slow, as the parties usually follow a gradual 
and cautious approach. Good examples of such gradual advance in the relations of 
two states are the Sino-Indian and the Sino-US rapprochements.  
Moreover, the literature points out that a rapprochement could be observed 
at different levels of body politic. In order to make the discussion more practical we 
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can distinguish three different levels. To start, changes can be observed in state-to-
state relations which refers to mainly diplomatic levels of communication, 
agreements signed between states, military cooperation, etc. The examples of 
rapprochements that have been mentioned already are fine examples of how a 
rapprochement process influences state-to-state relations. Secondly, a change may 
be initially observed in party-to-party relations, as was in the case of the Sino-
Vietnamese rapprochement. In this case the fact that both countries were ruled by 
communist parties played an important role in the normalization process (Tonesson, 
2003). As a final point, rapprochement can also involve the leadership level, as 
happened between Ismail Cem and George Papandreou (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). The 
personalities and the will of the leaders played an important role in the case of the 
US-India rapprochement, when Bill Clinton followed politics that signaled to India 
that he was not blindly in favor of Pakistan (Kapur and Gonguly, 2007). 
Apart from the official and state levels, it must be noted that a 
rapprochement process is also likely to include the societal level. Concerning this 
issue, we can distinguish two trends. The first one refers to cases where 
rapprochement happens at the top-level and then, following this, communication, 
economic relations, and cultural exchanges flourish. In the second case 
communication between two states’ entrepreneurs, grassroots leaders, and/or civil 
society increases, and eventually pushes policy makers towards seeking cooperative 
policies, as was in the case of Cuba and Brazil (Nazario, 1986).    
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Consequently, the definition of rapprochement should be comprehensive 
enough to include all of the above noted characteristics. However, because the 
characteristics of rapprochement included in the above case studies are still vague, 
the new definition should move towards creating a more clear description of the 
term. A working definition that can serve the purpose of the proposed study, while 
satisfying the abovementioned criteria, can read as follows: 
Rapprochement is a period of time when relations between two or more 
states encounter significant normalization and improvement, followed by a 
noteworthy increase in the will to cooperate, possibly experienced 
simultaneously at different levels of the body politic and the respective 
societies. 
 
 
2.3. Operationalization 
At this point it is also critical to further discuss the specifics of the working 
definition. One of the most important dimensions of rapprochement is that it is a 
period of time, which, although it has a distinct beginning, is transient in nature. 
Its initiation launches a series of processes and is by no means an end state. As 
such, even though the processes leading to the initiation of a rapprochement 
process is essential, the state of affairs between the states that initiate the process 
is largely irrelevant. Concretely, relations between the approaching parties before 
the rapprochement might vary from armed conflict to diplomatic aloofness. Even 
so, this abstraction is not purposefully planned in order to make the selection of 
the case studies for this research easier. It has strong roots in research and to a 
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certain point it, once again, stresses the lack of agreement between scholars who 
deal with rapprochement.    
The most challenging part of the definition is how to operationalize an 
improvement in relations between the parties and increase their will to cooperate. 
To begin with, resuming diplomatic relations is an indicator of improvement in the 
relations between two states. Opening diplomatic channels of communications 
shows that the parties have the will to solve their problems through dialogue. 
Actually, in cases where states halted diplomatic communication, recommencement 
of these relations may mean the rapprochement itself. For example, in the case of 
China and Japan, following the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Peking, Japan 
closed down its embassy in Taipei, and established a new Embassy in Peking. The 
next year the People’s Republic of China opened an embassy in Tokyo (Kim, 1975).     
A second strong indicator of improvement in relations between states is the 
increasing number of visits made by high-ranking officials. History offers many 
examples of such visits that have remained as bright examples of rapprochement. 
Tanaka’s above mentioned visit to Peking is only one of them. Mao’s declaration of 
will to receive Nixon in China in 1970, and Kissinger’s secret visit to the Chinese 
capital in July of 1971, are considered important steps, if not catalysts, of the 
rapprochement process (Jian, 2003). In the case of Sino-Indian relations, Al-rfouh 
characterizes the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China as “the major 
breakthrough in the process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations” (Al-rfouh, 
2003: 21). In general, we could describe these kinds of visits as the next step to 
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diplomatic proximity, or ambassadorial talks. Meetings between prime ministers or 
between ministers of foreign affairs could, in most cases, constitute a strong 
indicator that the parties have the will to take further steps towards cooperation and 
that they consider rapprochement as a priority of their foreign policy strategy.     
A third way to operationalize normalization and improvement of relations is 
to look at agreements that are signed between the parties. Typically, these kinds of 
agreements are signed during the official meetings of high-ranking representatives. 
These agreements offer a new ground for cooperation, and, in most cases, provide 
the framework for further cooperation, such as in finance and trade relations. For 
instance, in the case of the Russia-Ukraine rapprochement of 2001, meetings 
between the leaders happened frequently (e.g. Putin’s visit to Kiev in the 
celebration of Ukraine’s independence), a number of bilateral agreements were 
signed, and as a result the trade volume between the two countries increased 
considerably (Moshes, 2002). Another example, also concerning Russia’s relations 
to its neighbors, is the case of the Russo-Pakistani rapprochement. During 
Musharraf’s visit to Moscow in 2003, these governments signed a number of 
agreements concerning: transnational crime, Russian economic activities in 
Pakistan, and the restructuring of the Pakistani financial debt to Russia (Katz, 
2005).  
The Russo-Pakistani rapprochement case brings forth another act that 
strongly indicates improvement in relations. After signing the agreements, Putin 
made a statement highlighting the fact that the relations between Russia and 
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Pakistan improved “since Pakistan joined the international antiterrorist coalition” 
(Katz, 2005: 139). Similar statements were also made by General Musharraf. In the 
case of India and China for instance, improvement of relations also included 
official announcements of a series of commitments to good neighboring. These 
commitments were made clearer after the two states signed the “Declaration of the 
Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation” (Amprosio, 2005: 405). 
These kinds of joint statements or announcements by leaders are important for 
mainly two reasons. On the one hand, they point toward a change in the way one 
party perceives the other. Changes in attitudes are important in better understanding 
the process of rapprochement. On the other hand, official statements could serve as 
a vehicle to transfer positive mood of rapprochement to the rest of the society. 
In some cases, improvement in relations could also mean that one party 
starts seeing the other party as a possible third-party actor that could assist it in 
settling its differences with another state. For instance, during the Russia-Pakistan 
rapprochement, general Musharraf expressed his hope that Russia could play an 
active role in helping Pakistan to bridge its differences with India (Katz, 2005). 
This example shows that improvement of relations could also follow or lead to an 
increase of trust between the parties.     
Another important part of operationalization is to create boundaries between 
rapprochement and other similar terms. In this case, it is especially necessary to 
distinguish rapprochement from pre-negotiation and de-escalation. Pre-negotiation 
has been defined as a phase which begins when one or more parties consider 
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negotiation as a policy option and communicate this intention to the other parties, 
and ends when the parties agree to hold formal negotiations, or when one party 
abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option (Zartman, 1989: 20). The 
kick off of a pre-negotiation phase is generally marked by a turning point in the 
relationship of the parties (Stein, 1989: 239), which motivates parties to expand 
their alternatives and, therefore, consider negotiation seriously within their plans.  
In most cases, the turning point is either a recent crisis or an attempt to avoid an 
impending crisis (Stein, 1989: 240).  
Pre-negotiation is characterized as the period when parties move from 
conflicting unilateral solutions to a search for cooperative multilateral or joint 
solution (Zartman, 1989: 20), hence the similarities between pre-negotiation and 
rapprochement are clear. However, there are important differences between the two 
terms. At the outset, pre-negotiation is understood as a process, which is bound by 
formal negotiations, since its very definition is dependent on the existence of a 
negotiation process. On the other hand, rapprochement, while it could lead to 
formal negotiations between the conflicting parties is not always linked to a 
negotiation process. A rapprochement does not necessarily have official 
negotiations as its endpoint. Its substance and procedures can be more broadly 
defined. A simple way to set pre-negotiation apart from rapprochement is to say that 
pre-negotiation is a possible outcome or precursor of rapprochement.  
As far as de-escalation is concerned, the distinction is less clear. To begin 
with, de-escalation is quite a broad term including a variety of characteristics. Louis 
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Kriesberg (1991: 3), for instance, explores at least three different aspects of de-
escalation which are: a) the reduction in one or more dimensions of the intensity of 
the conflict behavior between adversaries, b) a contraction in the extend of the 
conflict, including the number of the parties and, c) efforts to move toward a 
settlement of the dispute. Once again the resemblance with the notion of 
rapprochement is apparent. Nonetheless, there is still a distinction to be made. De-
escalation is mostly understood as part of a conflict timeline, which refers to the 
different phases of a conflict. For instance, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) suggest 
that de-escalation follows the stalemate phase because the parties are tired of 
escalation, acknowledge their interdependence, and are searching for alternative 
ways of settling the conflict. In contrast, rapprochement does not necessarily refer 
to a stage of conflict. It could follow a stalemate phase, or any other phase of a 
conflict, however it can also take place in the absence of conflict. On the other 
hand, rapprochement can be observed between two parties that have decided that 
they want to upgrade their relations to a higher level, without previously being 
involved in a violent conflict. 
Finally, as the research question deals with successful rapprochement, 
special reference ought to be made to what the current study considers successful 
and unsuccessful. According to Collier et al. (as cited in Paffenholz & Spurk, 
2006), evidence shows that within the first five years following the end of 
hostilities the risk of reverting to violence is high. This risk considerably falls after 
a decade. This data on post-conflict environment can also be used in this study in 
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order to create a framework of what can be called successful and unsuccessful 
rapprochement. Thus, as far as this research is concerned, when relations revert to 
what they were before the rapprochement, within a five years time from the 
beginning of the rapprochement, it will be considered an unsuccessful effort. When 
the conditions crafted during the rapprochement continue, or transform into a 
higher level of cooperation, beyond a period of ten years then it will be considered 
a successful effort.  
 
2.4. Variables Explaining the Success or Failure of Rapprochement 
The current chapter will continue with a discussion on variables and 
examine how scholars have tackled the issue of rapprochement in order to explain 
its successful occurrence. Looking into the set of variables that have already been 
used in order to study rapprochement is essential and, will also serve as a guide to 
the selection of the independent variables for this thesis. 
The current study is different from former studies on rapprochement in two 
key aspects. Firstly, up to now, the literature has treated rapprochement in a cross-
sectional manner rather than in a longitudinal study. Usually, rapprochement is 
pinpointed to a specific chronological point, when particular events mark the 
occurrence of the rapprochement. On the contrary, the current study separates the 
initiation from the process of rapprochement. As such, there indeed is a point in 
time which marks the beginning of the rapprochement, however, what follows 
initiation, for the current work, is a part of the rapprochement process. Secondly, 
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the focal point in the present study is to find the causes leading to the success or 
failure of the rapprochement process. This is an important difference from the rest 
of the literature, which mainly focuses on the causes of the initiation of the 
rapprochement, or in some cases, the reasons that the initiation did not take place. 
The differences in research perspective, as indicated above, do not mean 
that it is pointless to look at the rest of the literature while searching for 
independent variables. Indeed, an overview of how other scholars tackled research 
questions can provide valuable insights, such as what type of theories scholars have 
used in order to examine rapprochement cases. Some of the variables used in 
previous research to explain the initiation of the rapprochement could also be 
relevant to explain the success or failure of a rapprochement process. Review of 
similar works might disclose variables that are suitable, whether slightly changed or 
in their originality, for the present study. Finally, a synopsis of the relevant literature 
will provide a solid ground upon which the independent variables for the current 
research can be based upon. 
Concerning more theoretical studies in rapprochement, special mention 
should be made of two studies, Stephen Rock’s book Why peace breaks out: 
Rapprochement in historical perspective and Tony Armstrong’s Breaking the ice: 
Rapprochement between East and West Germany, the United States and China, and 
Israel and Egypt. Both of these studies analyze preconditions that lead to successful 
rapprochement. Although their research question is similar to the one posed by the 
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present work, differences in conceptualization and operationalization of the terms 
“rapprochement” and “successful” create a considerable distinction.  
In both Stephen’s and Armstrong’s studies success or failure refers to the 
initiation of the rapprochement, while both scholars use “process” in order to 
describe the period preceding, rather than the period following, the initiation of the 
rapprochement. Furthermore, the current study examines rapprochement 
longitudinally. Finally, the present work studies rapprochement in a context which 
has not been studied before; Greek-Turkish relations, two middle-sized powers that 
are engaged in an intractable conflict. 
In Stephen Rock’s study, the rapprochement process is examined 
comparatively by focusing on major powers; the Anglo-French rapprochement at 
the end of the 19th century and the Anglo-American rapprochement at 
approximately the same time. In addition, the author also examines, though more 
briefly, two cases of unsuccessful rapprochements; Great Britain and Germany, via 
1898-1914 and, Germany and the United States, via 1898-1914. Rock poses and 
tests four hypotheses which establish why rapprochement among states is more 
likely in some situations than in others. In brief the first three hypotheses are as 
follow: 
a) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are heterogeneous in their 
exercise of national power. 
b) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are heterogeneous in their 
exercise of economic activities. 
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c) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are homogeneous in their 
exercise of social attributes. 
Heterogeneity here refers to states not having geopolitical goals or economic 
activities, wherein the pursuit of which is seen as a major threat to the other’s vital 
interests. Homogeneity refers to states having a significant number of common 
ideological or cultural attributes (see book review by Sears, 1990: 1321). Simply 
put, rapprochement is less likely to happen when there is conflict of interest 
between two states, especially concerning their exercise of foreign and economic 
policies, while it is more likely to take place among states with only minor cultural 
divergences.   
 Rock’s first three hypotheses, although supported by the findings of his 
research have some built in fallacies that are difficult not to take into consideration. 
To begin with, it is very difficult to measure notions such as heterogeneity or 
homogeneity in absolute values. Hence, it is a very challenging task to establish 
when two states are homogeneous and when they are heterogeneous in the areas 
that Rock looks upon. This type of ambiguity makes it difficult for Rock’s 
hypothesis to be tested or falsified by further research. In addition, as the author 
asserts, his assumptions seem to be applicable only in cases where both states 
posses “unifying ideologies”, meaning that each state respects the other’s 
sovereignty and does not claim authority over persons or states outside their 
borders. However, Rock in this case seems to overlook the fact that states tend to 
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perceive the other states as possible threats, even when the “others” have not shown 
signs of threatening behavior. 
Other than that, Rock’s first three hypotheses can be seen as a synthesis of 
the realist and the cost/benefit analysis approaches. The heterogeneity of national 
power could be translated as, two states not having serious concerns about their 
national security, while the economic, cultural and ideological incentives for peace 
could also signal the possibility for high rapprochement benefits. Rock’s fourth 
hypothesis (Rock, 1989: 18) postulates that:  
…even if the exercise of power, economic activities and societal attributes 
favor pacific relations, some catalytic event may be required to set the 
process of reconciliation in motion. The most probable candidate for this 
role is an acute crisis between the two states.  
The idea that unforeseen and unanticipated events can bring the 
rapprochement process to an abrupt end, or further strengthen it, is a very 
interesting one as it introduces a factor that is vague by definition, which is 
nevertheless present in most cases. In the case of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, 
for instance, there have been a number of studies looking into the impact of the 
earthquakes in Kocaeli and Athens as what precipitated the ensuing process of 
rapprochement (see for example Evin, 2004; Ker-Lindsay, 2000; Yalcikaya, 2003, 
also on findings concerning the “disaster-induced rapprochement phenomenon” see 
Akcinaroglu, DiCicco and Radziszewski 2007). 
Armstrong’s research focuses on three cases of rapprochement; East and 
West Germany, United States and China, and Israel and Egypt. All three cases 
embody, according to Armstrong, successful instances of rapprochement, meaning 
 23 
 
that the rapprochement process was actually initiated.2 Armstrong sets five 
assumptions and “each assumption stipulates certain conditions or behavior, and the 
basic logic of inquiry is to determine whether those stipulations are met in all three 
(successful) cases” (Armstrong, 1993: 19). The five major assumptions of his work 
are: 
1) Initiatives to improve relations will succeed when, first, the costs 
of maintaining hostile policies are growing or threatening to grow and, second, the 
prospects of gain through such policies are significantly diminished in comparison 
to previous expectations. 
2) The initial strategy employed in a successful rapprochement will 
be consistent with the central prescriptions of the GRIT (Graduated and 
Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction). 
3) Major issues are fractionated in negotiations that successfully lead 
to a rapprochement between hostile governments. 
4) Negotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement are 
conducted at a high level, are non-public and involve the fewest possible 
participants. 
5) The negotiating strategy engaged in a successful rapprochement 
initiatives is to initially take uncompromising positions on the major issues of 
                                                         
2 It must be stressed at this point that unlike Armstrong’s evaluation, it is the duration rather than the 
initiation that make a rapprochement successful in the current study. 
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contention, then offer concessions on a reciprocal basis, finally agreeing to disagree 
or seeking ambiguous formulations on matters of central principle. 
The first assumption is established on the basic premises of the cost/benefit 
analysis approach. There is not much to add, rather than pointing out that its 
inclusion in Armstrong’s research once again points to the importance of the 
rational or cost/benefit equilibrium in the decisions of policy makers. Nonetheless, 
the other four assumptions reveal a novel approach to rapprochement. Armstrong 
divides the rapprochement process into strategies and formal negotiations 
(Armstrong, 1993:20), and thus, the posed hypotheses here reflect these two 
components. The second assumption refers to the strategies; and the third, fourth, 
and fifth assumptions refer to the specifics of the negotiations.     
Armstrong’s novel approach should be taken into consideration. However, 
the author does not give any definition for what rapprochement is. Although this is 
typical in the existing rapprochement research, in the case of Breaking the Ice it 
creates additional problems. With no definition of rapprochement the selection of 
cases seems biased. Indeed, the case of the two-Germanies has little in common 
with the case of the Sino-American or the Israel-Egypt rapprochement. Moreover, 
the lack of definition leads to confusion when the discussion concerns the 
negotiation part of the process. In many rapprochement cases, as well as in the ones 
that our study is concerned with, rapprochement does not necessarily mean “getting 
to the table.” As such, Armstrong’s propositions must be tailored accordingly, in 
order to be used in the current study. 
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Armstrong’s and Rock’s works provide useful insights to the study of 
rapprochement. Firstly, they both rely on theories of international relations in order 
to answer their research question. Indeed, the use of IR theories in order to 
understand several aspects of the rapprochement process is a necessity, as the issue 
of rapprochement is closely linked to state behavior. IR scholars have persistently 
tried to answer questions such as: “Why do states fight?” or “Why do states make 
peace?” and, indeed, a number of different approaches have been developed in 
order to provide answers to those questions. Examining these approaches 
selectively in light of rapprochement could offer important insights in the effort to 
understanding as to why some rapprochement processes succeed and others fail. 
Secondly, both Armstrong and Rock discuss the role of the international 
system and the role of the process in order to explain why rapprochement is 
initiated or not. Such distinction, which is made clear by the variables each scholar 
uses, is clearer in Rock’ work. In Armstrong’s book, the motives for rapprochement 
imposed by the international and domestic conditions are also included in the 
cost/benefit equilibrium. While, on the other hand, the variables concerning the 
process include, in large, the type of negotiations that take place prior to the 
initiation of the rapprochement (i.e. the GRIT strategy, negotiations between high-
ranking officials, etc.). Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Armstrong’s first 
variable derives from IR theories, while the rest are mostly grounded in other fields 
of study (e.g. negotiation theory and/or conflict resolution). 
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Even though it is essentially different from Stephen’s and Armstrong’s 
works, in the next session an overview of the IR theories are discussed first and are 
then followed by other process factors. Particularly, as far as the current study is 
concerned, the focus is on how such changes (in this case process is understood as 
the development and progression of the rapprochement from its initiation to its end) 
could lead to the success or failure of a rapprochement.   
 
2.5. Factors Influencing the Success or Failure of a Rapprochement 
 Process 
One of the most useful insights from the review of Armstrong’s and Rock’s 
studies was that, in order to find possible factors influencing the success or failure 
of a rapprochement process, it is necessary to examine IR theories and other 
process-related subjects that IR theory does not cover. Looking into these two 
theoretical backgrounds will provide a backbone for this comprehensive analysis. 
  
2.5.1. Looking into the IR Theories 
IR theories provide a number of different explanations on how the 
international system and domestic politics shape the foreign policy of a state. In the 
pages that follow it will be discussed how different approaches may explain state 
behavior in regards to rapprochement. This discussion will focus on how ideas 
developed by IR scholars can be used to explain not the initiation, but the success 
or failure of a rapprochement process. The discussion covers the three main schools 
of thought in relation to rapprochement: realism, liberalism and constructivism.  
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2.5.1.1. Realism and the Study of Rapprochement 
Realists’ ideas can be traced back to Thucydides’ “The History of the 
Peloponnesian War,” Machiavelli’s “Prince” and Hobbes’ “Leviathan,” and how 
they blossomed in the late 1930s and 1940s as a reaction to the -until that time- 
prevailing “idealism” (Bull, 2000: 60). Realism emphasizes the anarchical nature of 
the international system which refers to the lack of an authority capable of 
arranging relations among nations (see Waltz, 1979: 102-128; Donelly, 2000: 81-
106). Realist theory of international relations includes three separate schools of 
thought: 1) classical realism, which is based on the work of Morgenthau (1985) and 
Carr (see Carr and Cox, 2001: 97; Vasquez, 1998: 35), 2) structural realism, 
introduced in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) and, 3) neoclassical 
realism, which was initially identified by Rose (1998), and introduced the role of 
domestic politics in international relations (for instance see Scheller, 2006; 
Christensen, 1997). 
According to Realists, states’ actions are always aiming at the protection of 
their national interests. These interests are defined in terms of power and are 
unaffected by time and space, while their protection is freed from moral restrains 
(see Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, 1985: 4-17). In turn, Waltz 
added that the decisive independent variable, as far as relations among states are 
concerned, is the structure of the international system, meaning its anarchical nature 
and the distribution of capabilities among its units (Waltz, 1998; Waltz, 1990: 29-
30). Under these given conditions, Realists have distinguished two practices that 
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states must follow, the first one is balancing, which involves two or more states 
aligning in order to balance a threat from another state or group of states. The 
second one is band-wagoning, which refers to alignment with the source of threat 
(on balance of power within the realist school see Nicholson, 1998; Walt, 1997). 
The realist approach to international relations provides possible 
explanations on why rapprochement between two states might succeed or fail. 
Realism, for instance, suggests that if the balance of power changes in a way that 
does not favor the improvement of relations between parties going through a 
rapprochement process, then the chances for failure increase as these states will try 
and find different alliances in order to protect their interests better. As states have 
high incentives to sustain their integrity, independence, and national security, the 
success or failure of a rapprochement process depends on how well it serves these 
incentives. 
 
2.5.1.2. Liberalism and the Study of Rapprochement    
Liberal theories of international relations have their roots in the preaching of 
the Enlightenment, which spreads faith in humans to progress and improve based in 
their capacity. As far as political developments are concerned, democratization and 
the spread of liberal values are understood as the main vehicles towards the 
achievement of a world peace, especially by certain political thinkers such as 
Rousseau, Locke, and particularly Kant. Concerning the realm of economics, since 
the 17th Century liberal economists and thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Jeremy 
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Bentham, supported that free international trade and market capitalism would 
eliminate wars, as most wars were fought in order for states to achieve their 
mercantilist goals (on the evolution of the liberal thinking see Burchill, 1996; 
Zacher and Matthew, 1995). Currently there are two main theoretical approaches 
building on the Kantian approach to international politics; liberal international 
relations theory, and neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism. 
Liberal theorists have highlighted the importance of actors, the interaction 
between state and non-state actors, and the idea that state preferences are the 
outcome of such interactions (for a summary of main liberal assumptions see 
Slaughter, 1985: 508; Moravcik, 1997). Perhaps one of the most significant theories 
within liberalism has been the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which argues that 
liberal democracies do not engage in war amongst themselves. The DPT can be 
traced back to Kant, but its modern variant is based on the work of several scholars 
such as Doyle (1983, 1986, and 1995) and Russett (1993). Although in practice, 
quantitative studies have supported the DPT claims (see for instance Maoz and 
Russett, 1993; Oneal and Ray, 1997) realist scholars have raised significant 
methodological and theoretical concerns (see for instance Layne, 1994; 
Mearsheimer 1990; Rosato, 2003). 
Neoliberals, on the other hand, have stressed the role of institutions in the 
international arena. Indeed, the role of the institutions is so central to the neoliberal 
view that sometimes the approach is referred to as liberal institutionalism3. 
                                                         
3 In essence liberal institutionalism is one of the four main branches of liberal internationalism, the 
other three being structural liberalism, liberal reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism (see McGrew, 
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Institutions are presumed to contribute to the international system by bringing a 
degree of safety and certainty as far as contacts among states are concerned. In 
essence institutions reduce the costs of making and enforcing agreements 
(Keohane, 1998; Nau, 2007; for a six-fold account of institutions’ functionality in 
shaping international behavior see also Keohane and Hoffman, 1993)4. 
Furthermore, international interdependence –referring to situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries resulting 
from the international flows of money, goods, people and messages– has also been 
central to neoliberal thought (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 8-9; also see Keohane & Nye, 
1988; Keohane & Nye, 1998). Neoliberals suggest that interdependence increases 
the complexity of the system and imposes higher costs to the actions of states or 
non-state actors (Keohane & Nye, 1998: 730). In general, institutions and 
interdependence together alter the assumptions of the realists’ ‘game models’ by 
influencing three important levels of the ‘game:’ 1) the payoff structure5, 2) 
“shadow of the future”, in other words the way institutions tend to extend the 
governments’ expectations of the effects of their current actions in future issues, 
and 3) the number of actors, meaning the number of “players” and how their 
relationship is structured. (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Axelrod & Keohane, 1986).    
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2002).  
4 Assumptions deriving by post-Cold War Europe 
5 In a typical realist game such as Prisoner’s Dilemma the payoff structure suggests that the cost of 
defection (D) is always lower than the cost of cooperation (C), so that DC>CC>DD>CD. However, 
liberalists suggest that this payoff structure is not typical in world politics and that strong institutions 
and interdependence make cooperative games possible. 
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As far as the success or failure of the rapprochement is concerned, the 
neoliberal assumptions, that interdependence and institutions increase incentives for 
cooperation, become very relevant. Without doubt, if during the rapprochement 
process interdependence between the parties increase, then the motivation for 
continuing the rapprochement also increases. Similarly, strong institutions reduce 
security dilemmas, which is typical in all realist games, and, hence, make steps for 
solidifying the rapprochement process less risky for the involved states. These two 
assumptions will be further discussed in the following pages, where the possibility 
that they can all fit in an all-inclusive cost-benefit variable will be examined.  
 
2.5.1.3. Constructivism and the Study of Rapprochement 
Constructivism involves a “sociological social psychological form of 
systemic theory of international politics in which the identities and the interests are 
the dependent variable” (Wendt, 1992: 394). In essence, constructivism is adding to 
what the Neoliberals and the Neorealists seem to have ignored; “the content and 
sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998: 
324). According to Kolodziej (2005:261): 
Constructivists claim to explain or at least provide provisional evidence to 
show how political actors –you, me, states, political parties, international 
organizations, et al.–   acquire their identities and, more pointedly, how 
these identities generate the material and non-material interests of those 
actors.  
  
As identities are socially constructed, the interests and behaviors of political 
agents are also dependent upon the contextual interpretation of the world. 
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Rationality, it follows, is not objective, but rather depends “on collective human 
enterprises and interactions” (Adler, 1997: 329). As one of the most important 
scholars of this approach pointed out, “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 
1992; on constructivism see also Hopf, 1998). 
Rapprochement scholars who follow a constructivist approach have mainly 
looked at the process of rapprochement by adopting a more or less historical 
analysis. The focus of their interest is to examine how perceptions and interests 
change over time and how this change increases/decreases the likelihood of 
rapprochement. The most important research of a rapprochement case in the 
constructivist tradition is Evelyn Goh’s work on the United States’ rapprochement 
with China, from circa 1961 to 1974 (Goh: 2005). Goh starts with a brief discussion 
on “conventional” approaches to rapprochement, and criticizes them not only for 
failing to answer the “how” questions, but also for lacking historical context. Goh 
supports that according to the premises of the rationalist and structural approaches, 
the rapprochement between the US and China should have happened immediately 
after the breaking of the Sino-Soviet relations, which was obvious, since 1962. 
Goh’s research shows how important the Constructivists’ ideas are for the 
current study. As Turkish and Greek peoples shared the same land for centuries, 
fought each other many times and have gained their independence from each other; 
issues of identity, enmity, mistrust, negative images and historical traumas are 
potential threats to the success of a rapprochement process, by hindering its smooth 
progress. 
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 Another useful insight from the constructivist school to the study of 
rapprochement is the notion of security communities. A security community is a 
group of nations6 positively identifying with the welfare of one another as such that 
one perceives the other party as a cognitive extension of the Self rather than an 
independent being (see Wendt 1994). In such situations, “the other is seen as a 
cognitive extension of the self rather than independent” (on security communities 
see also Bellamy, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998). If the rapprochement reaches one 
such level of cooperation, then a kind of collective or subordinate identity is created 
which transcends structural limitations. Such collective identity can deepen a 
rapprochement process and make it a successful one.    
 
 2.6. Theoretical Framework and the Variables 
 The discussion of the main theories that explain state behavior and states’ 
actions are useful in providing a general theoretical framework within which the 
independent variables for the current study are based upon. Issues such as the 
protection of national security and sovereignty, interdependence between the two 
states, or the construction of new state identities and interests are relevant for this 
study. 
Although the discussion on the IR theories has provided a good idea of what 
kind of independent variables are relevant to the research question, it is obvious that 
in order for a rapprochement process to succeed the incentives suggested by IR 
                                                         
6 The sentence refers to International Relations and a “group” can either be bilateral, regional or 
global 
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theories are, most likely, not enough. The ways in which the rapprochement is 
developing are also significant factors that could determine the success or failure of 
the process. The analysis of the process is concerned with issues that are largely left 
untouched by the IR theories. As such, motivations and obstacles, which are 
relevant to the process, are, in essence, complementary to those that have already 
been discussed and are relevant to the IR theories. In the following pages, I 
examine these process-related variables in detail.  
The evolution of the rapprochement process itself is a decisive factor 
determining its success or failure. A rapprochement that goes deeper as the time 
goes by is more likely to become a successful case. This is because positive 
developments will provide further momentum and motivation for the continuation 
of the process, while overcoming the possible obstacles will become easier. On the 
other hand, when relations remain superficial after the initiation of the 
rapprochement and decisive steps are not taken, it is likely that the initial 
momentum will be lost and eventually the process will die out.   
An important question that immediately emerges is, what “deep 
rapprochement” means, or, in other words, which factors determine the “depth” of a 
rapprochement process. In order to answer this question the indicators for 
rapprochement that were proposed earlier in this chapter will be used. These are: 1) 
summit-level meetings, 2) agreements signed, 3) military cooperation, 4) economic 
cooperation, 5) positive gestures or statements, and 6) grassroots level participation 
in the process. All of these indicators are expected to be part of a rapprochement 
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process; however, their degree of importance for the process varies. In some cases 
meetings between high-ranking officials are the main point of focus, in others, 
priority is given to economic cooperation and the improvement of financial affairs. 
In cases of rapprochement whereby progress is observed in most of these areas, if 
not all, the likelihood of success increases.  
 Another important factor influencing the success or failure of the 
rapprochement process is the occurrences of unexpected events, which are relevant 
to the rapprochement process or which are not directly linked to the rapprochement 
process but influence it nonetheless. The use of the term “unexpected events” is 
quite vague and, indeed, can be used to describe a large spectrum of incidents—be 
it the death of a leader, a cataclysmic natural phenomenon, the emergence of a new 
controversial issue, or an unexpected “hot” episode. In the field, a high importance 
is given to the existence of crises that increase the cost of maintaining hostile 
relations and eventually leads to the rapprochement initiation.  
The important role of such unforeseen events is also highlighted in Rock’s 
work wherein unexpected and unplanned catalytic events play a role in the 
initiation of rapprochement; an idea that has also been raised by other scholars. 
These kinds of events could have an impact on two levels: the policy makers and 
the society. As far as policy makers are concerned, a catalytic event disturbs either 
the power balance or the cost/benefit balance, creating new conditions that require 
the adoption of new policies. What is more interesting, however, is the impact of 
such events on the society.  
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Finally, as far as the process is concerned, it is important to examine how 
the issues between Greece and Turkey are negotiated during the rapprochement. 
The question of how negotiations between the two sides are made and how they 
influence the initiation of the rapprochement is introduced by Armstrong. However, 
as the initiation of the rapprochement rarely means that a solution to the problem 
has been reached, it is likely that negotiations between the parties entering a 
rapprochement continue after the initiation of the process.  
 
2.7. Choosing the Variables  
It is important to make a clear distinction between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. The dependent variable for this study is successful and 
unsuccessful rapprochement. Independent variables can be understood as all those 
factors that influence the success of a rapprochement. Rephrased otherwise, 
independent variables are key as to whether, or not, a rapprochement will be 
successful. Each theoretical approach to the study of rapprochement comes up with 
a peculiar way of designating independent variables, which have already been 
discussed in this thesis next to those specific independent variables that were put in 
place by, especially, Armstrong’s and Rock’s work on rapprochement.  
In the following pages, the analysis will focus on organizing the frame of 
the discussion by appointing eight well-defined independent variables, which, in 
return, will be employed to examine various case studies under consideration. 
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• The impact of the international system on national security 
Even though it is mainly Realists that are pre-occupied with highlighting the 
importance of national security for a state’s mode of action, national security is in 
fact constitutive of all other IR theories, as well. The study of the rapprochement is, 
too, related to this topic as that, arguably, if the international system and national 
security concerns dictate further cooperation between two states, then a 
rapprochement is more likely to occur. However, for the reason that the current 
study is concerned with the success or failure of the rapprochement process, rather 
than its initiation, just stated argument must be adjusted accordingly. Therefore the 
question is: in what way do changes in international systems affect the 
rapprochement process? 
In order to answer this question it first must be made clear that changes in 
international system can only be either favorable or unfavorable to the 
rapprochement process. Here favorable is to mean that changes create such 
conditions in which the continuation of the rapprochement becomes more essential 
to the parties’ pursue of satisfying their national security needs. The emergence of a 
third-party state with a threatening posture to the security of both states engaging in 
a rapprochement process is a good example of such a change. Unfavorable changes 
are then those events that offer counter motives for the continuation of the 
rapprochement process, such as the elimination of a common threat.  
The proposition that can be made for national security is, the likelihood for 
success increases as long as changes in international system are favorable to the 
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rapprochement process, while the likelihood for failure increases when changes are 
unfavorable to the rapprochement process. 
 
• State identity 
The short discussion on constructivism earlier in this chapter made it clear 
that, according to constructivists, notions such as national security or international 
structure are only meaningful when seen as part of a wider normative and cultural 
context. Even the most advantageous structural or systemic conditions may not be 
enough if both of the two states in rapprochement don’t develop a new identity that 
will allow them to see one another, not as a continuous possible threat, but, instead, 
as a possible long-lasting ally. In Hopf’s words (1998),  
The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions. A state 
understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while 
simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. 
The issue of state identity is very relevant for the current study as it involves 
two states, or more precisely two peoples, with a long and predominantly non-
cooperative past. As such, putting aside old hatred, negative images, irredentism, 
mistrust and suspicion, and creating new state identities for both Turkey and Greece 
towards a mutually cooperative scheme, is expected to increase the likelihood of a 
successful rapprochement. On the contrary, if old identities persist even after the 
initiation of the rapprochement process, then the likelihood of a successful 
rapprochement decreases. 
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• Costs and benefits equilibrium 
One of the main points discussed in the literature review was that 
rapprochement is far from being a one-dimensional process. Rather it influences all 
levels of the society and impacts its various sections. What can be inferred from 
this assumption is that the political decision to further on, or abandon, a process of 
rapprochement is not to be taken lightly. Instead there are a number of issues to be 
considered concerning the negative and positive effects of this decision.  
The decision to continue the rapprochement process or terminate it bears 
some costs and benefits. Thus, it is the balance between these costs and benefits 
that influence the success or failure of rapprochement. For instance, political cost 
due to public opinion’s disapproval of the rapprochement process can co-exist with 
significant benefits gained from trading agreements as a result of the same 
rapprochement process. 
As the balance between the costs and benefits influences the incentives for 
the continuation of rapprochement, it is only safe to assume that the likelihood of a 
successful rapprochement increases insomuch as that the benefits outnumber or 
outweigh the costs during the process. On the contrary, the likelihood of keeping 
with the rapprochement process decreases if perceived costs prevail over benefits. 
 
• Interdependence 
The role of interdependence in international relations is mainly emphasized 
by liberal institutionalists. Even though there is no universally agreed definition of 
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interdependence (Rosecrance & Stein, 1973; Kroll 1993), interdependence is 
closely linked to the theme of interstate cooperation and peace. De Vries (1990: 
429) explains this correlation by highlighting three different explanations, a) 
interdependent nations are more likely to take each other’s interests into 
consideration, b) as the international system becomes more structured, interests are 
increasingly affected by conflict, and c) interdependent nations recognize the 
consequences of their actions for other states, and of other states’ actions to their 
own interests.  
As far as the current study is concerned, interdependence should be 
understood as creating strong economic, trade, and military bonds. The question is 
whether interdependence influences the successful or unsuccessful outcome of the 
rapprochement. Based on the literature it is expected that high interdependence 
between Turkey and Greece would increase the likelihood of a successful 
rapprochement, while in other cases where interdependence remains low the 
likelihood of a successful rapprochement decreases.   
 
• Leadership 
Although it is widely acknowledged that rapprochement can affect all levels 
of the body politic and the society, it is most of the time a top-down process 
initiated by political leaders. It is therefore only logical to wonder how the leaders’ 
attitude and actions cause variations in the dependent variable. The incentive to 
look into the role of the leaders in the success or failure of the rapprochement is 
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also amplified by the liberal and constructivist positions on the potential role of 
leadership and agency in international relations.  
The main issues that matter to the current study are the specific actions of 
the Greek and Turkish leaders, as well as their overall support for the process. Did 
they support the process and how did this affect the outcome of the rapprochement? 
What were the leaders’ actions that helped the rapprochement? Were such actions 
vital to the continuation of the rapprochement? It must be made clear that leaders’ 
actions are not always supportive of the process’ continuation. Hence, leaders’ 
actions that constitute an obstacle to the continuation of the rapprochement process 
must be identified and underlined as well.   
 
• Depth of the process 
How the pace and depth of a rapprochement process impacts the outcome 
was discussed earlier in this chapter. In short, as the process becomes deeper, the 
possibility of a successful rapprochement increases, if the process remains 
superficial the likelihood of unsuccessful rapprochement rises. In order to measure 
the “depth” of the rapprochement process, each of the case study chapters will 
include information for each of the rapprochement indicators; summit level 
meetings, agreement signed, military cooperation, economic cooperation, 
statements/gestures, impact on societal level. In addition, a table will be included in 
each case study chapter to demonstrate the frequency of each indicator and its 
importance in the rapprochement process.  
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• Turning points 
Turning points is a term used in conflict resolution in order to describe “an 
event or processes that mark passages from one stage (of the negotiation) to the 
next, signaling processes from earlier to later processes” (Druckman, 1999: 92). 
Although Daniel Druckman conceptualizes the term “turning points” to describe 
and analyze the negotiation process, turning points have been used to describe 
fluctuations in the relations amongst states (see for instance Gazit, 1998), and we 
believe that they could influence the process and outcome of a rapprochement. 
After all, even though there is a partial agreement among scholars on the definition 
of turning points, there seems to be less agreement on the operationalization of the 
term (for a comparative study of 34 cases of international negotiation, as well as for 
examples of turning points see Druckman, 2001). In general, we can distinguish 
between two types of turning points: 
the ones that occur after a period of no progress and those that occur after 
the threat to the sustenance of the talks…Both types of turning points are 
inflections in a trend, or “upturns” that represent either sudden progress or a 
return to a period of stability (Druckman, 1986: 333).  
As for the current study, turning points will be treated as independent 
variables that include those unexpected incidents or events that have a shocking 
effect on the rapprochement process. This effect can either be positive or negative. 
An event is considered as “positive” when it increases the motivation for the 
continuation of the rapprochement process, creates better conditions in order for the 
process to deepen, pushes public opinion or policy makers forward to engage in the 
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rapprochement process. On the contrary, an incident is considered “negative” when, 
and if, it retards the viability of the rapprochement process.  
Overall, the expected impact of turning points on the rapprochement process 
is, on the one hand, to favor the continuation of the process if they are positive, and, 
on the other hand, to limit the prospects for rapprochement’s success if they are 
negative.    
 
• The GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction) 
strategy 
 The idea that a GRIT based strategy could increase the likelihood of 
successful rapprochement has already been put forth by Armstrong (1993). 
According to Lindskold, & Collins (1978: 679): 
Osgood’s GRIT strategy is a program for achieving tension reduction, 
managing conflict, and bringing about mutual beneficial cooperation. Grit is 
an acronym for Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension 
Reduction, and was proposed as a means for reducing the possibility that the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would become 
hot…[However] the strategies one which appears useful in conflicts of 
lesser magnitude.  
GRIT strategy pays heed to the importance of a series of small steps that a 
nation takes under the limitations of its defined security for the purpose of easing 
tension and, also, for eliciting reciprocity from the other state. If the first stage of 
reciprocity is obtained: then the margins for risk-taking behavior widen, and larger 
steps can be taken (Druckman, 1990: 555). In practice the literature shows that the 
GRIT-based strategies are effective, not only because the initiator is cooperative or 
because there is some tit-for-tat responsiveness…[but also because] it makes 
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explicit, through communication the interdependency of the two parties in the 
pursuit of their long-range interest, and makes the trustworthiness of the initiator 
highly credible (Lindskold, Walters & Koutsouris, 1983: 522). 
Apart from the independent variables there are also control variables, which 
are constant in all four cases and, thus, cannot account for the variation in the 
dependent variable. These are: 
• Parties: All four cases are concerned only with the Greek – Turkish 
conflict and, as such, the parties involved are only Turkey and Greece for all the 
selected cases.  
• Conflict issues: Although small variations might exist, in general, the 
problems between the parties either issue from security, territory, minority issues or 
a combination of these. 
• Regime type: As the regime status of either Turkey or Greece did not 
change during any of the rapprochement periods examined in this study, democratic 
peace can be considered a control variable.   
 
2.8. Concluding Remarks    
The current chapter’s first goal was to create a concrete definition of the 
term “rapprochement” by placing it on the grounds of past researches on 
rapprochement cases around the globe. In addition, a clear-cut distinction was made 
between what constitutes a successful or failed rapprochement. The discussion on 
these two points—what is a rapprochement and what makes it successful endeavor, 
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was necessary so as to clarify the two main concepts included in the research 
question. The definitions and clarifications provided in the first part of this chapter 
will serve as a reference point for the rest of the study, and especially at the 
assessment and case selection parts. 
The second part of the chapter focused on a discussion on the independent 
variables and examined how the issue of rapprochement has been approached so far 
in the literature. Two main approaches have been identified, the first one being the 
domination of IR theory on the study of rapprochement, and the second, the 
importance given to the process as a leading factor determining the initiation, or the 
absence of, a rapprochement process. Both of these approaches were discussed, 
followed by a discussion on how their assumptions can be altered in order to be 
able to answer the research question of the current study. The chapter was 
concluded with the presentation of the independent variables that will be tested in 
the current study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
One of the most important principles of scientific research is that it ought to 
make its procedures public (Collier, Seawright  & Munck, 2010: 34). Indeed, a 
scholar has to make his research design known so that the readers are able to “judge 
the quality of the research and the plausibility of its conclusions” (p.35). The 
objective of this chapter is to present the methodology that the current research uses 
and to discuss the rationale for choosing the research design. The discussion is 
about how to collect and then analyze data, how to choose case studies, and what 
the independent variables are.  
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3.2. Research Strategy 
In order to answer the research question the current work analyzes and 
compares two successful and two unsuccessful cases of rapprochement. The first 
step is to explain what might constitute a “case”. Overall, a case can be any of the 
following phenomena:, such as wars, social movements, peacekeeping operations, 
revolutions, and so on. One of the most comprehensive definitions of what 
constitutes a “case” is provided by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. 
According to George and Bennett (2005: 17-18) a case can be defined as: 
an instance of a class of events. The term ”class of events” refers here to a 
phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of 
governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that 
the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory 
regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances of that 
class of events. 
A case study is an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units (Gerring, 2004: 342). In general, case 
studies are considered by many scholars as weak means of research because of the 
difficulties in relation to generalizing findings and contributing significantly to the 
scientific dialogue (concerning this debate and a defense of case study research see 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). Nonetheless, it is an undeniable fact that some of the most 
important works in political science have adopted case studies as their main 
research strategy (such as Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, and Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions).  
According to Yin (2003: 1) case studies are the preferred strategy when 
“how” and “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
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over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context. The above statement is also true for the current research because 
the research question can be formulated as a “why” question (why some 
rapprochement efforts fail while others succeed). In addition, according to Barnett 
and Elman (2007: 171), qualitative research and especially case studies have gained 
wide popularity in the IR research and its subfields because they: 
often involve interaction effects among many structural and agent-based 
variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large numbers 
of actors across multiple levels of analysis with private information and 
strong incentives to bluff or deceive other actors. 
  
3.3. Research Design 
One of the most difficult problems in qualitative comparative studies is to 
establish causality. Political scientists have developed different strategies to tackle 
this methodological problem. However, it still seems that most of the proposed 
alternatives are based on Mill’s ideas on the method of agreement and the method 
of disagreement (for a presentation of these methods see Ragin, 1987: 36-42 & 
Skocpol 1984: 73-80), or, as they are usually referred to as the Most Similar 
Systems Design (MSS) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDS) (see 
Przeworski and Teune, 1970). There are two problems to be solved with both MSS 
and MDS research designs.  
To begin with, it is not an easy task to find cases that are similar in every 
aspect but their dependent variable and only one of the independent variables and 
vice-versa. The focused research question forces very specific limitations on the 
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case selection, thus, there are only a limited number of cases that could fit in those 
limitations. Moreover, when small number of cases is coupled with large number of 
independent variables, as is the case for the current study, the impact of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable is very difficult to configure. In 
order to overcome these difficulties the present study will employ two different, yet 
mutually complementary, strategies (on the ways to overcome these difficulties see 
also Lijphart, 1971 and Lijphart 1975). The first is the structured-focused 
comparison and the second is process training.  
 
3.4. Structured-focused Case Comparison 
Structured-focused method, originally proposed by Alexander George 
(1979), is an alternative way to organizing comparative case studies. According to 
George and Bennett (2005: 69): 
The method and logic of structured focused comparison is simple and 
straightforward. The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes 
general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions 
are asked for each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, 
thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of 
the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals with certain 
aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and 
focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by 
additional cases. 
Building upon the previous works of Alexander George and his colleagues, 
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) identified six separate steps that a structured-focused 
case comparison must follow. These six steps were offered as guidelines to those 
researchers that purport to conduct comparative case studies in their respective 
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fields, ranging from politics to psychology, and to political psychology. The first 
step (p. 378) concerns the selection of the research question. In structured-focused 
case comparison, it is essential to develop a focused research question, which in 
turn will help a researcher identify the most important variables as means of 
avoiding the possibility of including too many independent variables (see also 
Lijphart, 1971). 
The second step according to Kaarbo and Beasley (p. 379) is to identify 
variables according to the literature. For the current study, the task of configuring 
those independent variables that are more relevant to the question of successful or 
unsuccessful rapprochement was undertaken in the literature review chapter, 
wherein a number of factors that possibly influence the outcome of a 
rapprochement process were introduced. In addition, Kaarbo and Beasley suggest 
that a “…researcher should also make explicit which of the variables to be 
investigated are hypothesized to be most important for explaining the 
phenomenon.” As the most important and difficult part of the research, the 
discussion on the independent variables should also include a type of hierarchy—if 
only such is possible based on the existing literature.  
The third step of structured-focused comparison is the selection of cases, 
which is (p. 379). Kaarbo and Beasley further divided this step into three separate 
tasks that have to be fulfilled by the researcher. Firstly the selected cases must be 
comparable, at least on those parameters that are relevant to the study. Secondly, the 
cases should have a variation in the dependent variable, because otherwise “the 
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researcher cannot make any causal inference about the phenomenon because the 
same explanatory variables may be present in cases in which the phenomenon is 
absent” (p. 380). Finally, the last step in case selection is to use cases across 
population subgroups. This task is not presented as obligatory; however, it can be 
useful depending on the goals of the researcher concerning the explanatory power of 
his study. 
The fourth task is to operationalize the variables and construct a case 
codebook. The operationalization of the variables is a powerful tool as it helps the 
researcher identify the data useful to the study. The operationalization is necessary 
for both the independent and the dependent variables. As far as the current study is 
concerned, the operationalization of the dependent variable was undertaken in the 
literature review chapter, while the coding of the independent variables will be 
discussed later in the present chapter. 
Step five concerns the way each case should be written. According to 
Kaarbo and Keasley, the narrative is the most commonly used practice among 
researchers in their case studies, however, the presentation of data in coded form, 
such as a table, also constitutes a powerful tool for case demonstration. In the 
current study the narrative of the four case studies is presented in such a way that 
the empirical data is linked to the theoretical data. In addition, several tables are also 
included which summarize, in a coded manner, the main points of each case study. 
The final step refers to the comparison of the case studies. The main goal of 
the comparison is to identify patterns and processes across the cases (p. 386), and 
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thus, make assumptions on the explanatory power of each of the independent 
variables. Furthermore, once the initial assessment of the theoretical implication is 
made, the case study analyst may want to "return" to the cases to investigate 
candidate explanations for the relationships discovered. In other words, certain 
interpretations arising from the initial conclusions can often be discounted or 
suggested by analyzing the "extra" material included in the case studies (p. 387). 
  
3.5. Process Tracing 
Even if studies that examine a limited number of cases have the 
inefficiencies mentioned earlier, the small-n7 opens the prospect to the researcher to 
make a much more in-depth analysis of the cases; in essence it allows the researcher 
to perform a within-case analysis. A within-case analysis has been proposed as a 
powerful tool that increases the viability of the small-n analysis (Collier as cited in 
George, 2005: 179). George (2005) differentiates between two different types of 
within-case analyses, namely the congruence method (i.e. starting with a theory and 
then assess its ability to explain the outcome in a specific case) and the process-
tracing method. The proposed research will be using the process-tracing method in 
order to answer the research question.  
The main idea behind the process-tracing method is that the researcher tries 
to find the course of actions and events that occurred and led to a specific outcome, 
whilst he tries to examine and explain how the narrative he provides links the 
                                                         
7 N here refers to the number of cases 
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outcome with the process (for a discussion on process tracing methodology see also 
Bennett and Elman, 2006: 459-460). As Alexander George (2005: 207&215) puts it: 
Process-tracing forces the investigator…to consider the alternative paths 
that are consistent with the outcome and the process-tracing evidence in a 
single case. In more cases, the investigator can begin to chart the repertoire 
of causal paths that lead to a given outcome and the conditions under which 
they occur – that is to develop a typological theory…Process-tracing can 
identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out variables that 
were otherwise left out of the initial comparison of cases, check for 
spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases. 
 
Another account of how process-tracing works is provided by Bates et al.8 
(1998) who suggest that modeling the processes that produce specific outcomes can 
be helpful in capturing the essence of the narratives. Although their approach is 
basically actor-centric (i.e. examining narratives from rational-choice perspective), 
the idea of “identifying actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they 
made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated 
events and outcomes” (Bates et al, 2005 : 13-14), could also be said about process-
tracing methodology. 
Furthermore, process-tracing will help acquiring high levels of internal and 
external validity. Simply put “internal validity is when the hypothesized 
independent variable alone affects the dependent variable. Variables other than the 
treatment that affect the dependent variable are threats to internal validity” 
(Neuman, 2006: 259). Therefore, internal validity is achieved when the researcher 
has eliminated all the potential independent variables that could be affecting the 
                                                         
8 Bates et al. call their methodology “analytic narratives”, however their methodology is different 
from process-tracing only in the sense that it focuses on the logic of the processes that generate 
different phenomena by using rational choice theory.   
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dependent variable, and tests only the independent variable or variables whose 
causal effect on the dependent variables he tries to establish. 
Internal validity is difficult to establish as it is threatened by a number of 
factors (for lists of potential threats see Cook and Campbell, 1979). Various 
experimental methodologies have traditionally been seen as the best methodological 
alternative in order to overcome internal validity concerns (see Gerring, 2007: 151-
171), and usually the issue of internal and external validity is addressed together 
with experimental designs in methodology textbooks (see for example Druckman, 
2005 and Neuman, 2006). Nonetheless, although internal validity is an integral part 
of every scientific research, there are cases, as for example the current research, to 
which experimental designs cannot be applied. 
Internal validity is especially difficult to establish in case studies due to the 
many confounding causal factors that might exist, which cannot be eliminated by a 
pure research design or by quantitative techniques (Gerring, 2007: 172). Thus, how 
to establish internal validity in a case study becomes a complicated issue. To begin 
with, the process-tracing method itself ensures a high level of internal validity as it 
allows the gathering of a wide range of observations. These observations can be 
used in order to construct a consistent train of thought that could ideally establish a 
strong link between the cause and the outcome. However, Gerring proposes two 
more preconditions that make internal validity process-tracing achievable. As he 
puts it: 
Process-tracing is convincing insofar as the multiple links in a causal chain 
can be formalized, that is, diagrammed in an explicit way (as a visual 
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depiction and/or a mathematical model) and insofar as each micro-
mechanism can be proven (Gerring, 2007: 181). 
Hence, it is of vital importance not only to uncover the processes that lead to 
a specific outcome, but also to explain how these processes interact with one 
another and how one leads to the other.  
  
3.6. Research Question  
This chapter will follow Kaarbo and Beasley’s first three steps for 
conducting a structure-focused case comparison.9 The first task is to discuss the 
research question. The RQ of the current study is: “What are the preconditions for 
successful rapprochement?” It has already been apparent from the literature review 
that this research focuses more on the variables that are connected to the 
assumptions of some basic IR theories and, also, some important variables that 
concern the process of rapprochement and have attracted the interest of scholars 
who study the phenomenon of the rapprochement.  
 
3.7. Selection of Cases 
The third step according to Kaarbo and Beasley, is the selection of cases. 
The selection of the cases should not be random, but instead, it should serve a 
specific purpose within the overall scope of the inquiry (Yin, 2003: 47). The 
question of how to select the best cases has troubled many scholars and, indeed, 
                                                         
9 Fourth step was part of the discussion in the literature review chapter, while steps five and six 
concern the writing of the case studies 
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there are a number of different techniques for case selection as far as qualitative and 
quantitative studies are concerned (for instance see Bennett and Elman, 2007; 
Searight and Gerring, 2008). In general, small-n, qualitative studies, such as the 
current study, have been accused of not being able to provide causal explanations 
due to the case selection being made based on the dependent variable; yet, several 
responses to this concern have been provided by varying qualitative researches (for 
a more analytical overview of this debate see Mahoney, 2007; moreover, on 
selection bias see in qualitative research see Collier & Mahoney, 1996). 
Keeping in line with George and Bennett’s definition of a case, as well as, 
keeping with Kaarbo and Beasly’s directions for case selections in a structure-
focused case comparison10, the “case of event” for the current study is 
rapprochement. In total four different cases of rapprochement are discussed and 
compared. All four cases concern the Greek-Turkish relations (for a detailed account 
of the problems between Greece and Turkey see Bolukbasi, 2004; Theodoropoulos, 
1995). Two of these cases concern successful rapprochement outcomes and the 
other two concern unsuccessful rapprochement outcomes.  
The two successful cases are the 1930s Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
covering roughly the period from June 1930 to the emergence of the Second World 
War, and the last Greek-Turkish rapprochement which started in 1999. The two 
unsuccessful cases are the 1950 rapprochement, which abruptly ended in September 
1955, and the short lived Davos case of 1987. 
                                                         
10 Meaning that cases should be comparable and there should be a differentiation on the dependent 
variable. 
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3.8. Creation of Codebook 
Much about the independent and dependent variables were discussed in the 
literature review chapter, where a detailed operationalization of the dependent and 
independent variables was carried out. The next step is the construction of a 
codebook that will explain exactly which pieces of information the study must 
include and what indicators are used to define the variables. The current study uses 
Kaarbo as a model (1996: 516-517). 
 
Table 3.1. 
 
Codebook Summary 
Variables Coding Categories Questions/Indicators 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Successful 
rapprochement 
Successful/unsucces
sful 
What was the duration of 
the process? 
If the rapprochement 
continues for 10 years after 
the initiation of the 
rapprochement then 
successful if not then 
unsuccessful 
Independent 
Variables     
1.  Impact of the 
international 
system on national 
security 
Favorable/non-
favorable  
Does the international 
system continue to provide 
motivations for 
cooperation? Changes in the 
system, existence of 
common threats, threats 
from revisionist powers 
 
2. State identity Cooperative/non-cooperative  
Does a new state identity 
that does not hinder 
cooperation develop?/ 
Existence of enemy images, 
stereotypes, changes in 
perceptions security 
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communities 
 
3. Costs and 
benefits 
equilibrium 
 Benefits>costs/ 
Costs>benefits 
Does the balance between 
benefits and costs provide 
motives rapprochement 
process?/Bilateral issues, 
minorities, political costs 
4. Interdependence  High/low 
 
Does high interdependence 
develop after the initiation 
of the rapprochement?/ 
Economic diplomatic and 
political partnerships 
 
5. Leadership  Supportive/non-supportive 
What were the specific 
action from politicians that 
contributed to the 
continuation or the collapse 
of the process/Speeches, 
letters, gestures 
 
6. Depth of the 
process  Deep/superficial 
How much were the 
rapprochement process 
indicators influenced by the 
process?/frequency and 
importance of summit level 
meetings, military 
cooperation, agreements 
signed etc 
 
7. Turning points  Yes/no 
Were there any important 
events that influenced the 
course of the rapprochement 
process/Natural disasters, 
unexpected international 
problems, other 
unanticipated phenomena 
that impact the 
rapprochement  
8. GRIT strategy  Yes/no 
Did the parties use GRIT 
strategy during their vis-à-
vis negotiations?/small 
steps aiming at tension 
reduction 
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An important clarification on the above table regards the depth of the 
process, and specifically what the terms “frequency” and “importance” of the 
indicators mean. Frequency (coded as high/low) refers to the rate an indicator is 
present in the process compared the period before the initiation of the 
rapprochement. Low frequency refers to an indicator of the rapprochement process 
showing same or lower regularity when the pre-rapprochement period is compared 
to the period after the rapprochement. High signifies an increase in the occurrence 
of that indicator. Importance (coded as high/medium/low), refers to the extend a 
specific rapprochement indicator has been substantial to the process. If the indicator 
is prominent in the process shaping a big part of it, then its importance is valued as 
high. If the indicator has no profound manifestation over the rapprochement process 
its importance is valued as low. In the case when an indicator is only important only 
during a small part of the process, or its prominence during the process was neither 
substantial nor negligible, then its importance its coded as medium.    
 
3.9. Data Collection 
Even though the case study research is not associated exclusively with any 
type of evidence or data (see for instance Yin, 1981), there are several data 
collection tactics that have been preferred by the scholars who conduct these types 
of case studies. Yin (2012: 10) for instance identifies 6 common sources of evidence 
in case studies. These are: a) direct observations, b) interviews, c) archival records, 
d) documents, e) participant-observation, and f) physical artifacts. Similarly, 
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Eisenhardt (1989: 534) states that case studies typically use data collection methods 
such as interviews, questionnaires, observations, or a combination of these. The 
current study collects data from three different sources: namely second-hand 
literature, archives, and interviews.  
To begin with, there is an impressive volume of studies on the Greek-
Turkish relations. Indeed, the Greek-Turkish conflict, including the Cyprus 
question, has attracted much attention and a lot has been written on it, covering the 
entirety of the chronological periods that the current work is interested in. As such, 
this literature will be used in order to get information that will provide answers to 
the questions posed. Furthermore, the existing literature also includes memoirs of 
people who were the protagonists of the rapprochement process, such as, Ismail 
Cem’s book, which includes a section on the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999.  
Secondly, the current study uses a variety of historical archives. Newspaper 
articles are used to identify rapprochement indicators, such as signing of 
agreements, summit level meetings, and grassroots cooperation. In addition, the way 
the news is presented in the newspapers will provide a good source on how 
politicians, the press and people viewed the rapprochement process as it took place. 
For instance, it is important to know what type of tone the press is using in order to 
describe the rapprochement process or the kind of vocabulary political leaders use 
in order to address each other in their public statements.  
Newspapers’ archives are used for all four case studies. For the 1930s Greek-
Turkish rapprochement this research will use mainly Greek newspapers and, 
 61 
 
specifically, Athinaika Nea, Elefthero Vima, Oikonomikos Taxidromos and 
Kathimerini. All four of these newspapers have been completely digitalized. The 
first three are available on www.tovima.gr, under paid subscription and are part of 
the DOL (Lamprakis Journalistic Organization – Δηµοσιογραφικός Οργανισµός 
Λαµπράκη) Historical Archive, while the fourth is available without subscription on 
www.kathimerini.gr. The Turkish newspaper that was used as a source for the first 
case was Cumhuriyet, whose archive is available online at 
www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com under subscription. The second and third case studies 
use the same Greek newspapers, yet, it should be noted that Athinaika Nea was 
replaced by Ta Nea and Elefthero Vima was replaced by To Vima following the 
Second World War. In addition, the study also uses data from the Turkish newspaper 
Milliyet, whose archive from 1950 onwards is available on www.milliyet.com.tr. 
The fourth case study, in addition to the abovementioned newspapers, will also use 
internet based news resources such as the Hurriyet Daily News available at 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com.  
There are two main historical archives that will be reviewed. The first one is 
the Eleftherios Venizelos archive which is available online by the National Research 
Foundation’s “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” digital archive 
(http://www.venizelosarchives.gr/). The archive includes documents such as 
personal correspondence, letters, etc, which will be used in the first case study. The 
second archive is the Turkish General Directorate of State Archives (Devlet 
Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu - DAGM), which contains data concerning both the first 
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and second case studies, while for the period the third and fourth cases cover, the 
archives of DAGM remain undisclosed.    
Other than the data sources mentioned above there are additional 
supplementary sources that have been used as was needed. These include, but are 
not limited to: UN documents, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml, documents or statements published 
on the websites of the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Greek 
National AudioVisual Archive (Εθνικό Οπτικοακουστικό Αρχείο) available at 
http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/, documents of the Greek Parliament available at 
www.hellenicparliament.gr and the European Parliament available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/. 
 
3.10. Scope of Research 
The current study contributes to the understanding of a particular 
phenomenon: rapprochement. The originality of the current work is mainly due to 
its approach to the study of rapprochement, which is studied in a longitudinal 
manner rather than an instant in the relations between states. This dissertation will 
contribute to the better understanding of rapprochement, and provide convincing 
explanations on why some rapprochements fail while others succeed after initiation.   
Although the small number of cases do not allow for generalizations or 
theory building, the proposed study could constitute a building block for future 
researchers studying rapprochements processes. Moreover, the research will come 
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up with original data, and explore new directions in understanding rapprochement, 
that can be used by future scholars in order to better comprehend the cases that will 
be studied. Finally, in the following chapters the study will discuss in detail four 
separate cases of successful and unsuccessful rapprochements, and as such, the case 
studies here can be incorporated into other databases that could, for example, be 
used in a quantitative study relating to the rapprochement processes. 
 
3.11. Concluding remarks 
The main goal of the methodology chapter was, on the one hand, to provide 
a description of the main methodologies that the current study will use, and, on the 
other hand, to set the guidelines upon which the rest of the study will be based on. 
Each of the next four chapters will examine one case study, and each case study is 
structured so as a comparison concerning the independent variables, in the 
comparison chapter, is practicable.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE 1930 GREEK-TURKISH SUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The aftermath of the war in Asia Minor11 between the Greeks and the Turks 
created a new reality in the Aegean that both countries had to live with. On the one 
hand, Greece, the defeated party, had to deal with significant and massive problems 
that mainly concerned the accommodation of the refugees, a devastated economy, 
and important political issues. On the other hand, Turkey, the successor to a 
demised Empire, was a newly founded state whose leaders faced the huge task of 
reorganizing the whole of society within new, modernizing and western-oriented 
norms. Apart from their internal problems both Turkey and Greece had to redefine 
their roles and positions within the post-WWI international arena.  
The Lausanne Treaty, that the two states signed in 1923, appeared to be a 
solid basis upon which the two countries could develop a closer relationship. 
                                                         
11 Asia Minor campaign for the Greeks, War of Independence for the Turks  
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However, this was not the case. The rapprochement could only come after seven 
years, in 1930, when Greece and Turkey signed a series of agreements which laid 
the foundations for an honest and deep relation to exist. The new era of relations 
between the two countries, which started in 1930, lasted until the Second World 
War and, as such, is considered a successful case of rapprochement based on the 
guidelines that were presented in the literature review chapter. The current chapter 
examines this successful case and analyzes the underlying factors that have played 
a role in the successful outcome of the rapprochement. 
 
4.2. Historical Background 
The agreement signed in Lausanne settled issues that were of primary 
importance for both parties, such as the mapping of the borderline and the exchange 
of populations. Moreover, as it will be discussed in detail later, both countries faced 
significant problems in their internal affairs and had adopted similar foreign policy 
strategies in order to ensure the states’ integrity and security. For all these reasons, 
it is fair to say that the prevailing conditions of that time were such that an 
immediate rapprochement between the two states was highly probable and 
expected. Nevertheless, the initiation of the rapprochement did not happen until the 
end of the decade.  
The reasons that the rapprochement did not occur, in the aftermath of the 
Asia Minor war, are many. For example, the animosity that the war created and the 
sheer violence that was used by both sides, was a preventive factor to the 
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establishment of a friendship between the two states. However, these kinds of 
factors are difficult to calculate or determine. First and foremost, it is apparent that 
the problems, arising after the Lausanne’s treaty was signed, prevented the two 
countries from signing bilateral agreements. Concretely, the most important 
problem was to find a solution that would settle the issue of the properties that the 
exchanged populations had left behind, as well as the issue of the Istanbul Greeks 
that had left the city during the war. The solution of these problems became more 
difficult to solve due to the lack of a strong government in Greece. Problems 
concerning the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, as well as, the Pangalos’ 
dictatorship in Greece between 1925-6 further delayed any positive initiatives.    
The first important development in the relations between the two countries 
took place in June of 1925, after a serious deterioration in the Greek-Turkish 
relations that was caused by the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI from the 
Turkish territory on January 30, 1925 by the Turkish police (Psomiades, 1961). The 
deadlock that was created was finally resolved after Greece’s appeal to the League 
of Nations (LoN), which softened Turkey’s position on the issue. The solution, 
however, did not come from the LoN, but on the contrary, it was negotiated directly 
between Turkey and Greece. The discussions that took place ended with the 
abdication of Patriarch Constantine VI on May 26th12, and the assurance by the 
Turkish authorities that the election of a new patriarch would be made in an orderly 
and proper fashion (Psomiades, 1961).  
                                                         
12 The date that the abdication was accepted by the Turkish authorities 
 67 
 
Having solved the issue of the Patriarch, both Greece and Turkey signed the 
Ankara Accord on June 21st, 1925. The agreement stated that the 30.000 Greeks 
who fled from Istanbul, and who did not possess Turkish passports, could not return 
to Turkey. Instead, within 4 years their domains would be sold off. In return, Greece 
was granted the right to buy the Muslim domains in Western Thrace, granted that 
they were need to help cover the needs of refugees. Likewise, Turkey also reserved 
the right to buy the Greek domains located within her territory (Hatzivassiliou, 
1999: 59). After the signing of the agreement, the two counties established normal 
diplomatic relations and Cevat Bey became the first Turkish appointee to be sent to 
Greece (Gonlubol and Sar, 1966: 66).  
On December 1st, 1925 Turkey and Greece signed a new agreement in 
Athens, which replaced the one that had been signed in Ankara six months earlier. 
This agreement also granted Turkey the right to buy the Greek domains within its 
territory and Greece the right to buy the Muslim domains within its territory 
(Article 1&2) (for the full text of the agreement can be found at Benaki Museum 
Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 047 – 16)13. Nonetheless, strong 
opposition from the refugees, different interpretations and divergences as to the 
agreements’ specifics, the difficulties concerning the realization of the agreements, 
and the Pangalos’ dictatorship in Greece caused a serious deterioration in the 
Greek-Turkish relations and dissuaded the parties from the application of the 
agreements14 (see Anastasiadou, 1982; Hadjivasileiou, 1999). 
                                                         
13Available on line by the National Research Foundation “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” digital archive  
14 It should be noted that Pangalos had also objected the Lausanne Treaty 
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 In general, it is difficult to put a label on the Greek-Turkish relations 
between 1923 and 1928. It seems that both countries were willing to proceed to a 
closer relationship; but, the problems dividing them, as well as the complexity of 
these problems, blocked any efforts toward rapprochement. Anastasiadou (1982: 
13) claims that the Turks were more eager to sign a friendship agreement with 
Greece, independently from the ones that were signed in Ankara and Athens, but 
the Greeks were more reluctant as they thought that in order for a friendship 
agreement to acquire meaning, an agreement on the financial issues should be 
signed first. Such an agreement was not reached until June 1930. 
 
4.3. The Initiation of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement 
Changes in the state of affairs between two countries are not random nor do 
they happen by chance. Although chance could at times be a factor, it is usually 
international, political and domestic factors that instigate such changes. The most 
important of these factors were discussed in the literature review section, thus it is 
important to see which of these factors were also relevant for the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement in the 1930s. The current section will discuss the initiation of the 
rapprochement between Turkey and Greece by focusing on two different aspects, 
namely, the procedures that preceded its initiation and the triggers that contributed 
to its successful commencement. 
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4.4. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement 
A new era of Greek-Turkish relations was inaugurated in 1930, when a 
series of agreements between the two parties were signed in June and October, and 
contributed substantially to the improvement of bilateral relations.  The political 
will for improving bilateral relations had grown stronger since 1928 and, especially, 
after Eleftherios Venizelos’ election as the Prime Minister of Greece in August 
1928. Up to that point, and until the signing of the Ankara and Athens agreements 
in the mid-1920s, there was no progress in the Greek-Turkish relations that is worth 
mentioning.  
The change of leadership, which took place in Greece in the summer of 
1928, and more importantly, the changes of political attitudes in both Greece and 
Turkey that followed, were the most important factors that contributed to the 
initiation of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1930s. Venizelos, who had 
recently returned to politics and took over the leadership of the Liberals’ party in 
May of 1928, became a strong advocate of rapprochement. His intentions vis-à-vis 
Turkey were clarified during his pre-election speech in the city of Thessaloniki in 
July 1928, where he stated:  
I wish to repeat this evening, that Greece, honestly and without reservations, 
accepts the peace treaties through which the Great War ended. We wish to 
ensure not only good neighboring relations with democratic Turkey, but 
relations that are friendly to the greatest possible degree. We know that she 
does not have any desires for our territory, and she has to be certain that we 
don’t hold any aspiration for her territory. But [besides] it is obvious that 
both states will constitute important agents if they manage to adjust their 
relations on the basis of a warm-hearted understanding, which after all will 
allow the development of commercial and financial relations in the benefit 
of both countries….We are ready to sign an agreement of friendship and 
arbitration, which will be long-term and broad (Elefthero Vima, 23/7/1928).  
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Venizelos’ new approach regarding the Greek-Turkish affairs was a part of 
his wider foreign policy outlook. During the same speech he noted that he would 
follow similar political solutions with regards to Greece’s relations with Bulgaria, 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and with Romania, as he was looking 
for friendly relations with all these Balkan countries. 
Venizelos’ speech is important to the rapprochement process because it 
contributed significantly to the trust building process in two respects. First, he 
ended any Greek irredentist policies, otherwise known as the Megali Idea. 
Denouncing any claims for territories that were within the Turkish state’s borders 
was, indeed, a precondition for convincing Turkey about Greece’s future objectives. 
In addition, Venizelos made it known to the Turkish leadership and to the Greek 
public that Turkey had no aspirations for any of the Greek territories, and hence, 
tried to eliminate another issue that could reduce trust between the two sides. It 
should also be pointed out that, apart from its impact on the trust-building process, 
the confirmation that territorial claims were not part of the agenda eliminated an 
issue that, even though it was not for negotiation, it was a worrisome concern. 
Secondly, Venizelos expressed an optimistic view of what he perceived as a 
desirable status for the Greek-Turkish relations and took some basic steps on how 
this status could be achieved. His straightforwardness was an assurance of his 
commitment in the process and, hence, further boosted trust in the process.  
In August of 1928, Venizelos won the Greek national elections with a 
landslide victory, and it was the “first time since 1922 that Greece acquired a strong 
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government able to shoulder the responsibility of taking far-reaching decisions” 
(Alexandris, 1992: 174). The concurrent existence of both strong and pro-
cooperation governments in Turkey and Greece created a dynamic combination that 
soon resulted in landmark initiatives. Just ten days after his election, as the new 
Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu 
analyzing his intentions and explaining his prospects on the Greek-Turkish 
intentions. As he wrote: 
At the moment that the Greek people trusted me, by giving me a strong 
majority for the next four years, I would like to inform you that my only 
desire is to contribute to the settlement of the relations between our two 
countries, through ensuring a strong friendship and through the adoption of 
a friendship, non-aggression and arbitration agreement, that would be as 
broad as possible. 
I am fully aware of the fact that Turkey has no aspiration for our territories 
and, in that order, it has been repeatedly stated in public during the election 
campaign that does not aspire to Turkish territory and accepts the peace 
treaties, honestly and with no reservations. Therefore, I could not doubt that 
this agreement for the settlement of our relations abides to the willing of 
Your Excellency (Alexandris, 1992:175)15 
Venizelos also sent a similar letter to the Turkish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras16. The letters of the Greek Prime Minister to the Turkish 
                                                         
15 Translated from the French original text with the help of Thomai Iasonidou 
16 Parallel to his Turkish “opening” Venizelos visited Rome ( September23rd) and signed a friendship 
agreement with Italy (Συνθηκη Φιλίας, Συνδιαλλαγής και Δικαστικού Διακανονισµού). After Rome, 
Venizelos travelled to Paris straight away (26-29 of September) and reassured the French leaders that 
Greek-Italian approach did not mean that Greece was changing its stance towards France. 
Afterwards, the Greek Prime Minister travelled to London (September 30th) in order to convince the 
British that his foreign policy had good intentions. While in Paris, Venizelos also met with the 
Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Marinkovich, and with the help of France, which did not 
want to see Greece dragged behind Italy, the two men agreed to normalize the Greek-Yugoslav 
relations (See the minutes of the February 1934 of the meeting of the Greek political parties’ leaders, 
text available at Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 064 – 45, available 
on line by the National Research Foundation “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” digital archive also see 
Svolopoulos, 1992: 213-216) 
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leaders had trust building effects similar to those in his pre-election speech a few 
months earlier, yet, their main importance is that they constitute the first positive 
gesture towards initiating a rapprochement process. Unlike public political speeches 
that may often be overenthusiastic for domestic consumption reasons, personal 
correspondence is a much more credible way of communication among political 
leaders. In addition, Venizelos managed to put pressure on the Turkish leadership, 
which now had to reciprocate, and in turn, reveal their plans and aspirations as far 
as the Turkish-Greek affairs were concerned.   
The answer from Ismet Inonu arrived a month later, on September 28th, 
1928. In this letter Inonu agreed with Venizelos that the future of the two states 
should be based on mutual understanding and honest friendship. The willingness 
for a cooperative solution to the Greek-Turkish issues was also demonstrated earlier 
in September when, during a speech given by Inonu in the city of Malatya on 
September 13th of 1928, he said that if the two sides were approaching each other 
with good intentions it would be possible for them to resolve the problems that 
separated them. He added that the Turkish leadership was under the impression that 
Venizelos wanted to recommence honest negotiations concerning the unresolved 
issues, and stated that he would write a letter to Venizelos as soon as he returned to 
Ankara (cited in Gonlubol and Sar, 1996: 66; Demirozu, 2008: 315). 
At this point it is essential to stress the similarities between the Greek and 
Turkish maneuvers, both jointly leading to the initiation of official negotiations 
between Greece and Turkey. As it is evident in Inonu and Venizelos’ public 
 73 
 
speeches, both men made it clear that not only did they not have hostile intentions, 
but also that they did not perceive each other as enemies, but as possible strategic 
allies. Similarities concerning the language and expectations also exist when the 
correspondence is compared. As discussed in the literature review chapter strong 
and positive statements by political leaders is, apart from strong indicators of 
relations’ improvement, an important step towards changing the negative 
perceptions of one party vis-à-vis the other.  
The two governments seemed to agree on what their future relationship 
should resemble and the negotiations between Greece and Turkey resumed in 
December of 1928. The negotiations lasted for two years until June of 1930. Yet, 
despite the goodwill, the negotiations that followed were particularly hard, making 
it difficult to estimate whether the outcome of the talks would have resulted in an 
agreement or not (see Elefthero Vima, 15/12/1928)17. Mistrust, politics, and refugees’ 
objections18 contributed not only to delaying the conclusion of the talks, but they 
also brought a halt to the negotiations. The relations between Greece and Turkey hit 
rock bottom in the summer of 1929, when maneuvering of the Turkish Army along 
                                                         
17 According to the Greek press of the time, most of the Turkish press was expecting that the talks 
would reach to a satisfactory solution concerning the issues that divided the Greeks and the Turks. 
The only exception was Cumhuriyet newspaper which considered that the talks were pointless as 
long as Greece did not implement her obligations, meaning her obligations from former treaties and 
agreement.  
18 For instance, during the negotiations “in May 1929, the Turkish government decided that the 
property that belonged to the Greek Orthodox who were formerly of Ottoman nationality but were 
sent to Greece in the population exchanged be determined, evaluated and purchased. The decision 
said that the Turkish government had the right of purchasing property of this kind” (see Bilgic, 2006: 
29). In addition, reaching a positive agreement was hindered by the reaction of the refugees in 
Greece who strongly opposed the rumors that the fortunes of the exchanges populations would be 
expunged by balancing each other (see Anastasiadou, 1992: 22). 
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the Greek border and the reconditioning of the naval ship “Yavuz,” made the 
atmosphere very tense (Bilgic, 2006; also for a narrative of the negotiations 
progression based on the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs see 
Hadjivasileiou, 1999: 60-65). 
Nonetheless, as of December the situation started to change. Turkey’s 
realization of Venizelos’ sincerity was a catalyst towards improvement (Karamanlis, 
1995: 83). In addition, the Greek political leadership was convinced that Turkey did 
not pose a threat to Greece’s security as the former had no aspiration to occupy any 
Greek territory. During a speech in the Greek Parliament some months before the 
final agreement, Venizelos, after repeating Greece’s commitment to the 
international treaties stated: 
While I was in Lausanne…I had the good fortune to come to direct contact 
with the leader of the Turkish Government Ismet Pasa. When the discussion 
concerned the Western Thrace for which autonomy was requested he [Ismet 
Pasa] told me “Mr. Venizelos you can be certain that not only we shall not 
risk war in order to expand towards Europe, but even if the Balkan 
countries bestowed one part of their lands for us to expand, we would thank 
them for the donation, but we would turn it down because it is not to our 
benefit” 
I don’t have only this reassurance…I also have another proof. You know that 
when I went to Lausanne to negotiate the peace treaties and Turkey stated 
her claims towards Greece…while until the time of the Great War Turkey 
claimed the sovereignty of the Asia Minor coast adjacent islands, when she 
stated her claims she asked to remain under her sovereignty only Imvros 
and Tenedos, and she raised no other claims for the other island (Elefthero 
Vima, 11/2/1930) 
Venizelos’ speech in the Parliament, apart from openly suggesting that his 
personal relations with Inonu were an important factor to the process, largely 
explains why the negotiations did not fail, but instead led to the initiation of the 
rapprochement process in 1930. It was the commitment of the political leadership at 
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the top level which resisted difficulties and stood by the political spirit and planning 
that prevailed in September of 1928.  
The actions of the political leadership at the top levels were the driving 
force behind the initiation of the rapprochement. As is illustrated in Table 1 these 
actions basically constitute a step by step progress, beginning with positive 
statement and gestures and concluding with the signing a series of agreements in 
1930, which marks the beginning of the rapprochement process. In the following 
pages, the discussion will focus on the incentives that provide the answer to the 
question of: “Why did the political men who were involved in this process decided 
to take these decisions? 
 
 Table 4.1. 
 
Actio
n/ 
Event  
Venizelo
s pre-
election 
speech 
Venizelos 
wins 
Greek 
elections 
Venizelos 
letter to 
Turkish 
leaders 
Inonu 
response 
letter 
Comme
ncement 
of 
negotiati
ons 
Leaders 
actively 
support 
negotiation 
Time July 1928 
August 
1928 
August 
1928 
Septemb
er 1928 
Decemb
er 1928 
December 
1928 - 
June 1930 
Effect 
First step 
- 
building 
trust 
Strong 
Greek 
Governmen
t - GT Pro-
Cooperatio
n 
Governmen
ts 
Positive 
Gesture - 
Trust 
building 
Reciproc
ation – 
Positive 
gesture 
Effort to 
touch to 
real 
problem
s 
 
Negotiatio
ns continue 
and lead to 
agreement 
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4.5. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1930s Rapprochement 
Up to this point it has been made clear that political will and especially the 
decisive stance of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers were not only the driving 
force behind the initiation of the Greek-Turkish 1930s rapprochement, but also the 
sole reason for its successful commencement. Considering that political leaders are 
rational players seeking to maximize benefits for their countries and constituencies, 
strong incentives dictating a cooperative political behavior prevailed from 1928 to 
1930. In order to explore these incentives the following discussion will employ the 
theoretical assumptions analyzed, in length, in the literature review chapter.  
Undoubtedly, the concerns that both Turkey and Greece had for their 
national security were the primary motive in dictating the political will for 
rapprochement. To a great extent, Greece and Turkey were acting within a similar 
international environment, whose main characteristics were the lack of balance of 
power, and the existence of many players who were trying to take a leading role. 
Also in the Balkans, states such as Yugoslavia (also used for Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes) started to see themselves as the new key players, while others, 
such as Bulgaria, were holding persisting irredentist ideas and perceived themselves 
as the “losers” of the post-war distributions. As such, the possibility of a Greek-
Turkish rapprochement that included political, financial, and military/defense 
cooperation offered the Turkish and Greek politicians an opportunity to balance the 
playing field. 
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In that sense, classical political realism provides the strongest explanation 
for the 1930s rapprochement. This is hardly surprising taking into consideration 
that real politik became the dominant understanding of international politics during 
the interwar period. The search for national security was a major factor influencing 
political decisions and dictating foreign policy options. Especially for Greece, the 
need to normalize relations with Turkey was urgent as the former had failed to 
normalize relations with the rest of its neighbors across its northern frontiers19. 
Security was a major concern for Turkey as well, as not only did it share borders 
with most of the Great Powers of the time, but, in addition, it had unresolved 
business with them such (e.g. the Mosul question with Britain).        
Apart from the pressure that the international system was putting on 
political leaders, the domestic factors strengthening the political will for 
rapprochement should also be taken into consideration. The role of domestic 
politics in a state’s foreign policy has caused much debate in the field of 
international relations, and has mainly been advocated by the Innenpolitik 
approach. Innenpolitik scholars, who generally belong to the liberal or defensive 
realist schools of thought, have supported the primacy of domestic politics (Primat 
der Innerpolitik) vis-à-vis the primacy of foreign policy (Primat der Aussenpolitik) 
                                                         
19 On the one hand, Greek-Bulgarian relations had worsened after the Greek parliament did not 
proceed to the ratification of the Politis-Kalfof protocol that was signed in Geneva on September 29, 
1924 and arranged minority issues between the two countries. Relations were further worsened 
following a border incident in 1925, when the killing of two Greek soldiers drove dictator Pangalos 
to order an invasion of a Bulgarian border town (see Vlahos, 2006a). On the other hand, relations 
with Yugoslavia were also strained, as the latter had denounced the Greek-Serbian alliance Treaty of 
1913, while the series of agreements that were signed in 1926 between Greece and Yugoslavia met 
the reaction of the Greek political elite (Siousiouras, 2003) 
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(on this discussion see for instance Zakaria, 1992; Jacobsen, 1996). Nonetheless, as 
far as the initiation of the 1930 Greek-Turkish rapprochement is concerned, 
innenpolitik offers a weak explanation. Instead, realism, and in particular 
neoclassical realism, which accepts domestic politics’ impact but only as a 
secondary factor, provides a more convincing theoretical framework. Indeed, in the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement domestic conditions offered only supplementary 
motivation for the initiation of the rapprochement, while the main incentives were 
due to security concerns. 
Regardless, it should be mentioned that the quest for political stability and 
the need for social reforms in both Turkey and Greece required a period of peace, 
thus making rapprochement even more desirable. Stability in Greek-Turkish 
relations would allow the policy-makers to proceed with important changes within 
their respective countries. Pressures due to domestic factors were more urgent for 
Turkey, whose leaders had concluded that their ultimate goal would be to elevate 
their country to the level of contemporary civilization (see Heper, 1985; 48). Thus, 
the late 1920s would constitute for Turkey a decade of groundbreaking reforms 
ranging from constitutional amendments to social transformations (for an analytical 
account of these reforms see Lewis, 2002; Rustow, 1955; Tachau, 1984; Ahmad, 
2000)20. Greece experienced a high level of political conflict in the 1920s (Liberals 
vs. Royalists), while military involvement with politics also persisted after the end 
of the Asia Minor war (Karamanlis, 1985: 24).   
                                                         
20 Indeed, the variety of changes was such that scholars have characterized the Turkish revolution as 
cultural (Yalman, 1972), social (Mardin, 1997), or political (Ozbudun, 1981). 
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As far as financial issues are concerned, it is hard to estimate whether, or 
not, they had a positive impact on rapprochement. Greek researchers tend to agree 
that Turkey was focusing most of its attention on economic benefits, while Greece 
was focusing on territorial integrity. The argument supporting this claim is that at 
their opening speeches before the signing of the October 1930 agreements, besides 
the mutual complimentary remarks, it is clear that the main issue for Turkey was to 
avoid new debts, while Venizelos’ speech was more focused on guaranteeing the 
status quo (Anastasiadou, 1992: 39).  
Apart from the abovementioned motivations, the role of the refugees as a 
“veto-player” to the initiation of the rapprochement must also be mentioned as a 
significant counter-motivation. In Greece the refugees, who were supporting 
Venizelos, became very displeased with the provisions of the June 1930 agreement. 
Their dissatisfaction was raised in the parliament by refugee parliamentarians 
during the heated debate regarding the Greek-Turkish agreement that took place in 
late June.   
 
4.6. Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process    
The agreement between Greece and Turkey that arranged once and for all 
the issue of the exchanged populations’ fortunes and domains, was signed in 
Ankara on June 10th, 1930, almost two years after Venizelos’ first letter to Ismet 
Inonu and Tevfik Rüştü Aras. After this economic agreement, the most important 
obstacle to the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations ceased to exist and the 
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road towards an honest and strong rapprochement was open. Even though the 
intention of this agreement was no more than to solve the economic issues between 
the two parts, it paved the way for the initiation of the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement.   
a. Summit level communication 
The agreements signed in October 1930 covered a large spectrum of the 
bilateral relations, as they touched upon financial issues and issues of foreign and 
domestic affairs. As such, a strong basis was laid in place from which to build a 
solid and sincere friendship. In the following years, the progress of Greek-Turkish 
relations was indeed sharp and the two states experienced a decade of cooperation 
and collaboration. At moments the relationship that developed was so strong that 
actually surprises, or even, overwhelms the researchers. 
The change in attitudes began after the signing of the financial agreement in 
June 1930. Until Venizelos visited Ankara on 27th October, the change was such 
that the press wrote “never again had the government of the Turkish Republic 
welcome someone in such a celebratory atmosphere, as that of the day of the 
Venizelos and Michalakopoulos’ visit” (Elefthero Vima, 2/11/1930). Even the 
Greek press that stood in opposition acknowledged the unprecedented warmth that 
the Greek delegates received. The Greek press noted that “the Greek delegation 
received the warmest welcome by the Turks” while it quoted Revfik Rüştü saying 
“the two states united will constitute a major power” (Kathimerini, 28/10/1930).   
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The enthusiastic atmosphere did not fade away quickly. A year later Ismet 
Inonu accompanied by Turkish ministers reciprocated the visit, and arrived in 
Athens on October 3rd, 1931. The scenes that unraveled in the Greek streets, all the 
way from the port to the hotel where the Turkish delegation settled were indeed 
extraordinary (Cumhuriyet, 4/10/1931). Thousands of Greek citizens rushed to the 
streets in order to welcome the Turkish officials. The press made the following 
comments: 
A historic day rose today for the Greek capital city; for the Greek soul. Two 
flags that were covered with so much blood, two battle-hardened flags, that 
sometimes were raised to the win and other times were lowered to the loss, 
that had become rags from the fights, the hostility and the hate that 
separated the two nations, wave today in the attic sky new as being born 
again by the ashes, untouched, smiley, happy and reconciled, symbols of the 
new day that rises to the life of the two nations. Thus, Athens started today a 
celebration of innovation. For the first time in its history the dawn found her 
bedighted by Turkish flags (Athinaika Nea, 4/4/1931, see also similar 
comments from Kathimerini 4/4/1931)   
In general, meetings between officials became more frequent than before, 
while personal relations between Greek and Turkish leaders also improved. 
Especially the relationship Inonu had with Venizelos was quite friendly and 
personal. A very good example of this closeness is an incident that took place in late 
May 1932, when on their way to Rome, Inonu accompanied by Tevfik Rüştü Aras 
stopped by Athens. As their ship had to stay at the port of Piraeus for one and a half 
hours the Turkish officials expressed their wish to see Venizelos and 
Michalakopoulos. However, even though the two Greek politicians had scheduled 
this meeting, PM Venizelos felt ill and had to stay at home. When Ismet Inonu was 
informed about Venizelos’ indisposition, he insisted on visiting him and stated “it is 
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not possible for me to come to Piraeus, learn that my friend Venizelos is ill and stay 
unconcerned”. The Turkish officials stayed at Venizelos’ place for more than half an 
hour, during which time they agreed that the rapprochement was beneficial to both 
parties. They also discussed financial issues and issues of disarmament, and arrived 
at the conclusion that the views of both countries coincide (Athinaika Nea, 
23/5/1932). On their way back from Rome the Turkish leaders stopped by Greece 
again (Athinaika Nea, 1/6/1932). 
It is also important to note that the atmosphere during the official meetings 
was also very warm and friendly. The minutes of the October 1931 meeting among 
the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs show that 
the discussion took place among friends and within a cooperative spirit (Benaki 
Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 358 – 79). At first, the 
Turkish officials analyze Turkey’s relations with the Great Powers. Afterwards the 
discussion revolved around the Balkan issues and the discussants agreed that the 
Greek-Turkish understanding, although special, it should be open to the rest of the 
Balkan states. The discussion shows that the trust that the Turkish leaders have 
towards the Greek leaders and vice-versa, allows the discussants to adopt a, more or 
less, common roadmap for the Balkans.  
Neither the spirit of cooperation nor the rapprochement process was 
disturbed by the change of government in Greece. Indeed, the Greek Ambassador in 
Ankara Polychroniadis informed the Turkish Government that the newly elected 
Greek Government would continue to support the Greek-Turkish friendship 
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(DAGM 030.10/255.715.14.). Greece was stepping into a period of political 
instability. People’s Party (Laiko Komma) headed by Panagis Tsaldaris won the 
elections on September 25, 1932, and managed to form a government after a second 
round of elections on March 5, 1933 (Vakalopoulos, 1993: 395). What is important 
is that during the election’ campaigns no political leaders argued against the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement (Anastasiadou: 1992). 
On September 10, 1933 the Greek Prime Minister visited Ankara where he 
received a warm welcome (Athinaika Nea, 11/9/1933). Official visits continued 
frequently. For instance, Ismet Inonu visited Athens on several occasions, and 
Greek press always regarded his visits from a positive point of view (See Athinaika 
Nea, 29/12/1936; Athinaika Nea, 24/5/1937). The new Turkish Prime Minister, 
Celal Bayar, also visited Athens in order to sign another Greek-Turkish agreement. 
On this occasion the Greek press commented on the fostering relations stating that 
“the unprecedented fact with the Greek-Turkish reconciliation is that it gets 
stronger as time passes by” (Athinaika Nea, 27/4/1933). 
b. Signing of agreements 
First and foremost, the June 10th, 1930 Agreement that leaders signed in 
Ankara ushered in a new round of rapprochement process, thus carries a special 
importance. This agreement decisively settled important issues between Turkey and 
Greece, which had been a serious impediment to developing any type of 
cooperation between the two states. With the Articles 1 & 2 the estate and property 
of the Muslims and Greeks, which had been abandoned by the exchanged 
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populations, passed on to the ownership of Greece and Turkey respectively. The 
articles 10-13 concerned the issue of the Greek population in Istanbul, while the 
Articles 14-17 arranged the property issues of the Western Thrace Muslims. The 
articles 20-21 were also important they held as Greece liable to pay 425.000 
English Liras, to Turkey (For the full text of the Agreement in Turkish see 
Cumhuriyet 11/6/1930, also on the Ankara Agreement see Anastasiadou, 1992: 47-
48; Gioltsoglou, 2006: 654-660, Firat, 2008: 346-347). 
The agreement caused bitterness among large portions of the Greek 
populace, the refugees, who saw their dream of ever being reimbursed for their lost 
properties ending. Also the opposition severely criticized the final agreement, and 
condemned the Prime Minister Venizelos for giving up too much in order to 
achieve the financial agreement. On June 24, the discussion for the ratification of 
the treaty begun in the Greek parliament, and the refugee members of the 
parliament, attacked Venizelos verbally for the agreement he made (On the 
discussion see newspaper Kathimerini June 25, 1930; for some of the statements 
that were made by the refugee parliamentarians see Kathimerini June 25, 1930)21. 
In October 1930, during Venizelos’ visit to Ankara the two parts signed a 
friendship agreement that constituted the capstone of the rapprochement’s positive 
                                                         
21 Venizelos knew beforehand that the Agreement would spoil his ties to the refugees. As he had 
pointed out the loss of their vote would be less painful for him than their destruction. As 
Mavrogordatos (1983) points out Venizelos “was willing to risk such pain because he was convinced 
that the question of the compensation of the refugees should be terminated once and for all. 
Otherwise, the country would be pushed to economic bankruptcy and civil war” (p.207). Indeed part 
of the refugee vote left Venizelism, and even supported the Communist party which at the time 
“demanded the ultimate in terms of demagogy: both full compensation and total cancellation of all 
refugee depts., as well as abolition of the refugee rents!” (p. 220) 
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development. The Friendship, Neutrality, Reconciliation and Arbitration Agreement 
(Σύµφωνο Φιλίας. Ουδετερότητας, Διαλλάγης και Διαιτησίας – Dostluk, 
Tarafsizlik, Uzlasma ve Hakemlik Antlasmasi), obliged the two countries not to 
sign any political or economic agreements that would turn against the other, while 
they would have to solve their differences at the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Hague (Art. 1). Moreover, according to article 2, each part was 
obliged to remain impartial in the case that the other part was attacked by a third 
country (See Anastasiadou, 1992: 49-50; Gioltsoglou, 2006: 660-661, Firat, 2008: 
347-348).   
Apart from the friendship agreement, Turkey and Greece also signed a 
“Residency Agreement” (Σύµφωνο Εγκατάστασης) according to which the citizens 
of the signatory parties were capable of entering freely, travelling and residing at 
the territory of the other party, without being subjected to any kind of limitations, 
other than the limitations that the natives of that state are or will be subjected to (for 
more information on the content and the meaning of this agreement see 
Gioltsoglou: 2006: 663-665).  
Greece and Turkey continued their close cooperation with an unreduced zeal 
even after Venizelos lost the Greek national elections. During the new Greek Prime 
Minister Panayis Tsaldaris’ visit to Turkey, in September 1933 (For a detailed 
schedule of Tsaldaris’ visit as well as his meetings with Turkish officials see 
DAGM 030.10/255.717.3), he concluded with his Turkish counterpart an 
Agreement of Sincerity (Samimi Anlaşma Belgesi ) which aimed at increasing both 
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states’ security vis-à-vis the threat of the revisionist Bulgaria (Firat, 2008: 349). 
According to the Article 1 the two states mutually guaranteed the inviolability of 
their borders (Elefthero Vima, 15 September 1933; also a complementary 
agreement of the September 1933 and the October 1930 agreements were signed by 
Celal Bayar and Metaxas in Athens on April 17, 1938, see Elefthero Vima 28 April 
1938). Moreover, on December 22, 1933 and October 10, 1934 Turkey and Greece 
signed two compensation agreements (Συµφωνίες Συµψηφισµού – Takas 
Antlaşması). 
The aforesaid bilateral agreements were not the only important agreements 
that Greece and Turkey signed in this specific period. There were also a set of 
multilateral agreements that bind Turkey and Greece together. Thus, they were 
immensely important for Greek-Turkish cooperation. In that sense, the signing of 
the Balkan Pact was the most important development affecting the course of 
relations among the Balkan states. The idea that the Balkan states should form a 
type of alliance was nothing new. In fact it preceded the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. The seeds planted in 1929, when during the Global Peace Congress 
in Athens (Παγκόσµιο Συνέδριο Ειρήνης – Evrensel Βarış Kongresi), Greece’s 
former Prime Minister Papanastasiou proposed such a plan (Firat, 2008: 350). His 
ideas were accepted as the separation between revisionist and pro-status quo states, 
made such an agreement very attractive to all Balkan States (Yilmaz, 2008: 204).  
During the next years, a series of conferences took place, starting in Athens 
on October 5, 1930, with the participation of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
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Albania and Yugoslavia. It took another three years and three more conferences 
before four of these countries (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania) finally 
signed an agreement and established the Balkan Entente (Βαλκανικό Σύµφωνο – 
Balkan Entente) on February 9, 1934 (Cumhuriyet, 10/2/1934; also for the details 
on the conferences that preceded the signing of the Balkan Entente see Gonlubol 
and Sar, 1996: 99-101). 
The February agreement that was finally signed by Greece, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia and Romania, aimed at establishing peace in the region and the 
preservation of the status quo, through mutual guarantee of the signatories’ borders. 
Nonetheless the fact that Bulgaria, from which the agreement was actually meant to 
protect, was not part of the deal, created further issues and soon both the Greek and 
the Turkish governments rushed to clarify that the agreement was binding only in 
the case that a signatory was attacked by another Balkan state, and not just any 
other state (see Koliopoulos, 2002:305-307). Bulgaria, however, joined the Balkan 
Entente on July 31, 1938 (Athinaika Nea, 31/7/1938). 
c. Military cooperation 
During the first rapprochement, military cooperation mainly involved 
signing of agreements for the purpose of reassuring the other party that any 
emergent dispute will be solved through peaceful means. In that sense there were 
very few occasions when military cooperation took place on the field, just as in the 
case of the 1999 rapprochement whereby Greece and Turkey would common 
military training and organize joint forces under NATO.  
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The first step towards building a common understanding of the military 
affairs was taken during Venizelos’ visit to Turkey, in October 1930. Turkey and 
Greece on this specific occasion signed the Protocol for the limitation of naval 
armaments. Hatzivassiliou (2007: 89) argues that the main driving force behind the 
naval protocol was:  
the realization that both were conservative states, committed to the status 
quo in the Balkans. Since they were no longer divided by territorial 
disputes, they had an interest in avoiding an expensive naval race - and in 
the interwar years it was widely held that an 'arms race' was not only a 
source of financial difficulties, but also one of the actual causes of wars. 
 The signatories to the protocol agreed to avoid ordering or buying naval 
military vessels. In case of a new order of such equipment, the buyer had the 
responsibility to make his intentions known to the other side six months ahead of 
time (Elefthero Vima, 31/10/1930). Military cooperation became stronger after the 
signing of the Balkan Pact of 1934. Few months after the Pact was signed the Greek 
Minister of Military Affairs visited Turkey and met with Turkish officials and 
military officers. The Greek press noted that the trip gave Turks and Greeks a 
chance to elaborate on military cooperation (Athinaika Nea, 9/5/1934).  
Furthermore, visits between military men were not unusual. For instance, in 
September 1935 part of the Greek fleet went to Istanbul, while in December 1936, 
part of the Turkish fleet arrived in the port of Athens. The Turkish fleet was 
carrying the Turkish Admiral Sukru Okan (Elefthero Vima, 4/12/1936). Likewise, 
in June 1937 the Turkish battleship “Hamidiye” carrying Turkish cadets stopped at 
the Faliro port in Athens. During its stay in Athens the commander of the ship 
visited the city and met with Greek officers, while he also laid a wreath at the statue 
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of the Unknown Soldier. In addition the Turkish cadets and officers visited the 
Greek Naval Academy (To Vima, 6/6/1937).        
d. Economic cooperation 
Apart from the political level and bilateral relations, economic ties became 
stronger as well. On the one hand, economic benefits were the immediate outcome 
of the June 1930 agreement, especially for Turkey. Greece benefited mainly by the 
commercial agreement on the issues of importing brandy and soap. The same 
agreement benefited Turkey as far as animal taxation was concerned (Anastasiadou, 
1992: 60-61). The Greek press supporting Venizelos also saw the commercial 
agreement as an opportunity to refresh their commercial relations (Oikonomikos 
Taxidromos, 2/11/1930, front-page. The same article also provides a short 
assessment on what Greece benefited from the commercial agreement). 
On the other hand, good relations that the rapprochement built perhaps came 
back to create better conditions for strengthening economic bonds between the two 
countries. One of the most important of these developments was the foundation of 
the Turkish-Greek Bureau of Commerce (Ελληνοτουρκικός Εµπορικός Σύνδεσµος 
– Türk -Yunan Ticaret Bürosu) in Istanbul, in May 1934 (Firat, 2008: 350). The two 
states went on and signed a series of commercial agreements in the 1930s, such as 
the agreement in Athens in May 1933 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 7/5/1933), the 
agreement in September 1935 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 29/9/1935), and the 
agreement in May 1938 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 6/6/1938). All these 
agreements had the goal of creating better conditions in order for the commerce 
 90 
 
between Turkey and Greece to develop further. Nonetheless, this was not an easy 
task regardless of the good will from both sides. It is clear in Table 4.2. that the 
Greek-Turkish commerce remained more or less unchanged in terms of the value of 
exchanged goods (Data is taken from the speech of Mr Pesmatzoglou, President of 
the Greek-Turkish commercial Organization (Bureau of Commerce), Oikonomikos 
Taxidromos, 8/5/1939). 
 
 Table 4.2. 
 
  Import (from Turkey) Export (to Turkey) 
  
Thousand 
tons 
Million 
Drachmas  Thousand tons 
Million 
Drachmas  
1934 156 253 3 51 
1935 96 217 5 61 
1936 94 177 3 40 
1937 67 202 5 55 
1938 47 273 6 55 
 
Economic cooperation also took further boost from the Balkan Pact. As 
such, the heads of the Balkan Banks held a meeting in Athens in order to discuss 
ways to promote economic cooperation between the Balkan countries, while there 
were similar meetings concerning tourism and merchant shipping (Elefthero Vima, 
16/2/1937). 
e. Statements made by officials and good will gestures 
On several occasion Greek and Turkish officials made statements that 
confirmed the atmosphere of strong cooperation and trust that prevailed between 
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the two states. A characteristic example of such statements is Kemal Ataturk’s 
address to the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1930, after the signing of 
the Friendship Agreements. Ataturk stated: 
I am particularly pleased with the official visits to Ankara of the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Affairs’ Minister of our neighbor and friend Greece. 
The higher interests of Turkey and Greece have completely ceased to run in 
opposite directions. The sincere friendship of these two countries provides 
security and strength for both of them. The documents, which contract the 
new principles of the new period beginning between the two republics, have 
been presented for our final approval (as cited in Demirozu, 2008: 323-324) 
Apart from statements, a special reference should be made to some 
important events that are indicative of all the aforementioned developments in the 
Greek-Turkish relations, ensuing the 1930’s agreements. In late 193022 Venizelos 
sent a letter of recommendation to the Nobel Prize committee and proposed the 
Turkish President for the Peace Nobel Prize (full text of the letter is available at 
Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 283 – 71). In June 
1933, after the assassination attempt against Venizelos life, Inonu sent a very 
affable telegram sending his best wishes to Venizelos (copy of the telegram is 
available at Benaki Museum Archives, Elefthero Venizelos Archives, folder 348 – 
106). Finally, when Ataturk died, the Greek press made extensive spaces in their 
front-pages to describe the tragic event with sorrow23. They also refered to 
Ataturk’s friendly feelings towards Greece and his contribution to the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement (Athinaika Nea, 11/11/1938). The Greek Prime Minister 
                                                         
22 Anastasiadou assumes the date could range from December 1930 to January 1931 
23 The comment refers to Kathimerini, Elefthero Vima, and Athinaika Nea 
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went to Ankara to attend the funeral, while he was followed by a Greek military 
contingent that joined the parade (Athinaika Nea, 21/11/1938). 
f. Rapprochements’ influence on the societal level 
In the case of the 1930 rapprochement the attitude of the society is of 
special importance for two specific reasons. On the one hand, it was less than a 
decade that the two states had fought a deadly war during which many people lost 
their lives, their loved ones and their properties. On the other hand, the refugees 
that the war in Asia Minor created had seen their hopes of return or compensation 
shattered by the 1930 agreement. Thus, it is very interesting to examine the way the 
Greek and Turkish nations reacted to the rapprochement process.  
 It is difficult to understand the way public opinion in both countries 
perceived the rapprochement. However, several references in the press exhibits that 
people were then very positive and supportive of the rapprochement process. For 
instance, on the occasion of Ismet Inonu’s visit to Athens in late May 1937, the 
Greek press wrote, “The Greek Public opinion joyfully salutes the Prime Minister 
of a friendly and ally state, considering itself blissful to host, even for a short 
amount of time, Mr. Ismet Inonu, the architect of the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement” (Athinaika Nea, 24/5/1937). On another occasion, when Tevfik 
Rüştü Aras, who on his way back from Paris where he was negotiating the issue of 
Alexandretta, stopped by Greece, the press wrote:  
The Greek people feel particularly contended to host again in the capital city 
such a loved contributor to the Greek-Turkish cooperation and the Balkan 
understanding. The special bonds of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to this country and his frequent trip to it made him so well-known and 
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sympathetic that the Greek public opinion considers him as being one of 
them (Athinaika Nea, 29/12/1926). 
In addition, there are three more strong indicators of public’s support for the 
rapprochement process. The first one is the warm welcome that Greek and Turkish 
officials received when they visited the other party. Ismet Inonu’s visit to Athens in 
1931, for example, became a cause of celebration for the Greek people. The second 
indicator is that the opposition parties never contested the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement in Greece. Thus, there seems to have been no significant parts of the 
society that opposed the rapprochement process. The third indicator is a telegraph 
that the Greek Union of War Invalids24, sent to Ismet Inonu while he was stopping 
by Greece in June 1932 for a short stay. In the telegraph the representatives of the 
Union expressed their warm feelings towards Inonu and their hope that the Balkan 
Entente would soon become a reality (GASM 030.10/254.714.4). 
Finally, as far as communication between the Turkish and Greek societies is 
concerned, it should be pointed out that student exchanges between the two states 
took place (Anastasiadou, 1992), while sports events between Greek and Turkish 
teams were organized (See for example Athinaika Nea, 3/7/1931 for an article 
concerning the cancelation of such an event where there is also a reference on the 
good relations between Greece and Turkey in the sports section) Turkish professors 
visited Athens University for its centenary, while Greek professors also visited 
Turkish Universities (see DAGM 030.10/256.721.26; DAGM 
030.18.01.02/73.28.7). Meetings also included groups of professionals, such as 
                                                         
24 Ένωσις Αναπήρων Πολέµου Ολικής Ανικανότητας & των Φίλων της Ειρήνης 
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Table 4.3. 
 
Rapprochement Process 
  
 
Indicator 
 
Main events 
 
Frequency 
 
Importance 
 
Summit level 
meetings 
October 1930 
Venizelos’ visit, 
October 1931 Inonu’s 
visit, 
September 1933 
Tsaldaris visit  
 
High 
 
High 
 
Agreements 
Signed 
June 1930 Economic 
agreement, 
October 1930 
friendship agreement, 
September 1933 
Sincerity agreement 
1934 Balkan Entente 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Military 
cooperation 
Mainly in the form of 
guaranteeing 
agreements, 
exchanges also take 
place  
 
High 
 
High 
 
Economic 
cooperation 
Cooperation 
strengthened, 
agreements signed, 
foundations of 
institutions (Bureau 
of commerce) 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Statements/Gest
ures 
Several statements 
confirming the good 
will/atmosphere take 
place, several good 
will gestures from 
both sides 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Societal level 
 
Grassroots 
exchanges, support 
from public opinion 
and media 
 
High 
 
High 
 
press representatives (see DAGM 030.10/256.270.29. for a telegraph from Mr. 
Zarifis president of the Greek Press Representatives’ Union to Ismet Inonu). 
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4.7. Assessment of the Greek Turkish rapprochement 
The discussion on the rapprochement process clearly indicates that the 
progression of Greek-Turkish relations in 1930s was not only successful in terms of 
duration, but also it delivered a positive impact on on all of the indicators that were 
examined. This success was not the outcome of a single cause, but, on the contrary, 
a number of different factors contributed to the positive outcome of the process. In 
the following pages the discussion will focus on the independent variables that were 
introduced in the literature review chapter, and examine the role of each of those 
variables in the successful outcome of the rapprochement process. 
  
• Impact of the international system on national security 
The structure of the international system was favorable to the initiation of 
the rapprochement process as it provided Turkey and Greece with strong incentives 
for a closer relationship. It goes without doubt that developments in the 
international system facilitated a strong rationale for both states to pursue the 
permanence of the rapprochement process: thus, it positively contributed to the 
success of the process. A major development in the international arena was the 
adoption of revisionist policies by Germany and Italy during the 1930s, which 
made the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and, also, the Balkan Entente valuable. The 
division of Europe and the Great Powers into two opposing camps, brought a wave 
of uncertainty concerning the future, and as such, the significance of alliances 
increased considerably.   
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Apart from the structural changes in the international arena, special 
reference must be made as to how the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process altered 
power balance in the Balkan Peninsula, generating beneficial systemic changes on a 
regional level. Consequently, the most important development concerning the two 
states’ security arrived with the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934. The 
Entente itself is considered as a direct outcome of the new reality that the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement created in the Balkans. After 1930 the two countries 
combined their powers towards the creation of a Balkan Agreement that would 
include as many Balkans states as possible. As Venizelos, in 1931, put it: 
The importance of the Greek-Turkish agreement is special. We are in the 
position to say that the Balkan Union started through the Greek-Turkish 
friendship. Nothing divides the two states any more. We would proceed as 
far as possible, and if the rest of the Balkan states were ready then we could 
proceed very far. In any case, we are ready to accept to our union any other 
Balkan state, without any exceptions (Mpenaki Museum Archives, 
Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 358 – 79)   
Similarly, in an article of Tevfik Rüştü, which he wrote for the Greek 
newspaper “Elefthero Vima”, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that the 
Greek-Turkish friendship should build the first momentum needed for the 
realization of a broader understanding, which would include the Balkan states, and 
this union would, in turn, be a first step towards a union of European states 
(Elefthero Vima, 7/10/1931). 
Apart from the Balkan entente of 1934, the rapprochement created the 
conditions that heartened Turkey and Greece to coordinate their policies and 
defense structures against common threats, with Bulgaria and Italy being the 
important of them. This was mainly achieved through the agreement that was 
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signed in Ankara on September 14, 1933. With this agreement the two countries 
mutually guaranteed their common borders. The agreement at this capacity was 
about relegating the Bulgarian threat, at least, at the beginning, making reference 
only to diplomatic or political responsibilities. However, in October 1937, the 
General Staffs of both countries signed the Ankara Protocols, which concerned the 
common fortification and defense of Edirne/Adrianoupolis (Nikolaou, 1996: 358-
360). 
 
•  State identity 
 The alteration of state identity was clearer on the Greek side and it had 
already begun before the initiation of the rapprochement process. The termination 
of the “Megali Idea” by Venizelos was a major alteration in Greek foreign policy 
and definitely provided further space for future cooperation between Turkey and 
Greece. After the initiation of the rapprochement there were further positive 
changes in the way the two countries viewed themselves and the other. These 
positive changes made the rapprochement process a much more natural and stable 
one. In short, the shaping of new state identities that started before the initiation of 
the rapprochement, but also continued during the process, positively influenced the 
success of the first Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 
Specifically, there are two main assumptions concerning state identity that 
are equally true for both Turkey and Greece. On the one hand, each of these two 
states started considering itself as a pro-status quo state, at least as much as their 
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common borders were concerned. This was made clear by official statements that 
were constantly making clear that both Greece and Turkey had no aspirations on 
each other’s land, or the land of any other Balkan state. On the other hand, Greece 
and Turkey managed to develop such a state identity that allowed them to view the 
other side as a valuable friend, rather than a possible threat. The two states had no 
reservations about trusting each other or acting in harmony. The level of trust and 
cooperation was back then high enough that the relation can be described as a 
“security community”, borrowing the term from Constructivists’ theoretical toolset 
(Wendt 1994; Bellamy, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998). 
 
• Costs and benefits equilibrium 
Concerning the cost/benefit analysis, high costs of a possible deterioration 
of relations, and considerable benefits from the rapprochement significantly 
strengthened the incentives for each party to seek for the continuation of the 
process. Apart from the issues of security, benefits of the rapprochement mainly 
concern the improvement of living conditions for the minorities. However, it is 
itself a benefit that Turkey and Greece could construct a discourse according to 
which they committed themselves to the peaceable and mutually acceptable ways 
of sorting out emergent disharmony of interests. Nonetheless, there was a complete 
lack of considerable costs of continuing the rapprochement process.  
The frequent visits on the highest level, trustful environment and the mutual 
will for cooperation created a condition that was highly beneficial for both states. 
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The first to benefit from such a political proximity was the members of the 
minorities25. A direct outcome of the rapprochement process was that the living 
conditions for the minorities improved on both sides. The new spirit in the relations 
was manifest in the treatment of the minorities. Both Greek and the Turkish 
governments adopted a broader-minded attitude towards their respective minorities 
(Alexandris, 1992: 180). Indicative of the new attitude was the visit of Venizelos to 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul on November 1, 1930. This was the first 
time in history that a Greek Prime Minister was allowed to visit the Patriarchate 
(Alexandris: 1992: 194; for the full coverage of Venizelos’ visit see also Elefthero 
Vima, 2/11/1930). Return to the previous state of relations would mean that living 
conditions for the minorities would deteriorate, and thus the cost of interrupting the 
rapprochement process increased.  
Apart from the minorities, on the bilateral level, the aforesaid new approach 
in the relations prompted these two states to handle emergent frictions through 
rapid and consensual methods. There are two examples that are worth mentioning. 
The first one concerns Turkish Law of 2596/3.12.1934 that involved forbidding the 
priests of various religions to appear in public wearing their religious dressing. The 
previous days, the Greek press had been concerned that the banning would include 
the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, but in the final version of the law was made a special 
exclusion for the Patriarch while it included the rest of the religious leaders (see 
                                                         
25 At least during the end of the 1930s, which is the time period the current chapters examines. 
Concerning the ill-treatment of the minorities during the 1940s see next chapter. 
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Athinaika Nea, 30/11/1934, and 4/12/1934)26. The second example is related to the 
cooperation between Greece and Turkey concerning anti-Kemalists, members of the 
Muslim minority in Western Thrace, who propagated against the Turkish regime 
(see Anastasiadou, 1992). Greek administrators provided shelter to religious 
leaders, including the last Şeyhülislam, who fled Turkey after 1923, hoping that 
they would keep Greece’s Muslims away from the nationalistic influence of the 
Turkish Republic (Huseyinoglu, 2010). This practice changed after the initiation of 
the rapprochement. 
 
• Interdependence 
Concerning the sphere of economics, the new era in Greek-Turkish relations 
was marginally beneficial to both states. The economic benefits of the 
rapprochement should not be overvalued or exaggerated. Financial benefits, 
although existent, were not great for any of the parties. Even so, throughout the 
1930s the two states were able to discuss and arrange financial and commercial 
issues in a way that they were beneficial for both. As such, economic cooperation 
and the prospect for a better future as far as commerce is concerned were 
significantly improved compared to the situation before the initiation of the 
rapprochement.   
 
                                                         
26 On this issue Alexandris (1991) mentions that while the Patriarch was indeed excluded, but the rest 
of the religious leaders were excluded as well. Patriarch Fotios II’, avoided exiting the patriarchate as 
a protest to his escort being dressed with a secular outfit. 
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• Leadership 
The role of the Greek and Turkish leaders to the rapprochement was of great 
importance. To begin with, the initiation of the rapprochement process was only 
made possible due to the strong will of Venizelos and Inonu, who acted with 
determination and managed to overcome the essential obstacles that had prevented 
the rapprochement until 1930. This is especially true for Venizelos, who was acting 
in a much more competitive political environment, and, most importantly, was 
under the pressure of large portions of the Greek population, the refugees, who had 
for years expecting that a future arrangement between Greece and Turkey would 
allow them to return to their homes, or, at the minimum, would be reimbursed for 
their lost properties. It goes without doubt that had there been a Greek politician 
other than Venizelos ruling Greece, he would not be able to sign an agreement 
similar to the June 1930 Ankara Agreement.  
During the rapprochement the role of political leaders in the success of the 
process was positive as well. During the first years after the pioneers of the 
rapprochement’s initiation, Inonu and Venizelos, continued working hard and made 
important breakthroughs that further increased trust and strengthened the process. 
Apart from the official level, and what was already been discussed in the previous 
pages, actions such as Venizelos’ nomination of Kemal Ataturk for the Nobel Peace 
Price in 1934, or the granting of his wife’ house to the Turkish state to be used as 
the new Turkish Embassy are indicative of leaders’ efforts to strengthen the 
rapprochement process. On another occasion, Venizelos and his wife donated 5000 
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Turkish Liras to Türk Ocağı during their stay in Ankara in 1931 (see DAGM 
030.10/254.712.39.)   
 
• Depth of the process 
As it is clear in Table 4.2 all the indicators relating to the rapprochement 
were influenced during the process. Frequent summit level meetings, the signing of 
many important agreements, military and economic cooperation, various positive 
statements and gestures, and, lastly, support and participation of the Turkish and 
Greek societies are all proofs that the 1930s rapprochement was a deep and 
meaningful process.   The fact that the process impacted all of the indicators had 
positive effects in the success of the process.  
 
• Turning points 
The period during which the rapprochement stayed vibrant is characterized 
with the lack of turning points that would otherwise cause a deceleration or 
interruption of the process. The absence of turning points that could have 
interrupted the rapprochement can be attributed, apart from good fortune, to several 
factors. Primarily, the unchanged political support was an important factor that 
safeguarded the process. This issue concerns Greece more than Turkey, as the 
former experienced more changes during the 1930s. In that sense, it is very 
essential that Tsaldaris, Kondylis and Metaxas that ruled Greece after Venizelos, 
supported the Greek-Turkish friendship and even strengthened it with their policies. 
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Support from the public opinion and the press throughout the process, the lack of 
big changes relevant to the process in the international arena, and the fact that the 
two states had managed to solve their most important differences early-on in the 
process should also be considered as factors that minimized possibilities for 
negative turning points to appear.   
 
• The GRIT strategy 
Firstly, the issue of negotiations is not of primary importance for the process 
of rapprochement. Indeed, most of the negotiations between Greece and Turkey had 
already taken place before the initiation of the rapprochement. Before the 
rapprochement started, previous to the June 1930, the two states had already signed 
the bilateral agreements. These agreements solved practically all of the important 
issues that divided Greece and Turkey at the time. Hence, communication after the 
initiation of the rapprochement did not concern negotiations on issues of 
contention, but mainly discussions on further collaboration and improvement of 
relations. In that sense, it is clear that the GRIT strategy, which among others 
suggests a gradual approach to problem solving was not used in the 1930s 
rapprochement, at least not as far as the main core of the Greek-Turkish differences 
were concerned. 
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4.8. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the current chapter offered a summary of the first rapprochement 
between Turkey and Greece in 1930. Some of the most important factors that led to 
this rapprochement and, most importantly, those ones that helped the continuation 
of the process were identified. Further breakdown of these data will take place in 
the analysis chapter, where data from all case studies will be evaluated, compared 
and analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE 1950 GREEK-TURKISH UNSUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter described how the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 
1930 created the conditions for peaceful co-existence and fruitful cooperation 
between the two states. The first rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was a 
very successful example of how two states, despite a past filled with conflicts, 
managed their all-too-real differences to proceed along an era of collaboration. The 
spirit of rapprochement permeated not only the political and official levels, but also 
the social life and the peoples’ attitude towards one another. It is important to point 
out that the rapprochement did not end officially, as it was not broken abruptly by a 
disagreement that surfaced between Greece and Turkey. On the contrary, the Second 
World War (WWII) created a new state of affairs within which every country had to 
rearrange its priorities and interests.  
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The world order that came about soon after the end of WWII was very 
different from the one existing before. The world was split between two opposing 
camps, each of which was dominated by one of the two remaining superpowers, 
namely the USA and the USSR. Within this newly emerging world order, Turkey 
and Greece had to redefine their priorities and re-examine their positions in a way 
that would serve their interests best.  
In this chapter the focus will be on the Greek-Turkish relations after WWII 
and especially the time between 1950 and 1955. During this time Greece and 
Turkey managed to improve their relations considerably, while they also signed a 
number of significant agreements on various topics.  
Before reviewing the Greek-Turkish short-lived rapprochement of the 1950s, 
it is important to notice that that the 1930s rapprochement, which was discussed in 
the previous chapter, although it benefited both countries at the time, functioned as a 
spoiler for the future relations in two different ways. On the one hand, the 
agreements that were signed during the 1930s created several obligations, such as 
mutual guarantee of the borders, for each party towards the other. When WWII 
started, these obligations became very difficult to honor27, thus, after the war, a 
certain degree of distrust made its stage debut in between the two states on whether 
the agreements that were signed or were to be signed would be reliable. On the 
other hand, changes that took place during the time of good relations posed a 
problem when the relations deteriorated. For instance, in 1931 Greece extended its 
                                                         
27 Especially for Turkey meeting its obligations would mean to enter the War on the side of Greece 
without previously been attacked by Germany or Bulgaria 
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airspace to the 10 n.m. with the Law No. 5017, but due to good neighbor relations 
Turkey did not oppose such an extension (Inan and Gozen, 2009: 181). However, 
the extent of the Greek national airspace caused friction between the two states, and 
continues to do so until today.  
 
5.2. Historical Background   
It is important to note that relations between Turkey and Greece did not 
deteriorate to a point that would resemble the pre-1928 period. Although, during the 
1940s new problems arose between them, the two states managed to maintain a 
minimum degree of understanding that allowed a certain level of cooperation. For 
example, during WWII when much of the Greek population was suffering from 
famine, Turkey helped in several occasions. In 1940, 15 tons of sugar was sent with 
the permission of the Turkish government to Greece, while in 1941 Turkey sent 
10.000 doses of tetanus serum and the Turkish Red Crescent Society sent 
comestibles on various occasions. Moreover, food was transferred with the ship 
“Kurtulus”, and when “Kurtulus” was sunk, a ship named “Dumlupinar” was used 
for the same purpose (Hatipoglou, 1997: 253; for a detailed presentation of the 
Turkish help to Greece between 1940 and 1942 see Macar, 2009). Greece also 
received help from Turkey during its civil war (Unal, 2008: 429). 
Nonetheless, several issues still transpired in the 1940s to cause friction 
between Greece and Turkey. To begin with, Athens was being skeptical towards 
Turkey because of the latter’s stance during the WWII (for Turkish argumentation 
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concerning its legal obligations deriving from the 1930s Balkan Pact see Oran, 
2008). In addition, the issue of the Dodecanese islands caused temporary coolness 
as Turkey had expressed its interest in the islands even before the end of the WWII, 
and even when the liberation time arrived, Turkey acted at the backstage in order for 
the islands to be split between the parties (Alexandris, 1991: 115). Finally Turkey 
agreed to the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece in 1947, as part of the peace 
treaty it signed with Italy (Hale 2000: 124). 
Problems also sprang from the ill-treatment of the Greek-orthodox 
population during the Second World War. As part of the non-Muslim minorities in 
Turkey, the Greek Orthodox population became the target of two policies drafted by 
the Turkish government, 1) the Capital Tax (Varlık Vergisi) that was introduced in 
November 11, 1942 and, 2) the formation of the work-battalions (amele taburlari) 
which are also known as “20 Classes” of minority youth from May 1941 to 
September 194228 (Cetinoglu, 2012). Those arbitrary measures that the Turkish 
government exalted on the Greek population of Istanbul created feelings of 
resentment in Greece, which prohibited a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Similarly, 
the Turkish government continued being suspicious of the Istanbul Greeks and the 
role of the Patriarchate (Alexandris, 1991: 114). 
 
                                                         
28 The classes were actually released from their sentences on July 27th, 1942. It is also important to 
point out that Ismet Inonu, one of the architects of the first rapprochement, was also the Turkish 
President (1938-1950) who implemented these policies.   
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 5.3. The Initiation of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement 
 Even though the problems discussed above constituted obstacles to a full 
normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey, the conditions that the 
international politics of the time posed to both states proved much stronger for 
anyone to prefer rapprochement to conflict. In other words, the beginning of the 
Cold War was forcing the two states to overcome their problems and proceed to a 
rapprochement. Thus, from 1945 onwards, snatches of efforts towards the 
improvement of relations can be traced.  
 
5.4. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement 
A notable characteristic that differentiates the 1950 rapprochement from the 
three other cases studied in the current dissertation is that it took place at a time 
when Greece and Turkey did not have any major unresolved issues dividing them. 
The agreements that were signed during the 1930s rapprochement had settled most 
of the issues, which could otherwise cause bitterness between the two countries, and 
no other major question arose between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, as global 
politics was developing towards the creation of a bipolar system, it was also 
becoming obvious that Greece and Turkey would be part of the same camp, and 
hence, the two countries would have much similar objectives as far as the exercise 
of their foreign policy was concerned. These two factors made the initiation of the 
rapprochement a much simpler process compared to the other three cases. 
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On July 27th, 1945 the Turkish Ambassador to Athens Enis Akaygen let 
know a Greek colleague of his that the friendship between the two nations 
constituted a cornerstone for the Turkish foreign policy (Alexandris, 1991: 114). 
Enis Akaygen also helped the Greek community in Iran while he was an 
Ambassador in Tehran and received a letter of thanks from them in 193929. In 
addition, a dinner was organized in his honor, on the “Averoff” battleship by the 
King of Greece, the Archbishop, and the Bishop of Athens in 1945 where he also 
received the Medal Of Greek State (http://www.turkishgreeknews.org/bir-
konsolosluk-hikayesi.html). 
The confirmation by the Turkish ambassador of Turkey’s good intentions 
toward Greece was an important step towards the initiation of the rapprochement 
and it played a similar role to Venizelos’ pre-election speech in July 1928. Such 
statements create an environment of trust, while they also constitute a first step 
towards improvement of relations or have an ice breaking effect. The gracious 
treatment of the Turkish envoy by the Greek state was similarly a positive step 
towards the initiation of the rapprochement. The just mentioned steps gained further 
currency considering that Enis Akaygen was also the Turkish Ambassador to Athens 
during the 1930s and had also been part of the first Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 
On December 19th, 1946 the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Tsaldaris 
arrived at Washington and asked for financial and military assistance. Among the 
terms the Americans posed in order to provide assistance was the strengthening of 
                                                         
29 The original document of the letter can be found at http://www.azinlikca.net/Evren-Dede/bir-
konsolosluk-hikayesi.html (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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relations between Greece and Turkey. Similar pressure was already built on these 
states, but this time around, by England (Alexandris, 1991:113). Finally, on March 
12th, 1947 President Truman gave a speech to the US Congress, stressing the need to 
provide financial assistance to both Greece and Turkey, at the amount of $400 
Million, the majority of which would go to Greece. He also asked for authorization 
to dispatch military and political personnel to both countries (for the full text of 
Truman’s speech see To Vima, 13/3/ 1947).  
The US by putting its terms in such fashion, basically conditioning financial 
help on Greece’s gravitating towards Turkey, should have been the first building 
bloc of a working rapprochement process in 1950s. Apart from the incentives that 
Greece and Turkey had in order to further improve relations vis-a-vis, the US and 
Britain applied further diplomatic pressure in order for the rapprochement to take 
place. Furthermore, the “carrot” of financial assistance was offered in a time that 
was well needed by both countries, especially Greece. The Greek government at the 
time was also depending on American and British assistance in order to win the civil 
war against the communist guerillas. As such, the international pressure for 
cooperation should be considered as an important factor that led to the initiation of 
the rapprochement.   
After the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the Greek-Turkish relations 
followed a positive path and reached a high-point after 1950 until 1955. Concretely, 
two months after Truman’s speech to the Congress, a special committee for the 
promotion of the Greek-Turkish Cooperation was established in Athens, under the 
 112 
 
aegis of the Greek Government’s vice-president, Sophocles Venizelos (Alexandris, 
1991: 119). In August 1947, Sophocles Venizelos gave an interview to the Turkish 
newspaper “Vatan”, where he stated that in order for the Greek-Turkish friendship 
to solidify, the spirit of cooperation must prevail. To that end, he stressed the need 
for further cooperation between Greek and Turkish academicians, students, 
scientists and the like (To Vima, 2/8/1947).     
Also in the summer of 1947, the Turkish and Greek General Staffs 
inaugurated a dialogue on issues of common defense, which was closely monitored 
by Washington and London (Alexandris, 1991: 119). On July 22, 1947 an agreement 
on aerial transportation was signed in Ankara (see Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
– www.mfa.gr).  In October 1948, the two governments signed a financial 
agreement, while cultural exchanges increased considerably (Alexandris, 1991: 
119). 
 Table 5.1. 
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The establishment of the Cooperation committee, the urge for grassroots and 
professionals’ cooperation, as well as, the minor agreements on low politic issues 
contributed more to the trust building process. Furthermore, all these actions were 
preparing the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement process.  
 
5.5. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1950-55 Rapprochement 
As it has already been mentioned earlier in the current chapter, the second 
rapprochement was initiated in a very different environment compared to the first 
one. However, this does not mean that the incentives for the initiation were 
fundamentally different. Indeed, several of the motivations discussed in the previous 
chapter were also present in 1950. Nevertheless, the discussion on the incentives for 
the initiation of the rapprochement must start by pointing out the influence the first 
rapprochement had in terms of providing the foundations for a new rapprochement 
between Turkey and Greece. 
By the time the second rapprochement began, in 1950, Greece and Turkey 
had already experienced a decade of good relations (1930-1940), and both had 
enjoyed the benefits of such a relationship. Policies against the Greek minority in 
the early 1940s constituted a significant spoiler to Greek-Turkish relations and 
increased levels of mistrust between the two states. Nonetheless, the experience and 
impact of the first rapprochement on both states remained strong. In that sense, the 
improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations was, more or less, a natural 
development between the two states that which are partially freed from the most 
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significant points of friction. Furthermore, when the new era started, there is a good 
reason to think that their attitudes toward one another was amicable. Hence, the fact 
that the foundations of a strong relationship that the first rapprochement had 
established were still valid in 1950. Such positive background must be considered 
as the foremost incentive for the second rapprochement.  
The idea that Greece and Turkey were allied states was also exacerbated by 
the new world order that prevailed after WWII. Greece and Turkey belonged to the 
same 'camp' and they shared significant defense and security concerns, considering 
they were both neighboring with communist states. Specifically, Greece found itself 
neighboring with three communist countries to the north after WWII. Its relations 
with Bulgaria and Albania were tense. Bulgaria denied giving the full amount of the 
war compensation that was asserted to it by the 1946 Paris Treaty. In addition, the 
spectacular increase of the Bulgarian army and Sofia’s close relations with Moscow 
further strengthened Greece’s fears and anxiety. Greece and Albania remained in a 
state of war, at least from the legal point view. Greece had demanded the annexation 
of northern Epirus (Southern Albania), which hosted large Greek populations. 
Nonetheless, in December 1952, Greek Prime Minister Papagos officially declared 
that his government refrained from any use of violence and pursued its goals only 
through legal means (see Valinakis, 1989: 55-56). 
Turkish foreign policy did not see considerable changes in the early 1950s. 
The basic principles that guided Turkish foreign policy after WWII (1945-1950) 
continued after 1950 as well (Aktas, 2008). In post-WWII setting, the most 
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important feature for Turkey was the systems’ bipolarity, which was limiting 
Turkey’s options compared to the period before the war (Hale, 2000: 109). 
Menderes and his colleagues were even more west-prone than Inonu (Hale, 2000: 
111). In the period between 1950 and 1960, Turkish foreign policy and security 
policies was part of NATOs effort to contain the Soviet Union (Sovyetleri 
Çevreleme) (Unal: 2008: 427). In general, security concerns were, similar to the 
first case, providing strong motivation for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement and, 
thus, should be considered as one of the main incentives for the initiation of the 
rapprochement.   
Domestic politics also offered strong incentives for rapprochement as the 
early 1950s are characterized as a time of instability, in the case of Greece, and 
change, in the case of Turkey. In Greece, after the end of the war, elections were 
held on March 5, 1950, only to be followed by a new period of instability during 
which various combinations of parties were forming the majority in the parliament. 
Finally, centrist parties managed to form a government on April 15, 1950, with 
Nikolaos Plastiras serving as both the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs30. The Plastiras Government stayed in power for only four months and it 
was replaced by three Venizelos’ governments (August 21, September 9, and 
November 3). On September 9, 1951 a new round of elections was held, where the 
Greek Rally Party, led by recently dismissed General Papagos collected more than 
36% of the votes but did not manage to form a majority government. The 
                                                         
30 Also as Minister of Press and Information 
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government was to be formed by Plastiras whereas Sophokles Venizelos was 
assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs31. The Plastiras Government ruled for a 
year, during which NATO membership was fulfilled, and the improvement of 
relations with Turkey assumed a prior place, a major axis of Plastiras’ foreign 
policy. Finally, with the elections that were held on November 16, 1952, General 
Papagos’ Greek Rally won a landslide victory, gathering 49,2% of the votes and 247 
of 300 seats in the parliament. This was the first single-party government in post-
war Greece, and stayed in power for another 11 years (See Sampatakis, 2006a, 
Sampatakis 2006b)32. 
Turkey experienced major changes concerning its domestic politics, towards 
the end of the 1940s. Inonu gave a speech before the National Assembly on 
November 1, 1945, to stress the need for a new political party that would challenge 
the governing CHP. Two months later, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - the 
DP) was formed under Celal Bayar’s leadership. Although the DP lost the 1946 
elections, it managed a decisive victory in the elections of May 14, 1950, getting 
53,3% of the vote (Ozbudun, 1999). The shift to a multiparty regime was completed 
smoothly, but , such did not bring with it diffusion of power across social groups 
and classes. It was merely a reallocation of political power from one group of the 
ruling Kemalist bloc to another (Yilmaz, 1997). Menderes government would try to 
enforce a very ambitious plan, at the center of which lied the economic development 
and modernization of the rural areas of Turkey. This included a sharp rise in public 
                                                         
31 Also the vice-President 
32 Also including the ERE party that succeeded it 
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investments in an effort to increase agricultural productivity and the integration of 
peasants into the national economy (Sayari, 2002). In addition, Democrat Party gave 
promises that it would proceed with constitutional amendments and institutional 
innovations aiming to consolidate democratic rule in Turkey. Even though these 
promises were not kept, and the main efforts of the DP focused on weakening the 
Republican Party (Karpat, 1972: 353), it is clear that the early 1950s were a time of 
great changes in Turkey at many levels.        
Finally, as far as economics are concerned, a rapprochement-leaning motive 
gained ground as a result of the need of both states to improve their finances and 
achieve economic growth. This need was higher for Greece as it was, at the end of 
the 1940s, going through one of the worst moments of its modern history. The 
disasters that WWII and the civil war caused, both in terms of human victims and 
property damages, were immense. During the war, approximately 16.000 people lost 
their lives in the front, 7000 people died during bombings and 70.000 people were 
executed. Furthermore, 300.000 people lost their lives because of famine 
(Vakalopoulos, 2003: 435). The civil war added another 158.000 people to the 
victim count, while an estimated 50-100.000 crossed the borders and escaped to 
neighboring states (Vakalopoulos, 2003: 438). In addition, 1.700 villages had been 
destroyed; oil production had been reduced by 80%, wheat and raisin production by 
66% and the production of tobacco and cotton by 90%. The merchant fleet, one of 
Greece’s most important enterprises, was reduced from 600 ships (1.800.000) tons 
capacity to a number of 130 ships (50.000 tons capacity). In total, the national 
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income decreased by 41% compared to the pre-WWII income, which was already 
quite low (Vakalopoulos, 1993: 435; also on Greek economy in the 1950s see 
Hekimoglu 2006a, Hekimoglu 2006b, Hekimoglu 2006c). For Turkey, the DP 
managed to create the conditions for strong economic growth. Economic data 
demonstrates that this growth was faster during the first half of the 1950s, it 
continued, however, throughout the decade. In addition aggregate labor productivity 
showed a strong increase up until 1953, following the governmental plan that 
favored agriculture and private enterprise (Altug and Filiztekin, 2006). 
 
5.6. The Rapprochement Period    
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the 1950s rapprochement between 
Turkey and Greece started. As it was discussed above, sporadic efforts towards 
improvement of relations had started from mid-1945 onwards, but until the end of 
the 1940s no substantial development became visible. However, after 1950, the 
changing conditions allowed for a more realistic effort towards rapprochement. this 
study henceforth suggests that the year 1950 must be considered as a turning point 
for the rapprochement’s initiation. There are three main developments that occurred 
in 1950 that support this argument. 
Firstly, the previous year the Greek civil war ended with the defeat of the 
communists and the preponderance of the government forces with the support of the 
US and the Britain. Immediately after that point Greece followed policies that 
would bring it closer to the Western camp and, more concretely, would include it in 
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the western defense (Hatzivasilleiou, 2006: 11). Secondly, the change of leadership 
in Turkey, even if it did not produce major changes in Turkish foreign policy, 
benefited the rapprochement, as the Democrat Party (DP) was more committed to 
the West and to American way of economic liberalization (Hale, 2000: 111). 
According to Alexandris, Menderes government sought contacts with the Greek 
leadership, and in general, the DP’s coming to power signaled an advance in regards 
to the Greek-Turkish relations (Alexandris, 1991: 120). Thirdly, in the spring of 
1950 the two countries jointly applied for NATO membership. Even though the 
Americans were not forthcoming, the joint application was indicative that Greece 
and Turkey had coordinated their policy against the Soviet bloc (Hatzivasilleiou, 
2006: 11). 
Leaving aside the aforementioned changes, there was also a verbal 
agreement that signifies the beginning of the new era in the Greek-Turkish relations. 
In early June 1950, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs met the Greek Prime 
Minister Plastiras in Paris, where they decided to initiate a productive and close 
cooperation (Alexandris: 1991: 120)  
 
5.7. Breaking Down of the Rapprochement Process 
In the first chapter a set of indicators concerning what constitutes a 
rapprochement process was put together and discussed. At this point, how these 
characteristics should be applied to the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process, from 
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circa 1950 to 1955, will be the main theme of discussion within the rest of this 
chapter.    
 a. Summit level communication 
 The discussion of the 1930s Greek-Turkish rapprochement showed that 
visits of high-ranking officials between Turkey and Greece became so frequent that 
they were almost a banality. During the second rapprochement Greek and Turkish 
leaders continued official visits. Although the frequency of the visits decreased 
compared to the first case, for instance there are no informal visits or stopovers, the 
meetings were still made within a friendly and cooperative spirit. Moreover, the 
agenda of the visits attests the high level of cooperation and trustfulness.     
 On January 29th, 1952 the Greek Vice-president and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sophocles Venizelos visited Istanbul (Milliyet, 30/1/1952) and on the next 
day he arrived in Ankara. His visit concerted great importance from the Turkish 
Government (Milliyet 31/1/1952). During a speech he gave in Ankara, Venizelos 
addressed to the Turkish nation saying, “I bring to the Turkish nation the warm 
greetings of the Greek nation. I came to your country in order to reassure the 
friendship that was established by two historic men, Ataturk and my father 
Venizelos” (Milliyet 31//1952)  
 In less than three months after Sophocles Venizelos’ visit, the Turkish 
Prime Minister Menderes visited Athens accompanied by his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fuat Koprulu. When the Turkish ship “Ankara” arrived in Piraeus with its 
passengers, the Greek crowd warmly welcomed him, which in many ways was a 
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reminiscent of Inonu’s first visit that he made twenty-two years ago. In his 
welcoming speech Sophocles Venizelos stated:  
I express my joy for the arrival of the Turkish officials, and I am sure that 
this visit will seal what was accomplished during my last visit in Turkey, in 
a way that the commencing friendship, the work of two great men, will 
constitute a turning-point towards the strengthening of relations between the 
two states, which we are certain both states deeply desire (Ta Nea, 
26/4/1952)     
During this five-day visit, the two sides agreed upon a closer Greek-Turkish 
military cooperation within the western alliance framework, while they also decided 
to improve their relations with Yugoslavia (Alexandris, 1991: 120). During the time 
of the Menderes’ visit at Athens, Greek and Turkish officials were agreeing on a 
cooperation plan on the tobacco issue. They also agreed upon cooperation on the 
areas of tourism and visas. These agreements were to be reviewed by the two 
governments later on (To Vima, 2/5/1952).        
 On Sunday June 8th, 1952 the King and the Queen of Greece arrived in 
Istanbul to be enthusiastically celebrated by a crowd of thousands of Greeks and 
Turks. According to the Greek press, this was the first time Turks were giving such 
a welcoming posture to a foreign leader (Ta Nea 9/6/1952). The visit of the Greek 
Royal couple to Turkey had great significance not only because it was King Paul’s 
first official journey after his enthronement, but also because it was the first king 
that had ever visited Istanbul since the end of the Byzantine Empire (Alexandris, 
1991:121). An interesting comment was made by the Greek newspaper 
“Kathimerini”, which read the king’s visit as “…a triumphal consummation of the 
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Greek-Turkish friendship: A true apotheosis of the Greek King in Istanbul. Greeks 
and Turks cheered and applauded in a delirious state” (Kathimerini June 14/6/1952).  
 The series of visits that took place in 1952 was closed by the visit of the 
Turkish President Celal Bayar to Greece in late November, who returned the King’s 
visit to Turkey. The honors that were attributed to him clearly reveal that Greek-
Turkish relations had reached a zenith. Two Greek destroyers were sent to 
accompany the Turkish ship “Savarona” which was carrying the Turkish President. 
The Greek ships met “Savarona” close to the Greek island of Lemnos and 
accompanied it all the way to Athens. In addition, in order to honor the Turkish 
President, squadrons of jet-fighters flew upon his arrival. At the harbor of Piraeus, 
nautical and sports clubs asked for permission to form a welcoming formation of 
approximately 75 ships, in order to honor the Turkish visitor (To Vima 26/11/1952).      
During his visit, President Celal Bayar was announced a citizen emeritus of 
Athens, while the enthusiastic crowd filled the Town Hall Square. Bayar also 
inspected the Greek fleet at Eleusina, and a unit of the Greek Army close to 
Thessaloniki (Sedes). Upon his arrival at the city of Thessaloniki, Bayar once again 
received a warm welcome from the Greek crowd. After Thessaloniki, Bayar visited 
the city of Komotini where he inaugurated a Turkish high-school named after him 
(Celal Bayar Türk Lisesi, also on Bayar’s visit to Greece see Ta Nea 28/11/1952, To 
Vima 28/11/1952, To Vima 2/12/1952, To Vima 26/11/1952). Nevertheless, it should 
still be held in mind that no negotiations or any form of political agreements were 
signed during Bayar’s visit to Greece (To Vima 5/12/1952). 
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In June 1953, General Alexandros Papagos, who at the time was the Greek 
Prime Minister, followed by members of the Greek government visited Turkey and 
met with Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, while in June 7th, 1954, Menderes 
accompanied by his minister of Foreign Affairs visited Athens on his way back from 
the US (To Vima 19/6/1953; Milliyet, 19/6/1953)33.  
Apart from the abovementioned summit level visits, separate reference 
should also be made to relations between the Turkish officials and the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. Few days after Menderes’ and Koprulu’s visit to 
Athens, Bayar and the Turkish Prime Minister sent an official invitation to the 
Patriarch. Following the Patriarch’s visit to Ankara, Menderes visited the Greek 
Patriarchate, in June 1952, two days before King Paul’s visit to Istanbul. This was 
the first visit of such a high-ranking Turkish official to the Patriarchate in the history 
of the Turkish Republic34. During this visit the Turkish Prime Minister offered the 
Patriarch 5,000 Turkish Liras in support of a Greek hospital (To Vima 7/6/1952). 
Good relations between the Turkish leadership and the Patriarchate, continuing until 
1955, can be deemed as a side-product of a rapidly improving Greek-Turkish 
relations. For instance, President Bayar met again with Patriarch Athinagoras in 
Istanbul in 1953 and had dinner with him (Ta Nea 10/1/1953). 
  
                                                         
33 Kalaitzaki (2005: 110) citing Ferenc Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971), mentions another Celal Bayar visit to Athens in January 1954. 
However, no other reference of this visit was found. 
34 Until June 1952 there were only two other visits of a Turkish official to the Patriarchate. The visit 
of the Grand Vezyer Midant Pasa in 2/1/1877, and the visit of Ahmet Riza Pasa, one of the leaders of 
the Young Turks movement on 10/7/1908. 
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b. Signing of Agreements 
During the 1950s rapprochement, Turkey and Greece signed a number of 
agreements with the view of relegating financial and social issues, enhancing 
military cooperation and supporting intercultural dialogue. Apart from those that 
have already been mentioned, the two states also signed an agreement on fishery 
issues on June 21, 1952. The specifics of this agreement were discussed during King 
Paul’s visit to Turkey a few weeks earlier (Turan, 2008: 475-476). An agreement on 
education was signed on April 20, 1951. The Koutouma-Akdur Agreement, as it was 
called, arranged issues of minority education in both countries, and foresaw the 
exchange of teachers and teaching material for the minorities’ schools (Alexandris, 
1991:137). An agreement on cultural issues was signed in 1952 (Kültür Antlaşması) 
(Firat, 2008: 592). In September 1953, the Greek Minister of Public Works, 
Konstastinos Karamanlis and his Turkish counterpart Kemal Zeytinoğlu, 
inaugurated the construction of a bridge at the Evros/Meriç River at the Greek-
Turkish border (National Audiovisual Archive, Annotation of Asset D2531).  
Nonetheless, two agreements that also included Yugoslavia were by far the 
most important for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The first one was the 
Friendship and Cooperation Agreement (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Yunanistan Krallığı 
ve Yugoslavya Federatif Halk Cumhuriyeti arasinda Dostluk ve Isbirligi Antlaşması 
– Συνθήκη Φιλίας και Συνεργασίας µεταξύ της Τουρκικής Δηµοκρατίας, του 
Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος και της Οµόσπονδης Λαικής Δηµοκρατίας της 
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Γιουγκοσλαβίας) which was signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953, by the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.  
In the introduction section of the Balkan Agreement, the three states declared 
their conviction to the United Nations’ principles, and their determination to live in 
peace. The Article 1 was concerned with the cooperation among the signatories and 
arranged that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would meet, at least, once in a year in 
order to examine the course of international politics and, if necessary, take decisions 
to safeguard the aim of the Treaty. In the Article 2, the signatories agreed to 
continue common efforts towards establishing peace and security in their territories, 
and examine measures of common defense. The Articles 3 and 4 entailed 
cooperation in military issues and other areas (education, commerce and technical 
problems). The Article 5, on the other hand, stated that the parties should solve any 
conflict among them through peaceful means, according to the Map of the United 
Nations. They should also abstain from interfering with each other’s internal affairs. 
The next 3 articles (6, 7 and 8) discussed the agreements’ technicalities such as, 
conflict with other signatories’ obligations etc, while article 9 stated that the treaty is 
open to other states, as long as they agreed with its principles. Finally, the last 
article (10) stated that the Balkan Agreement would be valid for 5 years from the 
time of its ratification (For the full test of the treaty see To Vima 1/3/1953). 
The Balkan Agreement as having been finalized in Ankara, in 1953, was 
important because it helped create an environment of peaceful coexistence for 
Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Council which was 
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established with the first article, constituted an important safety net, 
reassuring/warning each party that should an issue transpire among the signatories, 
it will be solved through dialogue—but not through the use of force. In addition, the  
agreement encouraged further cooperation, which in turn would make the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement stronger.   
The second important agreement that Greece and Turkey signed also 
included Yugoslavia, and can be considered as the high point of the tripartite inter-
Balkan cooperation (Alexandris, 1991: 123). The Coalition Treaty (Συνθήκη 
Συµµαχίας, Πολιτικης Συνεργασιας και Αµοιβαιας Βοηθειας – Ittifak, Siyasal 
Isbirligi ve Karşılıklı Yardım Antlaşması) was signed at Bled, on August 9, 1954. 
The Treaty which was mainly concerned with issues of security, once again attested 
the signatories’ faith to the United Nations Charter, their will to promote peace, 
security and international cooperation, and their determination to ensure their 
territorial integrity and political interdependence (introduction). 
The most important assumptions of the Treaty were summarized in Articles 
2 and 6. The former stated that the signatories agreed that any armed offence against 
one of them would be considered an attack against all, and thus, the parties had the 
right of collective defense according to the UN Charter, article 51. The latter made 
an indirect mention of the obligations that Greece and Turkey were holding against 
NATO at the time. Article 6, stated that if a third state, that any of the three 
signatories has obligations of mutual assistance was under military attack, the 
 127 
 
signatories would meet in order to decide on their actions (For the full text of the 
treaty see To Vima 10/8/1954).    
Apart from the signed agreements, an interesting fact is that good neighbor 
relations allowed Greece and Turkey to seek bilateral negotiations that would settle 
the terms of a delimitation agreement, based on the principles agreed between Italy 
and Turkey by the December 28, 1932 Accord. Such a request was made by Greece 
in mid-1953, and Turkey replied positively in early 1954, however, no progress was 
achieved at that point. Later on, Greece made another attempt to negotiate the 
boundaries of the Dodecanese islands by a note verbale to Ankara in mid-1955, but 
the end of the rapprochement forced Turkey to unofficially reject the Greek request 
(Inan and Gozen, 2009: 185).   
c. Military cooperation 
The 1952 NATO membership for both Greece and Turkey not only enhanced 
military cooperation, but also constitutes one of the most significant elements of the 
1950s rapprochement. As of 1952 Turkish and Greek foreign policies became 
almost fully coordinated and, military cooperation acted as a boost for the 
rapprochement process as a whole35. 
                                                         
35 On the downside, Krebs (1999: 360), argues that, membership in NATO rendered irrelevant 
Greek and Turkish national efforts to ensure their security vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, providing these 
relatively small states with incentives to ride free on the efforts of their more powerful allies and to 
shift the focus of their foreign policy from the Soviet threat to their more parochial conflicts…After 
1952, with the Atlantic alliance guaranteeing its security, Greece believed itself able to pursue its 
long time dream of union with Cyprus, and, shortly after its accession, the Greek government, which 
had considered enosis its eventual goal but had long resisted domestic pressures for immediate action 
toward that end, officially endorsed that policy. Had Greece remained outside the alliance, it could 
hardly have devoted the resources or foreign policy attention to so peripheral an aim. 
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Hence, cooperation between the Greek and Turkish armed forces is one of 
the most important aspects of the 1950s rapprochement. The military cooperation 
was vital as the two states were following a common defense approach against the 
Soviet threat from the North. Military cooperation had its roots in the NATO 
membership that Turkey and Greece jointly sought in 1950. The outbreak of the 
Korean War helped disperse any disagreements against Greece’ and Turkey’s 
membership and on October 15-17 Turkey’s and Greece’s accession to NATO was 
confirmed in London, and membership procedures concluded in February 1952. 
From that point onwards the two states constituted NATO’s southeast wing 
(Hatipoglu, 1997: 289). The Americans saw Greece and Turkey “as useful and 
mutually reinforcing outposts” (Hatzivassiliou, 2006: 11) and thus they supported 
the efforts for military cooperation.  
Apart from some examples of military cooperation that have already been 
mentioned (the 1947 meeting of General Staffs, and Celal Bayar’s supervision of 
Greek army units at Salamina and Sedes), there are also other examples that 
strongly confirm that the level of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish armed 
forces was very high. On August 6, 1950 a Greek delegation led by the second in 
command of the Greek Miliraty, Kitrilakis visited Ankara for consultations. The 
talks on tactical issues continued in Athens (Alexandris, 1991: 120).  In August 
1952, common Turkish and Greek naval exercises took place, while at the same 
time the Turkish rear admiral Altigan paid a formal visit to Greece where he met 
with Greek military officials, the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense 
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(To Vima 20/8/1952). In April 1953, the Greek Chief of Staff, accompanied by high-
ranking officers, visited Turkey and met with Turkish military leaders (ToVima 
8/4/1953). A few months later, in June 1953, delegations of the Greek, Turkish and 
Yugoslav General Staffs met in Athens. The talks centered on the selection of the 
defensive locations in case of an offence, the engaging units and the defense of 
Thrace (Hatzivasilleiou, 2006: 38). In September 1954, the Turkish and Yugoslav 
Chiefs of Staff visited Athens and met with their Greek counterpart lieutenant 
general Kitrilakis (National Audio Visual Archive, Annotation of Asset D3933). 
The collaboration among military officials was the result of the NATO 
membership but it was further strengthened by the Article 3 of the 1953 Friendship 
Agreement and the spirit of the 1954 Coalition Treaty. In general, Greece and 
Turkey were regarded as two forces that, when combined, could pose a countable 
defense against a possible Soviet offensive. In May 1952, after these two states 
joined the NATO, the Greek Prime Minister Plastiras said during an interview to a 
Turkish journalist: “The military cooperation between Greece and Turkey will 
constitute within NATO a competitive force, capable to face any threat against 
peace, due to its strategic position and the strength of the two armies” (To Vima, 
2/5/1952).  
d. Improvement in economic relations 
The issue of further financial cooperation was always a sought-after topic as 
of the beginning of the rapprochement. The parties  understood closer economic 
relations as a complementary element to furthering political rapprochement. In 
 130 
 
1950, when Plastiras and Koprulu met in Paris they agreed that “especially” 
economic cooperation should be one of the important areas of focus for both 
countries (Milliyet, 7/6/1950). The need for stronger economic ties was further 
stressed with the Article 4 of the 1953 Friendship Agreement. 
The most important breakthrough concerning financial cooperation was 
made in November 1953, when Greece and Turkey signed a bilateral commercial 
agreement. The commercial agreement fixed the amount of Greek exports to Turkey 
at the amount of $10 Million (excluding the value of goods for which the export to 
Turkey was free). This was an important development considering that Greek 
exports to Turkey were $2,780 Million in 1952, $887 Thousands in 1951, $1,119 
Million in 1950 and just $600 Thousand in 1949. Greece’s main export goods were 
concrete ($3,000,000), fabric and textiles ($2,500,000), agricultural machinery 
($1,000,000), chemical fertilizers ($300,000), glass panels ($300,000) and 60 tons 
of Chios mastic. Turkey was gaining by the lifting of some limitations on its 
exporting goods to Greece, mainly pulses, fish and meat, (To Vima 13/11/1953; for 
the full text of the agreement in Turkish see DAGM 030.10/219.478.14).   
e. Public statements made by officials 
In the literature review chapter of this study, public statements made by 
political leaders were mentioned as one of the key parameters to evaluate a 
rapprochement process. Statements that affirm leaders’ confidence in the 
rapprochement process also increase the level of trust between the parties, positively 
preoccupy the public over the process and elucidate the importance of the 
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rapprochement effort. In several occasions statements, and especially the ones 
included in speeches which are given during official visits in exchange of 
amiabilities is a commonplace. But they hardly mean anything more than being 
compliment paid to other party. However, there are occasions that official 
statements can make huge advances towards the rapprochement process. For 
example in the 1950s rapprochement, the statements that were made by Plastiras 
and Köprülü in Paris, can be considered as a turning-point in the Greek-Turkish 
relations.  
Apart from those that have already been mentioned, there are several other 
occasions when Turkish and Greek political leaders made strong statements 
regarding the high importance and priority they confer on Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. In 1950, Köprülü gave an interview to a Greek newspaper and he 
stated:  
There is no disagreement. We have the best feelings towards Greece. We 
believe that your politicians also share those feelings, and as until now, in 
the future they will continue the same policies towards Turkey. The Greek-
Turkish friendship constitutes a solid basis for the well-being of the two 
nations and the global peace. I will personally work towards the 
strengthening of our ties (To Vima, 26/5/1950)     
In March 1952 General Plastiras gave an interview to the Turkish newspaper 
Milliyet, where he asked specifically about the Greek-Turkish friendship and his 
thoughts about the rapprochement. In his answer he said: 
These two nations must be united, they have to be one…I believe in the 
Greek-Turkish friendship and union. And I can see that with your actions 
you want to give more value to this closeness (Milliyet, 8/3/1952)    
In addition, going beyond the official statements, there were other 
occurrences in which parties mutually demonstrated their high level of amity, 
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indicating prevalent mood of amity between Turkey and Greece at the time. For 
instance, On May 14, 1954 the Turkish Ambassador to Athens Mr. Taray was 
awarded with the Certificate of Honorary Chairman of the Greek-Turkish 
Association as recognition for his contribution to the Greek-Turkish friendship (To 
Vima, 15/1/1954). Another important gesture of good will was the change of title 
from “minority schools” to “Turkish schools” (Türk İlkokulları) with law 
3065/1954 which was initiated by General Papagos (Firat, 2008: 592-593).  
f. Rapprochement’s influence on the society level 
While the rapprochement on the political, military and economic fronts 
between Turkey and Greece drastically grew, contacts between the Greeks and 
Turks at the grassroots level, too, flourished. There are several examples of such 
contacts, including contacts between civil-society actors, athletes, artists, 
intellectuals, students, institutions etc.  According to Alexandris (1991; 119), 
cultural exchanges between Greece and Turkey increased significantly after 1948. 
Student exchanges between Turkish and Greek schools and universities 
became quite common. In the summer of 1950 for example, a group of 76 female 
students from the Kozani high-school visited Turkey and were hosted by Çapa 
Lisesi (Milliyet, 24/5/1950). In early August 1952, a group of 30 Turkish students 
visited the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki where they were warmly welcomed (To 
Vima, 8/8/1950). In April 1952 University of Athens’ rector accompanied by a 
group of students visited Istanbul during the Easter Break (Milliyet, 25/4/1952).    
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Additionally, on December 20, 1952 the Turkish intellectual Ismet Mardan 
gave a lecture in a Turkish theatre before a predominantly Greek audience in 
Athens. On this special occasion, Stratis Mirivilis, a well-known Greek author, was 
present and actually made the opening remarks (Ta Nea, 22/12/1952). A few days 
later Mardan gave another speech regarding the role of women in the Turkish 
society at the Greek-American Educational Institute in Athens (To Vima, 
30/12/1952). Ismet Mardan had in the past translated Greek theatrical plays to 
Turkish, which were then played in Turkey with a great success (To Vima, 
26/5/1949). In 1954, the Greek National Theatre arranged a number of 
performances in Istanbul and Ankara, while the Turkish National Theatre was also 
invited to visit Greece. A number of Greek plays had planned to perform in Turkey 
during the summer and autumn of 1954 (To Vima, 26/5/1949). In March 1955 
Turkish singer Safiye Ayla gave a performance of Turkish folk music at the 
Kotopouli Theatre in Athens (To Vima, 20/3/1955).    
Civil-society organizations and quasi-officials were also active during the 
early 1950s. In early May 1951, members of the Greek-Turkish board 
(Ελληνοτουρκικός Σύνδεσµος) met with the speaker of the Turkish Parliament 
Refik Koraltan (To Vima, 4/5/1951). At the same time the mayor of Istanbul hosted 
members of the Athens Doctors Association at the Yildiz Palace (To Vima, 
4/5/1951). On April 7, 1954, a group of mayors from Athens visited Istanbul where 
they received a warm welcome. During their visit they met with Turkish officials, 
the Patriarch and the Greek Consul (To Vima, 8/4/1954). In July 1954, the “Κέντρο 
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Κωνσταντινουπολιτών” (People from Istanbul Centre) was founded in Athens. The 
organization aimed, among others, to support the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (Ta 
Nea, 17/5/1954). Other organizations, such as the “Pancretan Greek-Turkish 
Friendship Association”, took initiatives for the strengthening of the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement (Ta Nea, 3/12/1952). 
On March 18, 1953, an earthquake occurred in the Marmara Sea causing 
many deaths and disasters. Greece was one of the first countries to come up with 
help to Turkey. The Greek Red Cross sent medical equipment, food and supplies, 
while a number of volunteers from Greece also participated in the mission (National 
Audiovisual Archive, Annotation of Asset D2491).   
Finally, on several other occasions, sports games were organized with the 
participation of Greek and Turkish athletes. For instance, in April 1951 Greek-
Turkish sports games were organized in Athens with participation of Greek athletes 
and Turkish athletes of Fenerbahce and Demirspor (To Vima, 21/4/1951). Moreover, 
in several occasions the friendly football matches were played between Greek and 
Turkish teams (army teams, youth teams etc) (see for example Milliyet 20/12/1950; 
Milliyet 19/12/1951). 
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 Table 5.2. 
 
Rapprochement Process 
  
 
Indicator 
 
Main events 
 
Frequency 
 
Importance 
 
Summit level 
meetings 
S. Venizelos’ visit in 
1952 
Menderes’ visit to 
Athens 1952 
King and Queen of 
Greece visit 1952 
Celal Bayar’s visit to 
Greece 1952 
Papagos’ visit 1953 
Menderes’ visit 1954  
 
High 
 
High 
 
Agreements 
Signed 
Friendship and 
Cooperation 
Agreement in 1953, 
Coalition Treaty in 
1954, and a number of 
other minor 
agreements  
 
High 
 
High 
 
Military 
cooperation 
Mainly within NATO 
framework, also 
included consultation, 
joint exercises, and 
meetings among high 
ranking officers  
 
High 
 
High 
 
Economic 
cooperation 
The most important 
development was the 
signing of the 
commercial agreement 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Statements/ 
Gestures 
Several positive 
statements and 
gestures 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Societal level 
Communication 
between societies 
increase considerably 
and cover many 
different activities 
such as sports, 
education, civil 
society 
 
High 
 
High 
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5.8. The End of the Rapprochement 
The improvement of relations that Turkey and Greece experienced during 
the first years of the 1950s came to an abrupt end in September 1955. On September 
6, ten minutes after midnight, a bomb situated in the courtyard of the Turkish 
Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building adjacent to the house wherein Kemal Ataturk 
was born, exploded. Beginning at around 5:00pm, Turkish mobs devastated the 
Greek, Armenian, and Jewish districts of Istanbul, killing approx. 37 Greeks and 
causing damage on minority properties and worship places (Zayas, 2007: 138). The 
September Pogrom, as it was later revealed, was plotted by the Turkish Government 
in order to add extra pressure on the Greek delegation that was at the time 
discussing the Cyprus question at the London Conference (Weiker, 1980). Soon 
after Greece passed a new nationality law, the Greek Nationality Code (law 
3370/1955), which stripped Greek nationality from citizens of non-Greek descent 
(αλλογενείς) who were leaving the country (article 19). According to Sitaropoulos 
(2004: 205-206) 60,004 Greek citizens lost their nationality between 1955 and 
1998. 
The unfortunate events that happened in Istanbul deeply shocked Greek 
government and the public, while the coverage in the Greek media continued for 
many days after the events. On September 10, only few days after the Istanbul 
pogrom, American officials recognized that the Greek-Turkish friendship did not 
exist anymore (Ta Nea, 10/9/1955).           
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The pogrom against the Greek minority in Istanbul, and other cities in 
Turkey, should be seen as a spinoff of the Cyprus question. Ultimately it was the 
disagreements between Turkey and Greece on the future of Cyprus that ended the 
1950s rapprochement. As Coufoudakis (1985: 190) puts it, “the foundations of the 
Greek-Turkish détente were not strong enough to withstand the shock waves of the 
growing Cyprus dispute”. In addition, it should be added that although the 
September 1955 Istanbul events constituted the gravestone of the 1950s 
rapprochement, it was apparent that Greece and Turkey’s interests had been clashing 
over Cyprus since autumn 1954. A 1954 article observes that:  
…whatever the two governments may proclaim, the Turko-Greek union 
is none too solidly based. The two countries have conflicting interests 
and the present undercurrent of rivalry over Cyprus, fishing interests, 
and other minor matters, is not too happy an augury for the future 
(Helm, 1954: 439).   
 
5.8.1. The Cyprus Question Factor in the Greek-Turkish Relations 
The island of Cyprus was captured by the Ottomans in 1571, and was part of 
the Ottoman Empire until 1878. At that time it was assigned to Great Britain 
through the Convention of Defensive Alliance that the two parties signed on June 4, 
187836. Although Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus in 1914, Turkey ratified the 
British annexation with the Sevres Peace Treaty, and also in 1923 with the 
Lausanne’s Treaty (for the original documents see Hakki, 2007: 5-7). As the post-
world war era favored self-determination and decolonization, voices from the Greek 
                                                         
36 Also an annex to this Convention was signed on July 1st  
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Cypriots for “enosis” (the union of the island with Greece) started becoming 
stronger37.  
Greece was reluctant to open a Cyprus debate, not out of fear of the Turkish 
side, but in order to not upset its relations with Britain. Thus, in the Paris Peace 
Conference there was no mention of the Cyprus question by the Greek Government 
(Crawshaw, 1978: 57). Nonetheless, in March 1947, the Greek parliament 
unanimously expressed the hope that the union with Cyprus would be realized 
(Crawshaw, 1978: 58). Nonetheless, until the end of 1949 the Greek government 
was too preoccupied fighting the communist guerillas to pursue the Cyprus issue 
(Xydis, 1966: 3). 
 In 1950, the same year that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement started, two 
events further strengthened the struggle of the Greek-Cypriots union. In January, a 
plebiscite was organized by the Ethnarchy38, where more than 97% of those who 
voted expressed themselves in favor of “Enosis” (Xydis, 1966). In October, 
Archbishop Makarios III was elected and took on the union cause. He stated, “No 
offer of a constitution or any other compromise would be accepted by the people of 
Cyprus” (Crawshaw, 1978: 50-51).    
Nevertheless, the Greek government was still reluctant to pursue the issue, 
fearing that the conditions at that time, did not allow for much optimism. Prime 
Minister Papagos for instance, on a speech to the parliament on December 17, 1952, 
                                                         
37 Although it should be noted that an unsuccessful uprising against the British occupation had also 
occurred in 1931  
38 Archdiocese of Cyprus 
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stressed the importance of the Greek-Turkish friendship, and mentioned that the 
Cyprus issue would be dealt within the framework of current realities (Crawshaw, 
1978: 67-68). Earlier that year, in June, Makarios had visited Athens and had gotten 
a promise from Sophocles Venizelos that he would examine the possibility of taking 
the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. However, he added that any decision would 
have to take into account the wider necessities of Greek foreign policy (Holland, 
1998: 38). 
In the meantime, Turkish interest on the issue also started to grow and on 
several occasions Turkish officials warned their Greek counterparts that Turkey 
would not accept a future union of Cyprus with Greece. In 1951, Köprülü had 
warned the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs that Greece should not open the 
Cyprus question and that if it did it would find the whole of Turkey against it, and, 
furthermore, that the Greek-Turkish friendship irrevocably damaged (Mutercimler 
and Oke, 2004: 293). In addition, “the Turkish Ambassador in Athens had informed 
the Greek government that Turkey desired to maintain the status quo on Cyprus, that 
any negotiations on the island should include Turkey and that the debate in the UN 
would undermine Greek-Turkish relations” (Xydis, 1966: 10). In 1954, before a 
meeting between Papagos and Menderes in Athens, the Turkish Ambassador adjured 
Kyrou39 against mentioning the Cyprus issue to the Greek Premier, saying that such 
a conversation would have extremely unpleasant consequences on the Greek-
Turkish alliance (Xydis, 1966: 12).   
                                                         
39 Greek Ambassador to the UN  
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Finally, Greece decided to take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations in 
1954. In April of 1954, the Greek government warned the British that if bilateral 
talks did not begin before August 20, they would go to the UN. Yet, the British 
response was not positive. On June 29, the British Foreign Office issued a basic 
statement about the Cyprus question; stating that “any British statement of policy 
for Cyprus should declare self-government and not self-determination to be the 
ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a Commonwealth fortress” (Holland, 1998: 
36). 
The negative British response led the Greek Government to appeal to the 
United Nations. Joseph (1997: 36), who analyzes the Cyprus question within the 
analytical context of the Greek-Turkish relations, observes that the Greek appeal to 
the UN Assembly constituted a turning point in the Greek and Turkish involvement 
in Cyprus. Indeed, as talks proceeded, not only was it made clear that the Greek and 
Turkish positions were incompatible, but it was also the first time Greece and 
Turkey publicly disagreed on such an important topic. As a rebuttal to the Greek 
claims for union, the Turkish representative pointed out that the Greek case was 
based on the false assumption that Cyprus was Greek, while on the contrary it was 
an extension of Anatolia. He also stressed that Turkey would not accept any change 
in the status of Cyprus which did not have its whole-hearted consent (Crawshaw, 
1978: 87). 
The beginning of the armed struggle led by the Greek Cypriot organization 
EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) in April of 1955, created new 
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circumstances on the island. The British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, 
decided to call a tripartite conference in London among Britain, Greece, and 
Turkey, with no Cypriots participating, in order to discuss the future of Cyprus. The 
conference, which produced no results whatsoever, within a few days managed to 
accomplish what was avoided for several years. The Cyprus quarrel had shifted 
from an Anglo-Greek one to a primarily Greco-Turkish one (Holland, 1995: 39). It 
was during the London conference, on September 6th and 7th, that the events against 
the Greek minority in Turkey took place. 
 
5.8.2. Other Variables that Influenced the End of the Rapprochement 
Apart from the Cyprus question and the pogrom against the Greek 
population of Istanbul and other Turkish cities, another event that happened 
approximately at the same time also influenced the Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
negatively. In 1953 Stalin died, and 1955, one year after the Bled coalition treaty, 
was marked by considerable improvement in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. On May 
26, 1955, a Soviet delegate led by Khrushchev, visited Belgrade and the two sides 
signed the “Belgrade declaration”, and agreed on mutual respect and non-
interference in each other’s domestic affairs (Bjelakovic, 1999; 110). Combined 
with the developments in the Greek-Turkish front, the Balkan Pact would remain 
inactive and all the processes that the treaty envisaged were paused (Valinakis, 
1989: 55).   
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5.9. Assessment of the 1950s Greek-Turkish Rapprochement 
The rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, that happened in early the 
1950s and ended in 1955 constitutes a failed effort of rapprochement, as the two 
countries were not able to extent their good relations for more than a few years. 
Even though the two states managed to make considerable progress on almost all of 
the rapprochement process’ indicators, they were not able to prevent the collapse of 
the process. In addition, the agreements that were signed, and that were one of the 
main outcomes of the rapprochement process, became ineffective as soon as the 
relations between the two states deteriorated in early September of 1955. In the 
following pages, the contribution of each of the independent variables to the 
unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement process will be discussed.  
 
• Impact of the international system to the national security 
It has already been pointed out that one of the main incentives for the 
initiation of the rapprochement was the challenge posed by the post-WWII 
international environment on both Turkey and Greece. These conditions not only 
continued for the period following the initiation of the rapprochement, but also 
became even more prevalent as the competition between the two major powers 
intensified in the early 1950s and the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, 
emerged. Under these conditions, the incentives for continuing the rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey increased, as rapprochement increased the security 
levels for both these states.  
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In order to elaborate the above point better, it must be pointed out that the 
armies of Turkey and Greece combined constituted a much stronger deterrent against 
a possible attacker. In addition, the Greek and Turkish General Staffs had managed 
to develop close cooperation in the first half of the 1950s, and the Coalition treaty 
further enhanced this cooperation. This fact allowed a common planning of defense 
strategies, which, in turn, made military cooperation even more efficient. Failing to 
continue the rapprochement process meant that the two states would also have to 
sacrifice much of their security towards their northern neighbors. 
The unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement, despite the increased 
motives for its continuation provided by the international system, shows that this 
variable did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement process. 
 
• State identity 
Unlike the first rapprochement, the second rapprochement took place 
between two states that, more or less, perceived each other as friends and not as 
possible threats. The foundations for such perceptions were largely based on the 
impact of the positive relations that prevailed during the 1930s, and more generally 
put, on the positive experience that the first rapprochement constituted. The ill 
treatment of the non-Muslim minorities, by the Turkish state during WWII, caused 
some skepticism, but was not enough on its own to create prevalent negative images 
among the Greek population against the Turks. 
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Another issue that must be raised is that, during the period that the current 
chapter covers, state identities were largely, if not exclusively, shaped by the 
international structure. For states like Turkey and Greece, which belong to the 
western world, communism was the “great evil” and, hence, the main state identity 
developed was anti-communistic and pro-western. This is quite clear if one takes a 
look at the Greek and Turkish newspapers between 1950 and 1955. The existence of 
a common enemy for Greece and Turkey further helped the creation of positive 
images between the two states by constructing the image of two states fighting 
together against a common threat. In that sense, communism played a role similar to 
the one Bulgaria and the revisionist powers played in the 1930s. 
As far as the state images are concerned, their impact on the failure of the 
rapprochement is hard to estimate. It is true that the positive images that prevailed 
during the first half of the 1950s changed sharply after the events in Istanbul in 
September of 1955. However, it is equally true that some changes also took place 
before that time, and after the incompatibility of the Greek and Turkish goals 
concerning Cyprus became clear, sometime in the summer of 1955. In that sense, the 
change of state identities did not cause the end of the rapprochement, but instead, it 
much more likely that it was in large part due to the pogrom against the Istanbul 
Greeks. 
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• Costs and benefits equilibrium 
The costs/benefits equilibrium did not play a role in the abrupt ending of the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement process. On the contrary, the benefits from the 
process and the low costs of maintaining a close relationship would have been 
expected to positively impact the process and create high incentives for both states to 
try and keep the rapprochement going. In other words, the main assumption deriving 
from the examination of the 1950s rapprochement is that at the time the 
rapprochement ended the benefits outnumbered the costs, and that both Greece and 
Turkey lost significant benefits when the rapprochement process ended in September 
1995. 
Similar to the first rapprochement case, the first to benefit from the 
rapprochement were the minorities. Indeed, much like the 1930s, the conditions of 
the minorities improved. The general assumption for the minorities is that their 
living conditions followed the developments of the Greek-Turkish relations. As it 
was already mentioned, during the first half of the 1950s relations between the 
Turkish government and the Patriarchate reached their peak after the establishment 
of the Turkish state, while Greece approved the use of the term “Turkish” in order to 
describe minority institutions in western Thrace, a decision that caused problems for 
Greek governments that followed (Coufoudakis, 1985).             
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• Interdependence 
Economic benefits resulting from the rapprochement process were clear for 
both states. The volume of trade between Turkey and Greece increased, and the 
policy makers worked towards this direction. The financial benefits that could derive 
from friendly relations were not only highlighted by political leaders at the 
beginning of the rapprochement, as it was discussed earlier, but also became the 
subject for analysis. In an article that appeared on the Greek press (Oikonomikos 
Taxidromos, 2/9/1954), for instance, Professor Lung from the University of Zagreb, 
analyzed the importance of a closer tripartite economic cooperation and arrived at 
the conclusion that the possibilities of a Turkish, Greek, and Yugoslav economic 
cooperation could endorse many more activities than trade alone.  
The developing economic relations and the prospects for future benefits, 
however, were not enough to lead to a successful rapprochement, and, definitely, not 
enough to prevent the failure of the rapprochement process. The main assumption is 
that despite the increase in trade volume and the willingness for further cooperation 
in this sector, interdependence was not a significant enough factor in relation to the 
success or failure of the rapprochement case, as far as the 1950s case is concerned.  
 
• Leadership 
Compared to the first rapprochement, the role of the leaders was less 
important for the initiation of the process. This is mainly because, unlike the 1930s, 
in the 1950s rapprochement, Turkey and Greece had no important issues to solve, 
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and, hence, the political decision for a rapprochement had no complicated 
repercussions. Nonetheless, when looking at leadership as an independent variable, 
the assumption is that affected the failure of the process, meaning that Greek and 
Turkish political leaders could have possibly prevented the rapprochement process’ 
failure, but failed to do so.  
As far as the Greek side is concerned, Greek politicians had failed to deal 
with the emerging Cyprus issue in a way that would take Turkey’s interests under 
consideration, even though they had been warned several times by their Turkish 
colleagues. As it was mentioned earlier, Greek leaders, such as Papagos and 
Sophocles Venizelos, had been very careful in dealing with the Cyprus question and 
had publicly expressed that the Greek-Turkish friendship should not be interrupted 
because of Cyprus. After 1954, however, the Greek government was not able to 
resist the public sentiment and followed a more decisive approach, which although 
it was aiming against the British colonial rule, greatly dissatisfied Turkey.  
Likewise, Turkish leaders had the chance to save the rapprochement process, 
but were unable, or, unwilling to do so. Their main responsibility lay on the fact that 
they failed to protect the Greek population of Istanbul during the events of 
September 1955. As these events were the decisive and final blow to the 
rapprochement process, it is only logical to assume that had they been avoided the 
rapprochement process might had the chance to continue and become a successful 
case. 
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• Depth of the process 
In the literature review chapter it was argued that when the rapprochement 
process has an important impact on all of the rapprochement’s indicators, then the 
process’ chances for success increase. Nonetheless, this was not the case for the 
second Greek-Turkish rapprochement. On the one hand, as it is clear from table 5.2, 
the rapprochement process influenced all of the indicators of the rapprochement 
process, including the summit level meetings, military cooperation and the society. 
On the other hand, the considerable progress of the rapprochement process did not 
manage to prevent the failure of the rapprochement, as the problems causing its 
collapse could not be overcome. 
 
• Turning points 
It has been made clear that a series of unexpected and unfortunate events 
were the main reasons leading to the failure of the rapprochement process. The 
Cyprus problem is considered by far the main factor in ending the 1950s 
rapprochement. Though it still remains uncertain why the Greek government did not 
heed the Turkish warnings that the Turkish officials voiced numerous times 
throughout the years, the most plausible explanation is that Papagos simply ignored 
the Turkish interests in Cyprus, as it is supported by a number of indications 
(Coufoudakis, 1985). One of the indications is that the considerably close relations 
between Greece and Turkey created the impression to the Greek policy makers that 
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eventually the Turkish reaction would be mild, especially because neither of the 
countries considered the other as a potential threat.       
The events in Istanbul in September of 1955, constituted a blow to the 
rapprochement process in two ways. On the one hand, they shocked the Greek 
public. It is true that the Cyprus issue had already caused some unfriendly feelings in 
both the Greek and Turkish public opinions before 1955. Tachau (1959: 259) 
notices:  
[In Turkey]…public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 
became permeated with sentiments of anger and frustration. By the time 
Turkish interests in the dispute were recognized with the calling of the 
Tripartite Conference in London late in August, feeling within the country 
had reached fever pitch. 
However, the September events created a much stronger trauma and feelings 
of enmity than the ones that had been prevalent in the Greek public opinion up until 
that point. On the other hand, the September events weakened an actor, the Greek 
minority in Istanbul, which had supported, and could have continued to do so, the 
rapprochement process.  
Finally, the strengthening of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, although of secondary importance, should also be considered as an event that 
contributed to the unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement. Not only were the 
tripartite agreements of 1953 and 1954 weakened, but also the possibility for 
Yugoslavia to play a mediating role in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus had 
diminished. 
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•   GRIT strategy 
Similar to the first case, the use (or not) of the GRIT strategy during 
negotiations is an irrelevant independent variable in respect with the success or 
failure of the rapprochement. During the early 1950s there were no negotiations 
between Greece and Turkey as there was no real conflict between them. Most of the 
problems between the two countries had been resolved before 1930, and during the 
1950s discussions between leaders mostly focused on how to further develop 
cooperation, rather than on how to solve issues.  
   
5.10. Concluding Remarks 
Besides the promising cooperative trends that were achieved in the late 1940s 
and throughout the first half of the 1950s, Greece and Turkey did not manage to 
create a solid basis that could withstand the frustrations caused by the Cyprus 
question. From 1955 onwards, the Greek-Turkish relations would never reach the 
level of cooperation that was achieved in the 1930s and during the 1950s 
unsuccessful rapprochement. On the contrary, as it will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the Cyprus question became a major problem and a source of continuous 
friction between Turkey and Greece, and the two countries, in fact, came to the brink 
of war several times before the next effort for rapprochement was attempted in 1987.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE 1988 GREEK-TURKISH UNSUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The Cyprus issue which became the main cause of the failure of the 1950’s 
rapprochement should not be perceived as “just another problem”. Indeed, its 
importance and its overall impact on the Greek-Turkish relations has been greater 
than any other issue between the two states. In aftermath of 1955, and especially 
after 1974, the situation in Cyprus is the main factor shaping Greek-Turkish 
relations40. In a way Cyprus woke up feelings between Greeks and Turks that had 
been buried for decades. It offered a new ground for contest and new space for 
irredentism to develop. In a way Cyprus became a second Asia Minor; a battlefield 
for another clash between Greek and Turkish nationalisms.  
Consequently, even though few things relating to the pre-1955 status quo 
between Turkey and Greece changed, the Cyprus issue constituted such a strong 
                                                         
40 This is the case for both the third and the fourth rapprochements  
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catalyst, that Turkey and Greece started perceiving each other as competitors 
engaged in a zero-sum game. In turn, new issues arose relating to the Aegean Sea 
waters and airspace, while the conditions for the minorities worsened as well. 
During the decades following the 1950s, all these issues were compiled in order to 
form what is currently our understanding of the Greek-Turkish conflict.      
Although, the relations between Greece and Turkey improved briefly in the 
early 1960s after the signing of the London agreements, establishing an 
independent Cyprus state, the first real effort for a new rapprochement occurred 
only in 1988, when the Turkish Prime minister Turgut Özal, and his Greek 
counterpart Andreas Papandreou met in Davos, and tried to initiate a new era for 
the Greek-Turkish relations, what is now remembered as “the Davos spirit”. In this 
chapter, the 1988 rapprochement will be discussed, and the reasons for its failure 
will be examined.  
 
6.2. Historical Background to the 1988 Rapprochement 
Before examining the 1988 rapprochement, it is important to discuss 
developments in Greek-Turkish relations in the previous years. Undoubtedly, the 
most serious blow to the relations between Turkey and Greece came in 1974 with 
Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus following the unsuccessful attempt by the 
ruling junta in Greece to overthrow the Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios. 
Concomitantly, from 1973 onwards the tension in the Aegean Sea began to rise and 
reach its zenith in 1976 when the two states reached the brink of a war. In 1976, 
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following a number of meetings between Greek and Turkish experts an agreement 
was finally signed in Bern on November 11, which arranged a framework for future 
negotiations between Turkey and Greece. The agreement was kept secret from the 
media (art. 5), while the two signatories agreed to abstain from any action that 
would threaten the negotiations (articles 6 & 7) (for the full text of the agreement 
see To Vima 29/3/1987). From 1977 until 1981, a number of meetings—including 
five experts meetings and 11 meetings at the level of Foreign Ministries’ Secretary 
Generals, and a summit level meeting between the Greek Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Karamanlis and his Turkish counterpart Bulent Ecevit, on March 11 
& 12 1978 in Montreux—took place. However, no progress came of the said 
meetings.  
In 1981 all negotiations between Greece and Turkey collapsed as a result of 
the change of government in Greece. The newly elected Greek Prime Minister, 
Andreas Papandreou, had in the past used hardliner rhetoric on Turkey, and his 
party officially defended a position according to which negotiations were useful 
only when both parties have something to claim, and as Greece did not claim 
anything from Turkey then no negotiation between the two states should take place. 
While in opposition, Papandreou had continuously criticized the New Democracy 
government for engaging in negotiations with Turkey. Moreover, during the 1976 
crisis Papandreou issued a call to “Sink the Hora”41, an action that would most 
                                                         
41 Hora is the oceanographic Turkish vessel involved in the Summer 1976 Aegean incident 
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likely result in war between Greece and Turkey if it had been implemented by the 
Greek government (Clogg, 1987: 139).  
Hence, it was not surprising that Greek-Turkish relations further 
deteriorated during the first years of the 1980s. In December 1982, following 
repeated Greek allegations of Turkish infringements of the Greek airspace, 
Papandreou handed out personally a memorandum detailing the Turkish 
infringements at the NATO ministerial council meeting. In September 1983, Greece 
boycotted the NATO military exercise “Display Determination ‘83” in an 
expression of protest for the Turkish insistence that the island of Lemnos should be 
demilitarized. In addition, the unilateral declaration of independence of Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, on November 15, 1983 and the Greece newly 
adopted defense doctrine, which considered Turkey rather than the Warsaw pact as 
the main source of threat, in December 1984, brought Greek-Turkish relations to a 
new low. The puzzle of hostile relations in the 1980s was completed by two border 
incidents. The first one in 1984 concerned allegations that Turkish destroyers fired 
against Greek destroyers observing them from within Greek territorial waters 
during an exercise. The second incident took place in December 1986 when Turkish 
and Greek border patrols exchanged fire on the Evros river, resulting in the death of 
two Turkish and one Greek soldier (on Greek-Turkish relations prior to 1987 
seeRizas, 2006; Rozakis, 1991; Herakleides, 2007; Bolukbasi, 2004; Bahceli, 1990; 
on the 1980s see Clogg, 1991: 18-19).    
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6.3. The March 1987 Aegean Crisis 
The short review of the relations between Greece and Turkey before 1988 
clearly indicates the high level of tension between the two neighboring states. This 
built-up tension was finally released in late March 1987 when Turkey and Greece 
engaged in another crisis in the Aegean Sea that once again dragged them on the 
brinks of violent conflict. The 1987 Aegean crisis is important as it made clear to 
both parties that if they did not try to improve their relations, not only the likelihood 
of future crises would be high, but also the scenario of engaging in warfare was 
possible. Thus, immediately after the end of the March 1987 crisis, steps were taken 
to initiate an effort that would result in a Greek-Turkish understanding.  
The road towards the crisis opened in February 1987 when a new 
exploration program for oil was announced by Denison Mines Ltd, a company at 
that time was partially owned by the Greek Public Oil Company (10% of its 
shares). Although Denison had been conducting oil surveys since 1976, this time 
the exploration targeted an area beyond the Greek territorial waters, at the 
Bambouras location, 10nm within the international waters of the Aegean Sea 
(Dimitrakis, 2007: 102). At the same time the Greek government drafted a law that 
would allow it to take control of the majority of Denison Mines’ shares and thus 
control its exploration program.   
It was not the first time that research for oil in the Aegean Sea and its 
exploration was causing friction between Turkey and Greece. Apart from the 
problems that arose between 1973 and 1976, also in the 1980s Greek exploration 
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activities were alarming to the Turkish government. In 1982, the Greek 
government, answering Turkish complaints, gave assurances that it would comply 
with the 1976 Bern Agreement and invoked a “force majeure” provision of the 
concession agreement in order to cease exploration activities (Bolukbasi, 2004: 
298)42. Similar demarches were made by the Turkish side after 1984, concerning 
exploration rights the Greek government had granted to the national petroleum 
company including areas beyond Greek territorial waters, close to Thermaikos and 
Strymonikos gulfs (Bolukbasi, 2004: 298). 
The Greek literature supports that the crisis was the outcome of a 
misunderstanding, as the decision of the Greek government to acquire the majority 
of Denison’s shares was aiming to stop the company’s exploration activities beyond 
Greece’s territorial waters (UN documents S/18766). Turkey, on the other hand, 
became convinced that the Greek government was planning to proceed with the 
exploration and exploitation activities beyond the 6 nm limit (See for example the 
letter sent by the Turkish permanent representative to the UN Ambassador Ilter 
Turkmen, UN documents S/18759). Turkey’s distrust was exacerbated after several 
statements made by Greek officials that the “how, where, and when” exploration 
and exploitation activities will take place is a decision that the Greek government, 
                                                         
42 At this point it should be noted that on several occasions the PASOK government had declared that 
it did not recognize the Bern Agreement. In March 1982, the deputy minister of foreign affairs had 
informed the Greek Ambassador to Ankara that “…the Greek government considers inalienable its 
rights to conduct research drilling and mining within the Greek Aegean Shelf”. Also in June 23, 1983 
Yannis Kapsis, deputy minister of foreign affairs, informed the Turkish ambassador Mr. Alacam that 
the Bern Agreement does not mean anything to Greeks, while in September 1985 Kapsis repeated the 
same to Turkish Ambassador Mr. Akiman who replaced Alacam. See Andreas Papandreou speech at 
the Greek parliament, see Ta Nea 6/10/1985   
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and nobody else, will take (UN documents S/18766). Lack of understanding 
between the Turkish Ambassador Mr. Akiman, and Greek deputy MFA Mr. Kapsis 
was also one of the reasons that prevented the diffusion of the crisis (Dimitrakis, 
2007: 104). Finally, Stephen Roman, the Denison’s Chairman, contributed to the 
creation of the misunderstanding by (dis)informing President Özal that the Greek 
government indented to nationalize the company in order to proceed with oil 
surveys beyond her territorial waters (Dimitrakis, 2007). On February 24, Denison 
announced that the drilling at Bambouras location had already been agreed with the 
Greek government (Ta Nea, 25/2/1985), something that the Greek government 
denied. 
The crisis peaked on March 26, when Turkey published a map including 
areas of the Aegean Sea where the Turkish government was granting exploration 
and exploitation rights to the Turkish national oil company TPAO in the 
government newspaper (Resmi Gazete).  These areas included parts of the Aegean 
Sea, to the west of the Greek islands of Lesvos and Lemnos (Ta Nea 27/3/1987). 
On the same day the Turkish Security Council met and decided to send the “Hora” 
to the Aegean for oil surveys (Milliyet, 27/3/1987)43. Several harsh statements by 
both Greek and Turkish officials followed this only to further deteriorate the 
situation, while a meeting between Ambassador Akiman and Mr. Kapsis fell too 
short to yield any result. On March 27, the Greek Navy was already in its combat 
position. The Greek destroyers patrolled to the east of Lemnos island, waiting 
                                                         
43 The Hora was at that time renamed as Sismik 1 
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overthere for the Sismik and its escorts to arrive. Similarly, the Greek air force 
sustained a 3, 5 minute preparedness level and land forces were quickly settling into 
a battle position across the Evros river (Ta Nea, 28/3/1987). Papandreou made a 
statement saying that Greece would protect its rights over the Aegean Sea, and that 
the Greek armed forces would give a bitter lesson if Turkey continued its 
provocations (Milliyet 28/3/1987). On the other hand, Özal, who was at the time 
visiting England, appeared calmer and stated on BBC that “There is the Bern 
Agreement. We have to comply with it… I am not interested on this issue any more, 
we will see what happens” (Milliyet 28/3/1987). The crisis was finally diffused on 
March 28, and the press in both Greece and Turkey perceived its ending as a win of 
their respective states (Milliyet 29/3/1987; Ta Nea 30/3/1987; see also Kapsis, 
1990, for an extended narrative of the crisis from a Greek perspective). 
 
6.4 The Initiation of the Rapprochement 
The Aegean crisis that occurred in March 1987 was the starting point for a 
number of developments that finally led to the initiation of the third Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement 10 months later, in January 1988. There is little information on the 
exact events that took place during these 10 months as all parties involved were 
very cautious so that there are no leaks concerning the process. In general, what can 
be said is that the situation was similar to the 1928-30 negotiations period, although 
in a different context. Given the hostile relations between the two states and the 
lack of public support for a possible understanding between Greece and Turkey, the 
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negotiations remained secret, involved a very limited number of people and were 
extremely topic specific.  
 
6.5. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement 
The most decisive moment that took place during the crisis was 
Papandreou’s meeting with the Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akiman, which took 
place on the morning of March 29 after the Greek prime minister’s invitation. This 
meeting had a huge impact both on the diffusion of the crisis and what followed the 
months after. According to Akiman44, Papandreou welcomed him not in his office 
but in a bungalow that was also part of the property. The two men were alone 
without the presence of other diplomats, advisors etc. The Greek Prime Minister 
served the Turkish ambassador some whisky and explained to him that he believed 
“he could do business with Mr. Özal”, and that the next step should be to discuss a 
protocol on what the next steps must be and what is to be discussed. He also added 
that “if Venizelos and Inonu were successful, we can also be successful”. 
Based on Akiman’s description of his meeting with Andreas Papandreou it is 
clear that the Greek prime minister tried to take the first step by opening to the 
other side. The unofficial and friendly tone that Papandreou gave during the 
meeting, by seeing Akiman in the bungalow and serving drinks himself, must also 
be considered as an indication of a step-back from his previous hard rhetoric. In 
order to remove the crisis and open the lines of communication with Turkey, 
                                                         
44 Interviewed by the author 
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Papandreou had to “lose face” and also confess the disappointment that Mr. Kapsis, 
whom he had appointed, had caused him. In a way, the opening of the meeting 
produced a similar effect with Venizelos’ speech which ended the Megali Idea. In a 
similar way, the meeting with Akiman signaled the end of Papandreou’s 
intransigence and the adoption of a new outlook regarding the Greek-Turkish 
relations.  
The meeting also had a great trust-building effect. Papandreou’s admission 
that he believed he could come to terms with Özal was an important step to that 
direction. Earlier that morning Özal also instructed Akiman to reason with 
Papandreou directly45, as the Turkish Prime Minister also believed that Papandreou 
would do his best to moderate the crisis. The developing understanding between the 
Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers was important to the trust-building process. It 
should be also emphasized that the only other person involved in the 
communication between Papandreou and Özal was Ambassador Akiman46, who 
travelled several times between Athens and Ankara to personally deliver the notes 
each prime minister sent to the other.  
Following the first meeting an unusual type of shuttle diplomacy started 
between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers. This process resembles 
correspondence processes in other rapprochement cases. For instance, there are 
commonalities with the personal correspondence between Venizelos and Inonu in 
                                                         
45 This call was very likely recorded by the Greek secret services and it is probable what caused 
Papandreou’s invitation about an hour later 
46 There is no information of any participation of the Greek Ambassador during the shuttle diplomacy 
phase 
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1928, or between George Papandreou and Ismail Cem in 1999. There are of course 
differences between the 1987 process and the other two, most notably the duration 
that the period of exchanging letters took. Nonetheless, the goal, which was to 
prepare the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement, was common across 
these three cases. 
To sum up, leaving the special conditions that shaped the 1987 pre-initiation 
period aside, it is clear that some of the basic steps leading towards the initiation of 
the rapprochement process were present in this third case as well. Taking the first 
step, trust-building and preparing of the ground were steps that were followed in 
1987, as they have also been followed in the other cases, although they were 
manifested in various ways. 
 
Table 6.1. 
 
Action/ 
Event  
Aegean 
Crisis 
Papandreou 
meets 
Turkish 
ambassador 
Papandreou 
meets 
Turkish 
ambassador 
Message 
diplomacy   
Time March 1987 
March 29, 
1987 
March 29, 
1987 
March 
1987- 
January 
1988 
  
Effect 
Pressure 
for 
cooperati
on 
First step 
towards a 
dialogue 
Trust-
building  
Trust-
building  
– 
preparing 
the 
ground 
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6.6. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1988 Rapprochement  
As two neighboring countries with a leading role to play in the South East 
Europe, Greece and Turkey had several stakes in advancing their relations to a 
higher level. Hostile relations between the two states deprived them of valuable 
resources and were costly. As the past experiences already proved, improved 
relations offered significant benefits. Domestic political situation in Turkey and 
Greece for instance favored rapprochement as the two prime ministers were facing 
urgent issues that were seeking solution. One of the main tasks Özal had to 
undertake was the smooth “civilianization” of Turkish political life (on this issue 
see Evin, 1994). The other major issue, that of security, was created by the rise of 
Kurdish nationalism and the armed struggle that the PKK and the Kurdish rebels 
started at the South-East part of Turkey (see Taspinar, 2005). Other than that, Özal 
stood for a modern society that would be moral, religiously pious and respectful to 
traditional value (Kalaycioglu, 2002). In Greece, during the last two years of 
PASOK’s rule (1987-1989), in which is included the period of the rapprochement, 
the party was increasingly fragile to the ongoing allegations about various scandals, 
including the infamous Koskotas scandal and Papandreou’s affair with the much 
younger stewardess Dimitra Liani. In turn these scandals caused instability to the 
government not only because a number of ministers quitted or were being 
dismissed, but also because the opposition parties started pressing for early 
elections (Mendrinou, 2006; Close, 2002, Clogg).      
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Economic considerations were also favorable for a Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. The 1980s was a time when Turkey tried to stabilize and open its 
economy (Onis, 1991). ANAPs (Anavatan Partisi) plan for economic revival was a 
mixture of maintaining the stabilization measures that had been adopted by the 
military government and liberal policies supporting the entrepreneurial spirit and 
limiting the state’s engagement in commerce and industry (Ilkin, 1991). In general, 
the economic policies adopted in the 1980s were quite fruitful, leading to a 
dramatic increase in exports of goods and services (Saracoglu, 1994). In Greece, 
following the 1985 elections, an effort for stabilizing the economy was assumed by 
adopting austerity measures, tight income policies, and efforts to control the public 
deficit. A new set of institutional/structural reforms that emphasized the 
liberalization of the banking system, the flexibility of the labor market and the 
promotion of the stock market were also adopted (Tsalakotos, 1998: 118; on 
PASOK’s economic policies see also to Pagoulatos 2006: 137 and Hekimoglou, 
2006). 
As far as the foreign policy strategies are concerned, rapprochement was 
favored by Özal’s ideas, who favored an effort for normalization of relations so 
much with the countries to the east as well as with the ones to the west of the 
Turkish borders. Foreign policy in Özal’s era was led by the economic and political 
interest rather than ideology (Steinbach, 1994). According to Birand (1991: 27), 
especially concerning the policy vis-à-vis Greece:  
The Turkish Prime Minister (Turgut Özal) introduced for the first time a 
policy aimed at changing the public opinion and the subconscious idea of 
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the “establishment” and the methods of approach, while at the same time 
trying to understand “the other side”. He decided to destroy the deeply 
rooted anti-Greek sentiments in his country, thereby undoing the taboos set 
aside by the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greece was now confronted with a 
whole new set of ideas and Özal made his courageous attempt to review the 
problem under a whole new light  
In general, Özal is considered as a promoter, or even the leader, of the neo-
ottomanism doctrine which dictated Turkey’s active engagement both in the East 
and the West (See Ataman, 2002; Cengiz Candar’s article, Sabah, 28/4/1992). As 
for Greece, much of the discussion on PASOK’s foreign policy focuses on how 
Papandreou shifted to a more pragmatic position towards those issues that matter to 
Greece’s foreign affairs (See for instance Coufoudakis 1983; Coufoudakis, 1988; 
Couloumbis and Yannis, 1983: 370-372). This change was mainly an outcome of 
the PASOK’s development from a small anti-juntist movement to a governing party 
between 1974 and 1981. However, to the extent that relations with Turkey were 
concerned Papandreou remained relatively consistent with his pre-1981 ideas. This 
inflexible approach towards Turkey continued after the 1985 elections, even 
though, emerging economy and security concerns favored an even more realistic 
view on foreign policy. As Coufoudakis (1988) states:  
On the core issues of Greek foreign policy, however, PASOK remained firm. 
Until the end of 1986, no direct negotiations were undertaken with Turkey 
despite pressures from the U.S., the EC, and the conservative opposition in 
the Parliament, as long as PASOK's preconditions for a dialogue with 
Turkey were not met. Greece also continued its nonparticipation in NATO 
exercises in the Aegean that questioned established command and control 
structures and other Greek sovereign rights; and continued to object to the 
normalization of Turkey's relations with the EC unless Turkey revoked 
discriminatory measures against the Greek minority of Istanbul   
The previous discussion leads to the assumption that some basic incentives 
for rapprochement were present both within the previous two cases and the present 
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case, which surfaced from 1988 onwards. However, it must be pointed out that 
none of these incentives actually played a role. The explanation is that relations 
between them had reached such a low point that Greece and Turkey were prepared 
to bear the costs of continuing hostile relations than cooperate. The option to 
cooperate was only explored after the March 1987 crisis, which made it apparent to 
both states that, if failed to improve their relations, the likelihood of an armed 
conflict between them could by no means be completely eliminated. 
Hence the Aegean crisis must be considered as the foremost, if not the only, 
incentive for the 1988 rapprochement. The rapid escalation caused a shock to both 
Turkey and Greece. It simultaneously made obvious that the two states were 
lacking even the basic communication channels that could contribute at times of 
crises so that issues could be solved in a peaceful manner. 
 
6.7. The Rapprochement Process 
At this point it is important to clarify that unlike the previous two cases of 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement, the one in 1988 was taking place at the time when 
great hostility and mistrust dominated the relations between them. Given that the 
two states could just avoid an armed confrontation in 1987; even a small, but 
essential, improvement can be counted as a rapprochement according to the 
definition provided in the second chapter. This is because even a conservative 
approach towards cooperation can be considered as a “significant normalization 
and improvement, followed by a noteworthy increase in the will to cooperate” when 
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the previous state of affairs is warlike relations. The initiation of the rapprochement 
happened in the last day of January 1988, approximately ten months after the 
March crisis.  
The meetings between Andreas Papandreou and Nazmi Akiman were not 
kept secret from the public, but selective information was leaked to the press 
concerning the content of the messages that the two Prime Ministers exchanged. 
According to Akiman (2002: 27) most of the times the two men “worked on a text 
that would explain to the public why the two countries decided to start a dialogue, 
what would be the subject matter of this dialogue, and what the mechanism for it 
would be”. As the “message diplomacy” continued, the idea that a dialogue could 
be beneficial to both parties started taking root. For instance, after another meeting 
between Papandreou and Akiman in July, the head of the Prime Minister’s 
Diplomatic Office stated: 
Mr. Prime Minister welcomed today the Turkish Ambassador Nazmi 
Akiman, who delivered the Turkish answer to the message that the Greek 
side had sent…[T]oday’s answer by the Turkish side is part of a process, 
and it gives hopes for the continuation of this process to the benefit of both 
neighboring countries (Ta Nea, 23/7/1987)  
 
On the same issue Papandreou stated: 
It (Özal’s message) includes new elements and it gives hopes that it aims  
towards the benefit of the people of the two neighboring states (Milliyet, 
23/7/1987)  
 
 
 167 
 
6.8. Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process 
By the end of 1987 it was apparent that communication between Andreas 
Papandreou and Turgut Özal was paying off and it was expected that 1988 would 
bring important developments to the Greek-Turkish relations. Before the end of 
1987, a meeting to bring together Papandreou and Özal in Davos, at the end of the 
January 1988, had been arranged, without announcing such to the public on both 
sides(To Vima, 3/1/1988). However, the expectations before the meeting were not 
particularly high.  
Within the next pages we are going to explore how the indicators of the 
rapprochement, which were put forth in the literature review chapter, apply to the 
Greek-Turkish 1988 rapprochement.  
a. Summit level communication 
One of the most interesting characteristics of the 1988 rapprochement was 
that it was initiated during a meeting between the Prime Minister of Turkey Turgut 
Özal and his Greek counterpart Andreas Papandreou at the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) in Davos. The meeting was the outcome of a long lasted communication via 
messages (talking papers) that were exchanged between the two men.  
The meeting itself constituted a major breakthrough for the for Greek-
Turkish relations, considering that even the hard-liners, such as Papandreou, 
adopted after 1981 concerning negotiations did not allow for any dialogue to take 
place, even though efforts were made by the Turkish side. Two years before the 
Davos Summit, in 1986, the two leaders were attending another Davos Forum and 
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pressure was put on Papandreou by the WEF organizers and the Turkish side, 
especially the Turkish businessman Şarık Tara, for him to arrange a meeting with 
Özal (To Vima, 2/2/1986). The Turkish press previously reported about an 
upcoming meeting in between two leaders. But, instead, Özal and Papandreou met 
only briefly and did nothing but shake hands and have a brief talk (Milliyet, 
1/2/1986; Milliyet 2/2/1986).   
On the contrary, during the 1988 WEF, Özal and Papandreou met six times 
in total from Saturday January 30 to Monday February 1, 1988. The meetings were 
successful in establishing a personal relation between the two Prime Ministers and 
create an atmosphere of trust which would allow a fruitful dialogue to develop. 
After the meetings Papandreou was asked whether he believed the “ice” was broken 
between Greece and Turkey. He answered: 
On the personal relations level, yes. As far as the two nations are concerned, 
which I believe both of them desire peace, it will take some time to 
overcome the stereotypes of the past and create new ones (Ta Nea, 
2/2/1988).47  
Establishing better relations, even if this was limited to the decision making 
level, was one of the main goals of Davos in the first place.  At the time there was 
the impression on both sides (but especially on the Turkish side) that once a 
minimum level of trust developed, then it would be easier to discuss the problems 
concerning the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, the minorities etc. As Özal put it: 
 
The problems had piled up and unfortunately very few efforts were made for 
their resolution. The problems continue to pile up and at some parts of the 
two nations several harsh positions relating to the Greek-Turkish problems 
had been noted. We understood that the solution to the problems is not easy, 
                                                         
47 In this case PM Papandreou means positive stereotypes 
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on the contrary it is very hard…We know that there are different views for 
the same problem in each nation, and, thus, in order to find a solution we 
first need to melt the ice between the two states (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988)  
 
Similarly, Papandreou noted: 
 
I think on both sides we want to emphasize the fact that the course has now 
changed. The course now is clearly peaceful. The goal is to overcome our 
difficulties to the degree that this is possible or leave them aside and work 
for the benefit of the two nations, towards development and good 
neighboring relations, which will give the opportunity for both countries to 
take decisions on their own and not being paternalized by third parties (Ta 
Nea, 2/2/1988)   
Özal and Papandreou met two more times in Brussels during the NATO 
summit, which occurred in March 1988. The two Prime Ministers managed to 
reassure that the Davos spirit was still alive. The first meeting occurred on March 3, 
lasted for 90 minutes and the journalists were not allowed to attend. Following 
statements were also short, and in general they pointed out to the spirit of good will 
and cooperation that prevailed during the meeting. During the meeting the two 
Foreign Ministers, Mr. Papoulias and Mr. Yilmaz were also present. The following 
day, however, a detailed common statement was drafted and then shared with the 
press with a richer content of information on what Papandreou and Özal had 
discussed, and what decisions they took48.  
It is clear from the common statement that unlike what had happened in 
Davos, the two Prime Ministers in Brussels decided to discuss the essence of the 
problems between Greece and Turkey, or at least some of the problems. Thus, 
issues such as the fortune of the Greek citizens living in Turkey, the military aircraft 
                                                         
48 The content of the statement will be discussed later in this chapter 
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flights over the Aegean and Cyprus were discussed. After the second meeting, 
which lasted three hours, Papandreou maintained: 
We have just started on a long road to overcome the problems. Özal is 
providing all the indications that he is honest and objective. We have 
established a “hot line” in order to soften the problems that might arise. Our 
goal is a long-lasting peace at our relations, so that the fear that the one 
country is a threat to the other will decline. With Özal we agreed that no war 
shall happen (Ta Nea, 5/3/1988; on Brussels meetings see also Ta Nea 
4/3/1988; Milliet 4-5/3/1988).  
Although the results of the meetings were encouraging and it was apparent 
that both Papandreou and Özal supported what they accomplished in Davos, 
expressions like “no war” are indicative that the rapprochement effort was 
happening at a time when relations between Greece and Turkey were still quite 
fragile. Accordingly, in order for the rapprochement to be successful, it would take 
immense efforts to reverse the hostile images that were constructed over the past 
years.   
The third, and last, time that Papandreou and Özal met was during the 
latter’s visit to Athens in June 13-15, which was decided in Brussels. Özal’s visit to 
Greece, which was the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister after Menderes’ visit, 
caused mass demonstrations especially by Greek-Cypriots living in Greece. For the 
protection of the Turkish officials 8,000 police officers were conscripted, in one of 
the biggest police mobilization that Greece had ever experienced (Ta Nea, 
13/6/1988).  
The two prime ministers met twice on June 13th for a total of two hours in 
parallel with the meeting of the Economy Committee49. The Greek government 
                                                         
49 The committee will be discussed in detail later 
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spokesperson stated that the atmosphere was better than before, but added that there 
was no solution or agreement on any of the problems in Greek-Turkish relations (Ta 
Nea, 14/6/1988). Nonetheless, by the end of the second day of Özal’s visit, it was 
quite obvious that the two parties’ views were still very far. The problems that came 
to fore were about the all-known agenda of the Greek-Turkish conflict. As Özal 
also stated, of the problems between Turkey and Greece were the issues of the 
length of international space, the width of territorial waters, the militarization of the 
East Aegean islands and the Flight Information Region (the FIR).. This view was 
directly opposed by Athens, which stuck to the original line that the delimitation of 
the continental shelf was the only issue between the two countries (Ta Nea, 
15/6/1988). The lack of any development was immediately publicized by the Greek 
and Turkish press. For instance, Milliyet’s main title on the visit was “No result 
from the visit” (Milliyet, 15/6/1988), while after Özal left Greece the Greek press 
reported “the ghost of Davos”, implying that whatever was achieved until that time 
was ruined by the Athens meetings.  
Even though Papandreou and Özal started discussing the Greek-Turkish 
problems, the divergence of their positions was so stark that the two Prime 
Ministers anxiously pushed their point to a point of rendering the rapprochement 
process in dormancy. This is quite clear in Papandreou’s statement on the last day 
of the visit. As he stated: 
I would like first of all to say that the meeting at Athens is the third of a 
series of meetings that started in Davos, and that, certainly, there will be 
other meetings to follow. There is an exaggeration on the press headlines, 
and I don’t only mean the Greek ones but also the Turkish, as far as the 
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possibilities and the quality of these meetings. Whoever insists that with 
three meetings between Papandreou and Özal all the Greek-Turkish 
problems will be solved, of course he has no idea with the whole 
story…Was there any progress? It is natural that we don’t expect problems 
to be solved miraculously in these types of meetings (Ta Nea, 16/6/1988) 
 
Likewise, Özal stated: 
 
The series of meetings between Papandreou and me was realized in an 
environment of mutual understanding and in respect to the benefit of the 
two nations. The course we initiated in Davos was continued here with the 
same orientation, and it is without doubt that the meetings of the two 
commissions in Ankara and Athens the following September, as well as, 
Papandreou’s visit to Ankara next fall, will go even further and solidify our 
work (Milliyet, 16/6/1988) 
 
It is apparent from both the above statements that Papandreou and Özal 
were well aware that their work in bridging the Greek and the Turkish views was 
hard. However, they did not share –at least not completely- the views expressed by 
the press, which saw the visit to Athens as an abrupt end to the Davos process. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that during his visit, Özal, met with the head of the 
opposition party Mr. Mitsotakis and the Greek President Mr. Sartzetakis. Moreover, 
on the second day of his visit he laid a wreath to the Unknown Soldier monument at 
Syntagma square. 
b. Signing of agreements 
Although the rapprochement process of 1988 did not last long there were 
several issues agreed between the two sides. In accordance with the Davos spirit 
which dictated that breaking the ice and establishing trust is the first step towards 
rapprochement, the agreements that were signed between Greece and Turkey were 
mainly concerned with procedural issues and aimed at creating the conditions for 
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building a strong foundation upon which future negotiations could be based. In 
general, the agreements can be categorized into two groups. The first one includes 
decisions or commitments that were discussed between the two prime ministers, 
and were communicated through the common announcements that the two parties 
drew up together during their meetings. The second group included written 
agreements that were signed by the two parties. 
One of the most important decisions that were taken after the Davos 
meetings was the establishment of two separate committees (See Davos common 
announcement Ta Nea, 1/2/1988). One of the committees would focus on issues 
relating to the economic and social level cooperation, such as business 
collaboration, commerce, tourism communications, and cultural exchanges 
(paragraph 7). The second committee was given the task of recording the problems 
and, if possible, exploring the possibilities for the closure of the gap between the 
two countries (paragraph 7). Özal and Papandreou would personally supervise the 
progress of each committee. In the mean time, they also agreed to encourage 
meetings between military, press, and businessmen representatives, as well as 
establishing a common chamber of commerce (paragraph 7).  
The two Prime Ministers also decided that they should meet at least once 
per year and exchange visits. Apart from the visits Özal and Papandreou agreed to 
establish a “hot line” of communication that would allow for immediate action in 
case of a future crisis (paragraph 8). It is interesting that when Özal was asked by 
Turkish correspondents what the “colour” of the line would be, he replied “Blue, 
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because this is the color of the sea between the two countries” (Milliyet, 1/2/1988). 
In addition they agreed that their representatives in international organizations 
should meet more often so as to establish cooperation (paragraph 8). Heraclides 
(2007: 155) suggests that the Davos announcement was a groundbreaking text for 
the context of Greek-Turkish relations’ at that time, and that could open a new era 
for the relations between Greece and Turkey, even if the spirit of the text, alone, 
was applied. 
The second common announcement that followed the Brussels’ meetings 
also involved a series of agreements on the critical issues that divided Greece and 
Turkey (For the full text of the announcement see Ta Nea, 5/3/1988). This is 
because, as it has already been pointed out, in Brussels the two Prime Ministers 
discussed these problems. Firstly, it was decided that both countries should abstain 
from any actions that could undermine the prevailing good atmosphere (paragraph 
3). Secondly, it was decided that a sub-commission of the political commission, 
established at Davos, would meet within March, in order to discuss issues related to 
the national military exercises, as well as, those problems that are linked to the 
military airplanes’ flights over the Aegean Sea. Diplomats and military experts 
would form this sub-committee (paragraph 4). On the Cyprus issue that was 
especially urgent for the Greek side, it was decided that the missing persons’ 
committee, which included people from both the Cyprus’ communities and 
members of the International Red Cross should be re-activated. There was also 
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exchange of information concerning the missing persons, which was provided by 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots (paragraph 5).  
The following two paragraphs (5&6) are also important as they show 
another strategy that was used during the negotiation, what is known as tit-for-tat. 
Turkish side announced (paragraph 5) that after the lifting of the 1964 decree which 
was announced in January 1988, before Davos, Greek citizens of Turkey were 
allowed to invest the incomes derived from their properties in Turkey. It was also 
declared that the Turkish government would take all necessary actions to restore all 
rights of Greek citizens in accordance to the Turkish law50. This development 
allowed Greece to give her consent so that the additional protocol of the 1964 
Ankara Association Agreement would be signed before the meeting of the 
Association Council in April 25, 1988 (paragraph 7). Greece finally signed the 
protocol on March 22, 1988 (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991: 218).  
Unlike the announcements that were made after the meetings at Davos and 
Brussels, the two parties faced a lot of difficulties drawing up a text that would be 
acceptable to both sides, after the meeting between Papandreou and Özal in Athens. 
The difficulty of finding an acceptable way of phrasing caused Özal to delay his 
press conference for two hours. Özal himself was under the impression that there 
would not be a common announcement when he started the press conference but, 
                                                         
50 The issue concerns decree 6/3801/2.11.1964, which is known among Istanbul Greeks as the 
“Kararname”. The decree forbade transactions of the Greek citizens’ residing in Turkey belongings 
and especially of their estate in Turkey. Since mid-1986 the Greek Government set the lifting of the 
1964 decree as a prerequisite for her to lift her objections to the reactivation of the 1964 Association 
Agreement  between Turkey and the European Community (see Alexandris,1991:511-512  ;Clogg 
1991: 21).  
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meanwhile, the Mr. Makris Greek Ambassador at Ankara and the Turkish 
Ambassador at Athens Mr. Akiman somehow infused their views into a one single 
text. Nonetheless, the final announcement did not mention any of the major issues 
that divided Turkey and Greece and it was limited to making general comments 
concerning the good will atmosphere and the satisfaction with the ongoing work 
(Ta Nea, 16/6/1988).   
The second group of agreements includes the signed agreements between 
the two parties. The only agreement that can fit under this group is the Papoulias-
Yilmaz memorandum that was signed in Athens on May 27, 1988 (For full text of 
the memorandum see Ta Nea, 28/5/1988). The memorandum reflected the work of 
the Political committee that was established in Davos and assembled for the first 
time in Athens between 24th and 26th of May. With the memorandum, the two 
parties committed to respect each other’s sovereignty as well the rights to open sea 
and international air space (article 1). In addition, the two parties agreed that during 
national military exercises within international waters and airspace, they would 
abstain from any action that might come to obstruct navigation and air traffic, 
according to international laws and regulations (article 2). With regard to military 
exercises the signatory parties agreed, furthermore, that the issue of warning notices 
(the NOTAM) should refrain from a) isolating an area b) commit areas for long 
time periods c) taking place during high touristic period or national and religious 
celebrations (article 3). Finally, the memorandum noted that diplomatic channels 
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should be used more often and that its content should be held in harmony all the 
time with what was decided in Davos (articles 4&5). 
The common announcement that came out was to reveal that the two 
ministers agreed to establish two working groups. The first group led by the Greek 
deputy MFA Mr. Kapsis and his Turkish counterpart Mr. Kandemir, discussed 
confidence building measures (CBMs) and common NATO infrastructure shares. 
The second led by the Greek Foreign ministry general secretary Ambassador 
Georgiou and the general secretary of the Turkish department of bilateral relations 
Ambassador Akbel, discussed the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish 
diplomatic and state passports, as well as, cooperation in areas of drug trafficking, 
terrorism etc. In fact, the first person to benefit from the lifting of visa requirement 
was Prime Minister Özal, who visited Greece two weeks later, while for example 
Mesut Yilmaz had to validate his passport during his late May visit to Athens (Ta 
Nea, 28/5/1988).        
Some years after the Davos meetings Greek sources suggested that 
Papandreou and Özal inked an agreement in 1988, which foresaw the withdrawal of 
Turkish troops from Cyprus. This information was first presented by Papoulias in 
2000, who also pointed that Özal himself worked on the agreement, and that the 
agreement would have been implemented if it wasn’t for Özal’s untimely death51.  
Ambassador Nazmi Akiman however, denied knowledge of such an agreement, and 
                                                         
51 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=299&article=6166 
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suggested that it most likely did not happen52. (On the decisions reached in Davos 
see also Athanasopoulos 2001, Hale 2008, Akiman 2002) 
c. Military cooperation 
The issue of military cooperation was part of the agenda that which gained a 
concrete form during the meetings between Papandreou and Özal. When Özal was 
asked by journalists whether we thought that what was accomplished in Davos 
could also bolster military cooperation he answered: 
I believe it (Davos process) will have positive implications. As you can see 
in the common announcement our Ambassador at internationals 
organizations, the UN, the NATO, the OECE will have closer contacts. But 
for visits of military men we can see today that even between opposing 
camps there are visits. Our Chief of Staff has visited the Soviet Union and 
they have visited us. Also there are a lot of visits going on at NATO 
meetings. But I am talking about bilateral visits not only at the Chief of 
Staff level but also Chief of Army, Chief of Naval Forces etc, so that there is 
better understanding (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988).  
 
On another occasion Özal stated that,  
 
Concerning military there is much to be done. The way I am sensing it, what 
I would propose is that our military men have to come in terms with each 
other. They have to try and solve some of these issues, which are in majority 
of technical and not political nature (To Vima, 16/5/1988) 
It is quite clear that military cooperation during the 1988 rapprochement 
was rather aiming at finding a modus vivendi between the two sides, than engage a 
type of cooperation that would include for instance, joint military exercises or other 
types of joint action. Indeed, sources from the Greek government assured there was 
mention of joint military exercises in Davos or Brussels (Ta Nea, 22/3/1988). 
 
                                                         
52 Interview by author 
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The idea of a meeting of experts on military issues, however, became a topic 
of discussion between Özal and Papandreou, and a sub-committee of the political 
committee met in Athens for 3 days, between March 30 and April 1. This sub-
committee was presumed to discuss national military exercises and military aircraft 
flights. The Turkish group included 13 members and was headed by vice-admiral 
Omer Akbel and the head of the Turkish department of Aeronautic Affairs, Ugur 
Ziyal (Ta Nea, 29/3/1988). The Greek group also included high ranking military 
men and diplomats (Ta Nea, 30/3/1988). After the end of the three-day meeting no 
specific results were announced, however, an announcement was made saying that 
the work of the sub-committee would be presented to the meeting of the political 
committee, which was planned to take place in two months in Athens (Ta Nea, 
2/4/1988). Thus, it was almost certain that some of the positions that were adopted 
by the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum were initially discussed by the sub-
committee that summoned in March53.       
d. Economic cooperation 
By the year 1988, space for economic cooperation between Greece and 
Turkey was extensive. The commerce between the two countries accounted for a 
mere 1% of their total commerce, and out of 893 foreign businesses that operated in 
Turkey only three had some Greek participation (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 
21/4/1988). The Greek-Turkish commerce had remained stagnant from 1983 to 
1985, and while it rose in 1986, it still remained under 100$ million. In 1988, it was 
                                                         
53 This is because some of the issues that the memorandum touched upon were also issues that the 
sub-committee discussed 
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expected that the bilateral trade would reach 200$ million (To Vima, 7/2/1988). In 
addition, the tremendous possibilities of Greek-Turkish economic cooperation is 
also evident at the statement of the president of the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) Ali Coskun, who in 1988 said that by 
1990 the trade volume between Greece and Turkey could double (Milliyet, 
2/3/1988)54.       
It is therefore absolutely undisputed that a successful rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey in 1988 would be financially beneficial for both of 
them. This was well understood by Papandreou and Özal, who also believed that 
once economic cooperation was established it would be easier to discuss the 
significant problems in the two states’ relation. A month before his visit to Athens, 
Özal said to a Greek journalist: 
I have said so, and I repeat that on many areas, outside those were there are 
problems, we could start cooperating. For example, with visits of 
businessmen…they could agree to collaborate, or even to establish joint 
commercial and industrial enterprises…or maybe on tourism, there could be 
tourists’ visits…This will create an atmosphere of full trust (To Vima 
16/5/1988)     
Efforts to improve economic cooperation had started years before the 
political rapprochement, since the beginning of the 1980s. The efforts were initiated 
by the Turkish side, and especially businessman Sarik Tara, who in various 
occasions came in touch with Greek businessmen, among whom Costa Karras. At 
the same time the president of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Mr. Yasar, tried to 
keep in touch with the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mr. Efraimoglu. 
                                                         
54 This statement was made during a meeting Mr. Coskun had with the president of the Greek-
American Chamber of Commerce Mr Politakis  
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During these initial contacts the possibilities of an approach between Özal and 
Papandreou were explored. The meetings between Greek and Turkish businessmen, 
which had started in May 1984, stopped in January 1985, after Kyprianou and 
Denktaş meeting failed (To Vima, 9/2/1988). 
Both sides common desire to elevate economic relations with one another 
became clear in Davos when the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers decided to 
establish a committee that would discuss issues relating to economic collaboration 
(paragraph 7 of the common announcement). In addition, Turkish and Greek 
businessmen held a separate meeting at Davos, where they discussed issues relating 
to imports and exports, tourism, communications and transportations etc. Some of 
the participants of this meeting were Sarik Tara, and the president of the Turkish 
Confederation of Employer Associations (TISK) from the Turkish side and Mr. 
Papalexopoulos, President of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises on the Greek 
side (Milliyet, 2/2/1988).  
The efforts for economic cooperation created a number of committees 
geared to discuss and promote economic cooperation. Firstly, two committees, one 
Turkish and one Greek, were formed by businessmen. The Turkish one was called 
Turkish-Greek Business Council (Türk-Yunan İş Konseyi) and was headed by Sarik 
Tara (Milliyet, 2/3/1988) and, the Greek one, the Council of Greek-Turkish 
Business Cooperation (Συµβουλίο Ελληνο-Τουρκικής Επιχειρηµατικής 
Συνεργασίας) was headed by Mr. Papalexopoulos. The two committees55 met twice 
                                                         
55 It should be noted that occasionally they are mentioned as one body 
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in 1988, once in April in Athens and once in early October in Istanbul (Milliyet, 
20/4/1988 and 8/10/1988). In addition, Papalexopoulos met with Özal during the 
latter’s visit to Athens in June (Ta Nea, 16/6/1988). 
Secondly, two committees, one for each side, were formed in order to 
discuss economic issues according to the decisions that were taken in Davos. 
Together the two committees formed the economic committee, which met in 
parallel with the political committee. The main task of the economic committee, 
and what differentiated it from the businessmen initiative, was to try and establish 
the basic principles upon which the “Davos spirit” could realize (To Vima, 
17/4/1988). The first meeting of the joint committee took place in Ankara, between 
24 and 26 of May. The discussion touched upon three main issues a) the 
institutional and legal framework, b) infrastructure issues and c) cooperation by 
different sectors. A number of decisions, such as, increasing cooperation on the 
issue of road transportation, improving the telecommunications network and 
promoting collaboration on the areas of trade, banking tourism etc were taken (Ta 
Nea, 27/5/1988). The second meeting of the joint economic committee also 
proceeded in parallel to the political committee in early September. The second 
meeting was in Athens and did not produce any results worth of mentioning here.  
In general, despite the good will for cooperation which was stressed by both 
sides, few things were finally accomplished as far as economic cooperation is 
concerned. It was because of the shared mood in both sides that economic matters 
will be again sacrificed for political issues, thereby they simply saw no point in 
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pressing for business related issues before a correspondent advance could be made. 
Specifically the Greek party was motivated by this same logic. The Turkish side 
made a number of suggestions, such as the establishment of a Greek-Turkish bank 
or a plan to promote investments, but the Greek side remained cautious and dilatory 
(To Vima, 19/6/1988; Ta Nea 3/9/1988; Ta Nea, 7/9/1988).   
e. Public Statements made by officials 
In the 1988 Greek-Turkish rapprochement case, public statements at the top 
political level played an important role. As the three key moments of the 
rapprochement were an international forum, a NATO summit and an official visit of 
a prime minister, the initiators of the rapprochement, meaning the two prime 
ministers and their environment, were able to give many interviews and make 
public statements that attracted much attention. Special attention was given by both 
Papandreou and Özal to stress out in every chance that the atmosphere within 
which the discussions and the communications took place was pleasant and 
responsive. This is made obvious not only in various statements by both of the 
leasers but also on every joint announcement that followed the various meetings.   
As some important statements have already been quoted, it would be 
beneficial to present some statements that show how the protagonists of the 1988 
rapprochement tried, occasionally to connect their efforts to the 1930 
rapprochement between Venizelos and Ataturk. For instance, during a reception the 
Greek Ambassador in Ankara Mr. Makris gave at the Ankara Palace, Özal stated: 
In this building the agreements between between Kemal Ataturk and 
Eleftherios Venizelos were signed in 1930. In the same building the Greek 
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Ambassador gives a reception. I think there is a symbolism. I am optimistic 
that something positive will arrive for the Greek-Turkish relations (Ta Nea, 
31/3/1988) 
On another occasion Özal had also stated that: 
I don’t see any reason why we cannot realize today the cooperation that 
started at the time of Ataturk and Venizelos (Milliyet, 16/2/1988) 
Finally, during the meeting of the military experts, in March, the head of the 
Turkish delegation, Admiral Isik Biren, visited the Venizelos Museum in Athens. 
After his visit he stated: 
Maybe now the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece is difficult, but 
it was even more difficult (meaning in 1930s). However, it was achieved 
due to the efforts of Venizelos and Ataturk (Ta Nea, 2/4/1988) 
The abovementioned quotes prove the impact of the 1930s rapprochement 
which became a reference point for Greek-Turkish relations in the 20th century. In 
addition, the reference to the 1930s, mainly by Turkish officials, constitutes an 
indication of the preferred level of cooperation that Turkey was craving for.   
 The 1988 rapprochement between Turkey and Greece offers an example of 
how statements made by officials can cause negative reflections to the other side 
and endanger the rapprochement atmosphere. For example, statements were made 
by Mr. Yilmaz and also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson Mr. Batu, 
concerning the presence of the Turkish military in Cyprus and Denktaş’ jurisdiction 
and responsibilities, caused much skepticism on the Greek side, to the extent that 
the Greeks wondered whether Özal’s visit could actually take place under these 
circumstances (Ta Nea, 23/4/1988)56. Finally, few days before his visit to Athens, 
                                                         
56 It should be pointed out that Mr. Yilmaz and Mr. Batu’s statements were in full conformity with 
Turkish official line on the Cyprus issue at the time. However, it was expected by the Greek side that 
Özal would proceed with a good will gesture on the Cyprus issue before his visit to Athens.   
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Özal stated that there couldn’t be any substantial progress in the Greek-Turkish 
relations because of Greece upcoming national elections, in 1989 (Ta Nea, 
8/6/1988). This statement was spotlighted by the Greek press. However, the Greek 
government tried to downplay it and added that Papandreou would ask for 
clarifications.    
f. Rapprochement’s influence at the society level 
It is difficult to assess the influence that the Davos process had on the Greek 
and Turkish societies. Due to time limitation, this round of rapprochement does not 
allow for measuring its affect at the grassroots level. In general, however, it can be 
said that the inter-societal interactions were not very common either before or after 
the Davos process. After all, it should be stressed that the 1988 rapprochement was 
a top-down process, where the impact at the societal level was of secondary 
importance. Apart from the stated time limitations, which perhaps help 
rapprochement from reaching the society level, media’s nationalistic rhetoric 
throughout the months that followed the meetings at Davos, and negative images 
that were created by the events in Cyprus, should also be considered as two 
important factors that prohibited rapprochement between the Turkish and the Greek 
societies.  
Public opinion polls that were made at the time showed the mistrust 
between the Greek and Turkish people. A poll among Greek high-school students, 
which was publicized immediately after Özal’s visit to Greece, showed that close to 
a 70% of all students in that school considered Turkey as the most hostile country 
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(Milliyet 16/6/1988)57. Nonetheless, in early 1988 polls indicated that both Turks 
and Greeks were in favor of a rapprochement between the two countries. 
Concretely, in a poll that took place simultaneously in Greece and Turkey by the 
Turkish magazine “NOKTA” and the Greek “PONTIKI”, 77% of the Turks and 
58% of the Greeks said that they would be supportive of a rapprochement process 
and peaceful resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey (Politakis, 
1987). 
Other than that, any efforts for improving cooperation between the Greek 
and the Turkish societies were mostly undertaken by elite individuals, such as 
artists or writers. Two of these efforts are worth mentioning. The first is the Greek-
Turkish friendship committee. The committee, which consisted of a Turkish and a 
Greek committee, was created in late 1986. Its goal was to support the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement and to help the creation of those conditions that could 
support the easier resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey (Ta Nea, 
13/12/1986). The establishment of the committee(s) was the idea of Aziz Nesin, a 
leading Turkish author, while from the Greek side the contribution of Mikis 
Theodorakis, a well-known Greek composer, politician and political activist was 
invaluable. In addition to these, the initiative was supported by a number of 
academicians, journalists, artists etc (Ta Nea, 26/11/1986). The work of the 
committee focused mainly on the organization of joint events such as concerts, 
book presentations, film festivals58 and the like.  
                                                         
57 The poll was made by the Greek magazine “ENA” 
58 For instance the committee organized a Greek Film Week in Turkey in December 1988, see Ta 
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Table 6.2. 
 
Rapprochement Process 
  
 
Indicator 
 
Main events 
 
Frequency 
 
Importance 
 
Summit 
level 
meetings 
Özal & Papandreou 
meeting in Davos 
Özal & Papandreou 
meeting in Brussels 
Özal’s visit to Athens 
June 13-15 1988 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Agreement
s Signed 
Agreements mainly 
in form of common 
announcements, 
Papoulias –Yilmaz 
Memorandum 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Military 
cooperatio
n 
Sub-committee on 
military issues 
meeting in Athens 
from March 30 to 
April 1 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Economic 
cooperatio
n 
Several committees 
formed to discuss 
possibilities of 
economic cooperation 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Statements/ 
Gestures 
Several positive 
statements made by 
political leaders 
especially after the 
official meetings 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Societal level 
No major 
breakthroughs 
Limited mainly 
among elites 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
The second was the “Abdi İpekçi” awards of Greek Turkish friendship 
which was founded in September 1979 in the memory of the Turkish journalist 
Abdi İpekçi, a supporter of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, who was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Nea, 10/12/1988 
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assassinated earlier the same year. The award was given to the authors of 
journalistic or literary articles that supported the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (To 
Vima, 24/9/1979).  
Nonetheless, it is clear that both the Greek-Turkish Friendship Committee 
and the Abdi İpekçi Peace and Friendship Awards were initiated before the 1988 
rapprochement and continued their work while the rapprochement lasted.     
Finally, according to Clogg, following Davos, there was an increase in 
Greek nationals visiting Turkey by some 170%, to approximately 360.000 visitors. 
Clogg attributes this increase to the lifting of visa requirements for Greeks by the 
Turkish state; however, it should be made clear that the visa requirement was lifted 
in 1984, shortly after Akiman’s arrival to Athens. Actually, the lifting of the visa 
requirement was a goodwill gesture made by Özal, while appointing a new 
ambassador to Greece (Akiman, 2002). 
 
 
6.9. The end of the Rapprochement 
There are different opinions as to why and when the 1988 rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey ended. In most cases, a number of factors that acted 
simultaneously are offered as an explanation to the end of the Davos spirit. These 
factors mainly concerned exogenous obstacles that appeared in late 1988. By the 
same token, factors imbedded in the process of the rapprochement are also 
responsible for its short duration. As to when the rapprochement ended, there are 
two different views (see Heraclides, 2007: 156). The most pessimistic of those 
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views sustains that the spirit of Davos ended with Özal’s visit to Athens, while 
more optimistic accounts consider that the rapprochement ended after the second, 
and the last, meeting of the political committee in September 1988. 
The September of 1988 is a more convincing alternative for one to 
chronologically situate the end of the rapprochement. This is for mainly three 
reasons. First, the assembly of the political committee in early September not only 
failed to produce any results, but also revealed that the two parties had different 
understandings of the process. Greece and Turkey had their own interpretations on 
what their dialogue should include. The frustration was mainly caused by Greece’s 
preparedness to discuss only some of the issues while neglecting others, coupled 
with Turkey’s insistence to add issues to the agenda. One day before the end of the 
political committee’s proceedings Mesut Yilmaz stated: 
Contrary to the Davos spirit, Greece does not discuss issues such as the 
territorial sea and air space limits, the fortification of her islands and her 
minority issue, claiming that these issues concern sovereignty rights. A 
dialogue that does not include these issues is not possible to lead to 
permanent solution, which is the goal of both states (Ta Nea, 7/9/1988)   
Second, Andreas Papandreou’s health sharply deteriorated in August 1988 
and he left for England in order to have an open-heart surgery. Papandreou’s health 
adventure forced him to abstain from the political life for several months, and it 
was the main reason for the cancellation of Papandreou’s visit to Turkey that two 
sides agreed to hold in 1988. Finally, a major financial scandal broke out in the 
second half of 1988, destabilizing the PASOK government and putting Greece in a 
long pre-election period.  
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In 1989, there were two elections held in Greece (June 18 and November 5) 
and both of them failed to elect a one-party majority government. It was not until 
April 1990 elections that Konstantinos Mitsotakis managed to form a majority 
government and became the new prime minister (on how the PASOK Government 
found a rapid end and left its place to Greek elections see Anastasiadis, 1993; 
Mendrinou, 2006). As such, during this time there was no development in the 
Greek-Turkish relations. Indeed, it could also be argued that there were setbacks as 
a meeting between Papandreou and Özal at the NATO summit in May 1989 
produced no results and clearly showed that Davos spirit had faded away (To Vima, 
28/5/1989).  
Mitsotakis who had in the past criticized Papandreou for engaging Turkey in 
a wider dialogue rather than discussing only the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, uplifted the Cyprus issue to the number one problem between Greece and 
Turkey, and sustained that no progress could be made without tackling Cyprus 
(Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 27). Mitsotakis met with Özal on August 25, 1990 at the 
European Democracy Union meeting in Antalya (To Vima, 20/8/1990) and in 
Davos in 1992 (To Vima, 2/2/1992)59, however, the two leaders were not ready to 
revive the Davos spirit or start another similar process that would improve relations 
between Turkey and Greece.  
 
                                                         
59 This was the first official summit level meeting between Greece and Turkey after Özal’s visit to 
Athens in 1988. 
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6.10. Assessment of the 1988 Greek-Turkish Rapprochement  
After the failed rapprochement of the 1950s, and following more than three 
decades of strained relations, the 1988 case constituted another failed 
rapprochement process between Turkey and Greece. Although the two countries, 
and especially the two prime ministers, were successful in sustaining a positive 
atmosphere for several months and managed to create expectations and hopes for a 
peaceful coexistence, the Davos spirit was not able to survive even the end of the 
year. In the following pages the discussion will focus on whether, and in what ways, 
each of the independent variables influenced the outcome of the rapprochement 
process. 
 
• Impact of the international system to the national security 
Unlike the 1955 rapprochement which is mainly seen as part of Greece and 
Turkey’s efforts to eliminate their security concerns, the Davos process, 
unanticipated as it was, is mainly attributed to situational factors relating to the two 
states realistic aspirations of a vis-à-vis normalized relation. As such, the impact of 
the international system to the initiation, development and failure of the 
rapprochement is quite limited. 
Special mention, however, should be made to the ways the European 
Economic Community (EEC60) offered significant incentives for a successful 
rapprochement, especially to the Turkish side. Even though Greece and Turkey had 
                                                         
60 Later EU 
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signed association agreements with the EU since the early 1960s (June 9, 1961 and 
September 12, 1963 respectively), Greece submitted her full membership 
application on 12th, 1975 and became effectively a full member on January 12, 
1981 (See Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991). Having been delayed by domestic 
political concerns, Turkey could not submit her application for full membership 
before 1987, only a couple of weeks after the Aegean crisis (for a short chronology of 
Turkey-EU relation see Erdemli, 2003). In general, the literature suggests that Greece’s 
membership to the EU was not beneficial for Greek-Turkish relations specifically in 
the period of time previous to 1999 (Rumelili, 2004). As it is, this does not 
contradict the fact that if Turkey wanted to fulfill her EU aspirations, she had to 
come in terms with Greece, as the latter’s veto power could block Turkey’s 
membership indefinitely. According to Rumelili (Celik and Rumelili, 2006: 216) 
EC membership was perceived as and valued for having provided Greece 
with bargaining advantages in its dealings with Turkey. As a result, Greece's 
membership has created and sustained the understanding in Turkey that the 
EC/EU has become 'captured' by Greece, and therefore, cannot be impartial 
with respect to Greek-Turkish issues. 
 
• State identity 
Undoubtedly, state identity played an important role in the failure of the 
third Greek-Turkish rapprochement. During the decades preceding the initiation of 
the rapprochement, both sides constructed one another in the image of an enemy. 
The negative images and mistrust, dominating the space in post-1960s, were by 
large the outcomes of the outbreak of the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, other 
issues especially concerning the Aegean Sea, too, came up in the 1970s by adding 
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further material to the construction of enemy images between the Greeks and the 
Turks. Especially on the Greek side, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus constituted a 
great shock, emboldening Greek perception of Turkey as a hostile occupying force.   
Special mention ought to be made to the ways Andreas Papandreou had, 
until 1987, encouraged the creation of negative images against the Turks, by 
adopting a hardliner political rhetoric against Turkey when he was the leader of the 
opposition party. Papandreou who was a harsh critic of the United Stated and the 
EU, tried to compensate his declaratory to his operational policy on foreign affairs 
soon before and, also, after he became the prime minister. However, to the extent 
that relations with Turkey were concerned, Papandreou remained relatively stable 
to his pre-1981 ideas. This inflexible approach towards Turkey continued after the 
1985 elections, even though, emerging economy and security concerns favored an 
even more realistic view on foreign policy. As Coufoudakis (1988) mentions:  
On the core issues of Greek foreign policy, however, PASOK remained firm. 
Until the end of 1986, no direct negotiations were undertaken with Turkey 
despite pressures from the U.S., the EC, and the conservative opposition in 
the Parliament, as long as PASOK's preconditions for a dialogue with 
Turkey were not met. Greece also continued its nonparticipation in NATO 
exercises in the Aegean that questioned established command and control 
structures and other Greek sovereign rights; and continued to object to the 
normalization of Turkey's relations with the EC unless Turkey revoked 
discriminatory measures against the Greek minority of Istanbul   
The impact of the state identities, which were shaped during the years 
before the rapprochement, had a great impact on the process and its outcome, 
especially in two distinct ways. On the one hand, both political leaders had to deal 
with the criticism of the opposition and the public opinion. This criticism not only 
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increased the political costs for Özal and Papandreou, but also made it difficult for 
the political leaders to move forward faster than they may wish to do. The fact that 
their correspondence was kept secret, and that their meetings were held without the 
presence of journalists clearly indicate that the two leaders were considerate of 
possible reactions either from the public opinion or other political parties.  
 
• Costs and benefits equilibrium 
Even though the third Greek-Turkish rapprochement lasted for a limited 
amount of time, this process still left behind substantial benefits to be reaped by the 
states.. Both Turkey and Greece, to start with, now had the opportunity of 
improving the relations with one another, thus found themselves well-positioned to 
significantly improve their national security. As previously touched upon, the 
efforts for the initiation of the rapprochement started immediately after the crisis, 
which was about to consume both of them into a bloody conflict. And, these pre-
existing efforts indicate that both Greece and Turkey thought of rapprochement as a 
way of escaping from an imminent conflict. The signing of the Papoulias-Yilmaz 
memorandum showed that the rapprochement process had from early on benefited 
the two states as far as their security was concerned.  
Moreover, there were good indications that if the rapprochement had 
continued the benefits from the process would have been even greater for both 
parties. Theodoropoulos, a very experienced Greek diplomat and an acute observer 
of Greek-Turkish relations, suggested on a newspaper article that hostile relations 
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with Turkey were costly for Greek diplomacy as they forced Greece to monopolize 
her foreign policy focus (To Vima, 4/12/1988). For Turkey, normalization of 
relations with Greece would also mean positive repercussions on her relations with 
the US’ Congress after hitting the lowest-possible-point in 1974. At the same time, 
Ankara would be able to concentrate her security concerns on the situation in the 
South-east (Kramer, 1991).  
As far as the costs of the process are concerned, there were not any 
considerable costs for Turkey and Greece. The only costs were the political costs 
that the political leaders had to withstand, but those were not relevant to the states, 
but only to politicians. 
Despite the considerable benefits that accrued to both parties, encouraging 
each of them to anticipate even further benefits in the future, their impact on the 
rapprochement process’ outcome was minimal. Indeed, the benefits from the 
process provided with the involved parties extra motivation go along the dialogue 
phase.. But, these motivations were obviously not strong enough to keep Greece 
and Turkey as players vested in the continuation of the game. On the other hand, 
the costs from the continuation of the rapprochement were not significant enough to 
be considered as the causes of the process’ failure.  
 
• Interdependence 
As with some of the previous independent variables the short time that the 
rapprochement process lasted gave little space for any interdependence to develop. 
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Although for instance the improvement of relations was expected to increase 
economic cooperation and, in turn, trading volume between the two countries there 
was no considerable process made while the rapprochement lasted.  
According to the discussion in the literature review chapter, high levels of 
interdependence are generally seen as beneficial for the rapprochement process, 
whereas the absence of interdepence does not bode well for the viability of 
rapproachment. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1987, for that matter, did not 
produce high levels of interdependence. However, it is rather doubtful that this 
played an important role in the emergence of unsuccessful ending. Indeed, there is 
no indication to believe that the lack of interdependence had a role to play in the 
way the rapprochement process came to a halt, or that it produced adverse an 
impact on an otherwise successful endeavor.  
 
• Leadership 
Similarly to the cases discussed so far, the political leaders played an 
important role to the initiation of the rapprochement and while that lasted. The most 
notable difference of the 1987 case should be that the two prime ministers, Özal 
and Papandreou, monopolized the process and, hence, the success or failure of the 
rapprochement, at least seemed to be, dependent on the leaders’ ability to manage 
the  difficult task of repairing Greek-Turkish relations. It is quite characteristic that 
Papandreou had asked from the Turkish Ambassador to fly in person to Ankara and 
update his superiors about what they discussed in Athens, between March 1987 and 
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January 1988. In the fear of leaks, no phone calls or other type of communications 
were used. Consequently, leadership must be considered one of the independent 
variables that had an important impact to the unsuccessful outcome of the process. 
To begin with, it must be pointed out that both Papandreou and Özal tried 
hard in order for the rapprochement process to succeed. They had carefully planned 
their steps during the previous year through the exchanges of personal notes, they 
both took advantage of their personal power and prestige and they were both 
willing to bear the political costs that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement would 
bring. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that the fact that the Davos spirit lasted, 
even for the short time that happened, was due to Papandreou and Özal’s personal 
efforts and commitment to the process.  
Nonetheless, problems that the two prime ministers faced during after mid-
1988 forced them to loosen their commitment to the rapprochement process. Firstly, 
according to Birand (1991: 33-34) Greek and Turkish bureaucracies started putting 
pressure on both Papandreou and Özal, demanding a more careful and less 
enthusiastic approach. From the Greek side the problem was that the Cyprus issue 
was left out of the talks, while in the Turkish side much reluctance was present, 
concerning Greece’s willingness or commitment to meet her obligations. 
In addition, developments in domestic affairs caused supplementary 
concerns to the Prime ministers, making their commitment to the rapprochement 
process weaker. This is especially true for Papandreou who at the end of 1988 
experienced serious health issues that led to the cancelation of his trip to Turkey in 
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late 1988, which had been agreed upon by the two prime ministers earlier that year. 
Personal and domestic political problems for Papandreou prohibited him from 
proceeding with major foreign decisions, while domestic political developments in 
Turkey were also troubling Özal (Coufoudakis, 1991).     
 
• Depth of the process 
The 1988 rapprochement remained a relatively superficial process. This is 
an outcome of its short duration, the way the process developed, but also the 
general historical context that the rapprochement took place. In short, during the 
few months whereby the rapprochement was still robust, the main locus of the 
process remained on the top political level. In addition, not only did the process fail 
to engage, or gain support, from a larger part of the population, but it failed to 
deliver significant results on the level that it actually took place. The political 
leaders that initiated and supported the rapprochement did not manage to provide 
solutions to the Greek-Turkish problems, and it was these problems that constituted 
a significant obstacle to the success of the rapprochement.  
The failure to produce results on the Cyprus issue for instance worked to 
negate the entirety of the rapprochement process. The Greek-Cypriots both in 
Cyprus and Greece, were skeptical of the rapprochement and considered that their 
interests were not fully served by the process. As it has already been mentioned, 
Cypriots demonstrated their bitterness against Özal during his visit to Athens, while 
similar demonstrations took place when the Mayor of Istanbul visited Athens in 
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early May, 1988 (Pridham, 1991: 83). It should be mentioned, however, that the 
beginning of the Davos process coincided with the election of George Vasiliou as 
the new president of the Republic of Cyprus, a man who represented a rather 
moderate face and, to some extent, received support from the communist AKEL61.  
Even though Vasiliou met with Denktaş in August 1988 and a certain level of 
enthusiasm did exist, the negotiations soon proved unproductive, and talks ended in 
failure in March 2, 1990 (Bolukbasi, 1995: 465). In general, the lack of progress on 
the Cyprus problem should be considered as an obstacle to the continuation of the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 
Apart from Cyprus, lack of progress in dealing with the problems in the 
Aegean Sea and minority issues also caused for the initial enthusiasm to fade away 
quite rapidly. The non-solution of the problems led to the collapse of the 
rapprochement process in two ways. First, further the problems remained 
unresolved, more did they cause friction between Greece and Turkey as the 
dialogue was still continuing. Coufoudakis (1991) distinguishes three such points of 
friction62 that came forth, especially, in 1989: 
I. The growing number of Turkish violations of the Greek airspace 
II. Provocations regarding the Muslim minority in Western Thrace 
III.  Turkey’s failure to take steps towards restoring property rights of 
the Greek minority of Istanbul 
 
                                                         
61 Although independent 
62 As seen from the Greek side 
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Second, as there was no progress by the summit level meetings as well as 
the several committees that had been formed, belief to the process started 
evoporating, as did the trust to the “other’s” commitment to the process.  
 
• Turning points 
As it was mentioned earlier in the current chapter, the 1988 rapprochement 
process did not end abruptly, but, on the contrary, after May 1988 it started losing 
momentum and subsequently became impalpable. It is, hence, clear that the end of 
the rapprochement was not the result of an unexpected event, but rather the 
outcome of diminishing support and interest from the engaged parties. As such, 
turning points is an irrelevant independent variable as far as the third Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement is concerned.  
 
•   The GRIT strategy 
The 1988 Greek-Turkish rapprochement is the first case of a situation in 
which the two states engage in negotiations after the initiation of the rapprochement 
in order to solve significant issues that set them apart. Due to the fact that the 
discussions that took place during the meetings were largely confidential, and only 
selective information was leaked to the press, it is not possible to know with 
certainty what was the nature of the negotiations, what type of issues were raised, 
and what type of approach that Papandreou and Özal assumed during the 
negotiations. Nonetheless, from the leader’s statements it can be inferred that the 
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two sides had completely different expectations from the process, and hence, their 
approach to the negotiations were also quite far apart.  
On the one hand, if one examines Özal’s interviews before and after Davos, 
one can see that Özal did not care about discussing the Aegean Sea issues or 
minority problems. On the contrary, he understood that these issues were so 
complex and difficult to resolve that it would take several years of negotiation to 
reach a mutually acceptable solution. Past negotiations between Greek and Turkish 
representatives were a proof that Özal’s concerns were not unfounded. Özal 
believed that economic cooperation was what should be established first, in order to 
create an atmosphere of collaboration and trust. Then there could be a discussion of 
the Aegean Sea, the airspace etc. This view was also reflected to the Turkish 
businessmen supporting the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 
On the other hand, Papandreou was eager to produce tangible results that 
would be presentable to the public. For instance, it was important for Papandreou to 
consolidate with Turkey a joint stance towards Cyprus, especially concerning the 
withdrawal of the Turkish armed forces. The Greek prime minister did not oppose 
the idea of economic cooperation, but he also understood that such should be given 
no priority ahead of much more pressing political issues. However, it should be 
pointed out that the Greek side was eager to discuss the issues that she considered 
as problems or as part of the agenda.  
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6.11. Concluding Remarks 
The progress that was made in 1988 by Andreas Papandreou and Turgut 
Özal did not last for long. Soon relations between Greece and Turkey turned back 
to its ‘customary’ mode—that is defined by enmity and competition. By the early 
1990s relations had deteriorated so much that even the initiators of the 1988 
rapprochement were not seen as trustworthy by the other side. For instance, on a 
letter sent to the UN General Secretary in February 19, 1991 Greece accused Özal 
of directly threatening to use military force against Greece (UN Documents 
S/22243, for the Turkish answer to the Greek accusations see UN Documents 
S/22297). A meeting between Mr. Mitsotakis, the new Prime Minister of Greece 
and Mesut Yilmaz the new Prime Minister of Turkey in September 1991 in Paris63 
did not produce any results either. In fact, it did not even come anywhere close to 
continuing the effort that Papandreou and Özal had initiated in Davos. On the other 
hand, Mitsotakis and Yilmaz should not be blamed for the end of the 
rapprochement process, as the rapprochement had faded away much earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
63 See historical review in 1999 rapprochement chapter  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE 1999 GREEK-TURKISH SUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
Shortly after the Greek-Turkish rapprochement that took place in 1988, 
world politics experienced a great shift: that is, the Communist Bloc collapsed 
paving way for the establishment of multitude of new states in Turkey’s and 
Greece’s neighborhoods. Despite the immense changes that took place, however, 
the frosty relations that prevailed at the end of 1988 continued for the first half of 
the 1990s. Then came a sharp deterioration after 1995, which brought the two states 
on the edge of a war. It therefore can be said that the 1999 rapprochement, similarly 
to the one in 1988, follows a period of tense relations. Nevertheless, it is a far more 
complicated and prolonged process than how it looks at the first brush, as it covers 
a period of several notable progress and some occasional setbacks from the mid-
1999 until to this date. 
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The fourth Greek-Turkish rapprochement is largely epitomized by the role 
of the European Union. Turkey’s decisiveness to join the Union provided Ankara 
with extra incentives for the peaceful resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict, 
whereas Greece’s strategy to use the EU as an external balancing mechanism 
against the Turkish ‘threat’ also contributed towards this end (see Tsakonas and 
Tournikiotis 2003; on the role of the EU on the Greek-Turkish conflict see also 
Oguzlu, 2004; Onis 2001; Aybet, 2009). The attention that the EU received from the 
scholars studying Greek-Turkish relation is indeed justifiable. The EU is not just 
another international institution, or another NATO. Despite the fact that before 
Greece was admitted the EU had declared that it would not be a party to the Greek-
Turkish conflict (Aydin, 2004), the EU was able to shape the framework of the 
Greek-Turkish relations through two different ways. On the one hand, Greece used 
its membership “to impede progress in EU-Turkish relations” (Bahcheli, 2004: 
112). Secondly, both states had to “Europeanize” their foreign policies, a shift that 
made the rapprochement more welcoming.  
Nevertheless, in order for it to succeed, the 1999 rapprochement needed 
more than the motivations the EU had to offer. Thus, charismatic and daring 
leaderships on both sides, important decisions that changed the foreign policy 
strategies and honest efforts for cooperation with support coming from different 
strata of the Turkish and the Greek societies, also played an important role in the 
initiation and the successful outcome of the 1999 rapprochement.   
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7.2. Historical Background 
As of the early 1990s relations between Greece and Turkey remained tense. 
Several events contributed to the building up of tension between the two states, 
finally leading to the complete deterioration of relations and a “near-miss” 
reconciliation opportunity in the first months of 1996. The departure from the 
Davos spirit sheerly surfaced itself when Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the Greek Prime 
Minister met with his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yilmaz in Paris, in September 
1991. The meeting did not produce any tangible results other than causing harsh 
criticism of Mitsotakis by siginificant portions of the Greek national press (See for 
instance To Vima 15/9/1991, Ta Nea 13-14-15/9/1991). The only positive outcome 
from the Paris meeting was that of Mitsotakis’ mention of his preparedness to 
change the article 19 of the Citizenship Law (KEI) of 3370/1955, which hitherto 
allowed the stripping of the citizenship from Greek Muslims under special 
conditions64.  
Two years after the Mitsotakis-Yilmaz meeting in Paris, under a new 
PASOK government, in November 1993, Greece and Cyprus announced a joint 
defense pact. This pact was about helping coordinate Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
military strategies, bring parties together within joint military drills and 
embolden/synchronize their military equipments. Turkey reacted to this by 
announcing that it would offer a similar type of assistance to the Turkish Cypriots. 
                                                         
64 However, it should be pointed out that the law 3370/1955 was annulled much later, in 1998, by law 
2623/1998. See http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/GRE%203370%201955%20(original).pdf (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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In 1995, Greece ratified United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), 
which became effective on July 21st, 1995 (See Government Newspaper, 
Α/136/1995). The Article 2 of the Law 2321/1995, which ratified the convention, 
confirmed Greece’s right, according to the Article 3 of the UNCLOS to extend her 
territorial waters up to 12nm, at a time of her choosing. On June 8th, 1995, only 8 
days after Greece had ratified the Convention, the Turkish National Assembly 
issued a resolution granting full authority to the Turkish government to employ any 
means, including the use of military force, to maintain and protect Turkey’s 
interests in the Aegean in case Greece extended its territorial waters to 12nm (casus 
belli threat). 
In the late January 1996, while important domestic changes were taking 
place in both Turkey and Greece, a major crisis, the biggest after 1974, took place. 
A month earlier, on December 26, 1995, the Turkish ship Figen Akat ran aground a 
small islet in the Eastern Aegean. The captain of the ship refused Greek assistance, 
arguing that he was within Turkish territory. The Turkish ship was, finally, assisted 
by the Greeks after communication with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
while notes were exchanged between the Turkish and Greek Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs concerning each party’s views on the Imia/Kardak Islets’ status. This 
incident was some days later leaked to the Greek press, culminating in the raising 
of the Greek flag on one of the Islets, by a group of citizens led by the mayor of the 
nearby Kalymnos Island. The Greek flag was taken down by a group of Hurriyet 
newspaper journalists and was replaced by the Turkish one. The situation soon 
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spiraled up, as nationalistic rhetoric dominated the media in both countries. The two 
countries, and especially Greece, managed to concentrate considerable firepower 
around the islets, and a warlike situation rapidly developed in the area (the view 
that Greece had managed to concentrate superior forces is expressed by Limperis, 
1997). The diffusion of the crisis was only made possible through vigorous the 
USA mediation during the night of January 30-31.     
A year after the Imia/Kardak crisis, another crisis occurred relating to the 
purchase and installment of Russian-made PMU-1 (S-300) missile system, in the 
Republic of Cyprus. The plans of the Cypriot government alerted Turkey, which 
perceived the actions of the Greek-Cypriots as a political and military provocation. 
On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot leadership considered the installation of the 
missiles as its inalienable right. The S-300 crisis, though not as serious as the 
Imia/Kardak one, became one of the dominant issues in Greek-Turkish relations 
during 1997, and until the end of 1998, when Clerides, the Greek-Cypriot president 
decided for the missiles to be installed in Crete, instead of Cyprus. The S-300 crisis 
is evident that the Cyprus question continued constituting a key component of 
Greek-Turkish relations, and a constant threat to stability. For instance, the 
demonstrations on the Green Line in summer 1996, which resulted in the murder of 
two Greek Cypriots65, had also caused friction between Greece and Turkey.  
At the end of 1997, the EU Luxemburg Summit did not include Turkey in 
the list of official candidates. The assumptions of the Summit mentioned: 
 
                                                         
65 Also a month after the events a Turkish Cypriot was found dead  
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The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the 
European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and 
economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of 
human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European 
Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of 
satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement 
of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court 
of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a 
political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions.66 
The results of the Luxemburg summit caused much disappointment to the 
Turkish side67 and actually caused further distress in Greek-Turkish relations, rather 
than forcing Turkey to approach Greek position. In addition to Turkey’s hardening 
stance, Denktaş broke off contacts with Clerides68, rendering bi-communal contacts 
extremely difficult.  
The final blow to the relations between Greece and Turkey was the arrest of 
the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya, in February 1999. Amidst Ankara’s 
official plea to the international community for his return to Turkey, Öcalan entered 
in Greece carrying a Greek-Cypriot passport and took a shelter in the Greek 
Embassy in Kenya in run-up to his subsequent arrest. The Öcalan incident put the 
Greek Government to a very difficult position, as it was not Simitis’ will to provide 
help with the Kurdish leader. In fact, Simitis had met with Mesut Yilmaz in Antalya 
in October 1998, and had reassured the Turkish Prime Minister that Greece would 
                                                         
66 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed 
20/9/2013) 
67 See Turkish government’s official statements, 
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/December1997-February1998/STATEMENT.PDF, and, 
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/December1997-February1998/STATEMENT2.PDF 
(accessed 20/9/2013) 
68 See official statement http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish--republic-of-northern-cyprus-government-
statement.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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not provide political refugee status to Öcalan, who had already left Syria (To Vima, 
21/2/1999). The revelation that Öcalan found safe haven, even for a while, in a 
Greek diplomatic mission further infuriated the Turkish side amidst accusations 
against Greece for allegedly supporting terrorism69. In Greece, the Öcalan 
imbroglio led to the dismissal of three ministers including, but not limited to, Mr. 
Pangalos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a well-known hardliner. George 
Papandreou, the son of Andreas Papandreou, who later initiated the Davos process, 
was appointed in his position.  
Among the abovementioned events that contributed to the steep 
deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations, few efforts were made to achieve 
normalization, but none of them managed to make considerable process. There are 
two cases that are barely worth mentioning. The first one is the Madrid Declaration 
signed between Turkish President Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Simitis during 
a NATO Summit in July 1997. The agreement was engineered by the US Foreign 
Minister, Madeleine Albright, and covered six basic principles to designate the 
future discourse of the Greek-Turkish relations. These, briefly, included mutual 
commitment to peace, respect for each other’s sovereignty, respect for international 
law, respect for each other’s legitimate and vital interests, commitment to refrain 
from unilateral acts, and commitment to settle disputes through peaceful means on 
the basis of mutual consent70. 
                                                         
69 See for instance reports on the Turkish press, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=the-
greek-pkk-connection-qampa-1999-02-20, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ankara-
keeps-quiet-on-greece-at-least-for-now-1999-02-18 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
70 See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=us-new-beginning-for-turkey-and-greece-
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The second step towards cooperation was made by the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ismail Cem who on February 12, 1998 sent a letter to his Greek 
counterpart Mr. Pangalos. The letter elaborated on a possible solution to all of the 
issues related to the Aegean Sea and called for high level talks to begin by the end 
of March 199871. Greek side came to conclude that Cem’s proposal did not bring in 
anything new, but only reproduced Turkey’s longstanding view favoring bilateral 
negotiations, thus politely politely rejected his overtures72. Ismail Cem sent a 
second letter, in March 11, to push one more time for a re-consideration of his 
former request, and the Greek Foreign Minister once more turned him down on the 
same basis73.  (On the Greek Turkish relations prior to the rapprochement as well as 
accounts of the abovementioned crises see Veremis, 2001; Ker-Lindsay, 2007a; 
Herakleides, 2001; Herakleides, 2007; Simitis, 2005; Cem, 2001; Bolukbasi, 2004; 
www.mfa.gov.tr;  www.mfa.gr) 
 
7.3. The Initiation of the Rapprochement 
The year of 1999 started with the worst conditions for the Greek-Turkish 
relations. The Greek involvement in the Öcalan Case caused much bitterness on 
Turkish side, which went beyond the policy-making elites to spread across the 
different segments of the society. It was at that time that even individuals and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1997-07-10 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
71 See full text of the verbal note http://www.mfa.gov.tr/a-call-for-peace-from-turkey-to-
greece_br_february-12_-1998.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
72 Apart from the point proposing the formalization of the Madrid declaration. 
73http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_the_-reply-of-ambassador-necati-utkan_-the-foreign-ministry-
spokesman-to-a-question-addressed-to-him__br_march-30_-1998-__p_.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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groups from the Turkish side, otherwise in favor of rapprochement, grew hesitant 
towards reconciliation with the other side of the Aegean. For instance, almost the 
entirety of the Turkish part of the Greek-Turkish Forum withdrew, and the Forum 
was only saved because one Turkish member decided not to abandon dialogue. 
Nevertheless, the conditions changed dramatically in the months that followed 
Öcalan’s arrest. When the summer came around corner the Greek-Turkish relations 
started to improve, surprisingly, at a quick pace, preparing the ground for the 
initiation of the fourth Greek-Turkish rapprochement.  
 
7.3.1. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement 
It is generally held that the first step towards the fourth round of Greek-
Turkish rapprochement came about with letter of Ismail Cem to George Papandreou 
on May 24, 1999 (for the full text of the letter as well as Papandreou’s reply, see 
Ker-Lindsay, 2007a: Appendix A). In it the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
suggested that the first step to ameliorate bilateral relations should start from 
concluding an agreement on combating terrorism. In addition, Cem suggested that a 
plan for reconciliation should also be arranged. Papandreou’s reply, which was sent 
to Cem on June 25th, was a lengthy one. Papandreou welcomed Cem’s willingness 
for improving bilateral relations in the letter, and suggested a number of issues that 
he believed this cooperation should premise upon. More specifically, Papandreou 
pointed out six topics covering everything from culture to tourism, from 
environment to crime, and from economic cooperation to ecological issues. 
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Furthermore, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed their will to meet 
Ismail Cem in person whenever a convenient opportunity appears in the horizon. 
This answer, obviously pleasing Ismail Cem, reassured him about that “things were 
possible.” (Cem, 2001: 182) 
The letters that Cem and Papandreou exchanged were significant for the 
initiation of the process. Their initial communication was quite similar to the 
exchange of letters that Venizelos exchanged with Inonu in 1928. Nonetheless, 
apart from Cem’s first step and Papandreou’s reciprocation, one can mention of a 
burgeoning process of trust-building in between these two countries. Indeed, 
bearing in mind that Cem had already sent two letters to Pangalos in short notice, 
only to be turned down by the Greek side, his decision to send a yet another, similar 
letter to the new minister of foreign affairs shows that Cem anticipated Papandreou 
to react differently.  
An opportunity for the two ministers of foreign affairs to meet in person 
soon arrived, on June 30. Their venue of meeting was New York, in the margins of 
UN’s “friends of Kosovo” meeting, wherein the two decided to put together a team 
of Turkish and Greek high-ranking officials in hopes of discussing matters of low-
politics. Among the topics to be handled by this committee were "tourism", 
"environment", "trade", "culture", "regional cooperation", "organized crime”, “drug 
trafficking”, “illegal migration”, and finally “terrorism". Tourism, environment and 
trade issues apparently took a prior place with parties appointing them as the 
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subjects of discussion during the first meeting in Ankara, on 26-27 July 1999, while 
leaving the rest to the following summit in Athens, on 29-30 July 199974. 
Papandreou and Cem’s meeting in NewYork, significantly contributed to the 
trust-building process, as the two men had the opportunity for the first time to meet 
in person and exchange their thoughts on the future of Greek-Turkish relations. The 
establishment of the committees clearly indicates that the dialogue that took place 
was not superficial, but in fact authenticates the overall willingness of Cem and 
Papandreou to move forward. Alternatively, the committees can be considered as a 
tactical move to prepare the ground for the initiation of a more decisive step taken 
in the direct of a Greek-Turkish reapproachment, which would, for instance, 
include the signing of agreements between the two sides.      
In August 17 a catastrophic earthquake measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale 
struck Turkey’s Izmit district, by the Marmara Sea causing massive destruction. 
Fifteen minutes after the earthquake the Greek Embassy in Ankara received a plea 
from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help. In less than half an hour, 
Papandreou had contacted Cem and assured him about his governments resolve to 
offer whatever help Turkey may have needed. Be noted that this was the first 
answer from international community to Cem’s request for help (Ker-Lindsay, 
2000). Indeed, Greece immediately sent the Greek Emergency Rescue Team 
(EMAK), fully equipped and accompanied by sniffing dogs. In addition, two 
                                                         
74http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-the-understanding-reached-between-turkish-and-
greek-foreign-ministers_br_july-22_-1999.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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mobile hospital units together with a team of doctors, and a team of seismologists 
were also dispatched to Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2000).  
Nonetheless, it should also be noted that, besides the official response by the 
Greek state, the response by the Greek society was also quick and attentive to the 
humanitarian tragedy that wrecked a havoc on Turkey. The Greek Church in 
accordance with the Patriarchate offered humanitarian help. The mayors of Athens, 
Thessaloniki, Piraeus and Patras and Heraclion met in order to better coordinate 
their common efforts for help. The academic communities of two Universities in 
Athens decided to give a helping hand to the victims of earthquake, as well. Other 
NGOs such as the Médecins Sans Frontières, the Trade Union Centre of 
Thessaloniki, and the Greek Women’s Association, too, did not fail to stand by the 
side of Turkey in the face of the said natural disaster. Finally, the Daily Newspaper 
Editor Union sent a letter to the Istanbul and Ankara Journalist Unions to express 
their sincere condolences, while Mr. Koutsikos, the president of the Greek-Turkish 
Business Association also sent letters with similar content to the Turkish business 
community, citing the will of the Greek businessmen to help Turkey recuperate 
from the resultant humanitarian and material loss (Ker-Lindsay, 2000; also see Ta 
Nea, 19/8/1999). Greek assistance was reported in the Turkish media in a way they 
all praised Greece’s timely offered help (see for instance Sami Kohen’s article on 
Milliyet, 25/8/1999, page 18; also Ta Nea, 23/8/1999). 
Just in a matter weeks, this time around Athens fell victim to a similar 
earthquake. Even though the emergent damage was incomparable to what had 
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happened in Turkey, the Turkish state and Turkish citizens eagerly voiced their 
willingness to assist their Greek neighbors. A team of the Turkish Emergency 
Rescue Team (the AKUT) lost no time to establish connection with the Greek 
Ambassador in Ankara only minutes after the earthquake to offer help. The AKUT 
departed for Greece immediately after the earthquake to commence on its first 
mission outside Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). The Turkish President Suleyman 
Demirel, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and Ismail Cem sent their condolences to 
the Greek government (Ta Nea, 9/9/1999). Additionally, many Turkish citizens 
informed the Greek consulate in Istanbul they are prepared to give support to their 
neighbors hurt by a similar disaster. A few days after the Athens earthquake the 
Greek Prime Minister stated:  
The presence of the Turkish rescue team, as well as the presence of the 
Greek rescue team during the earthquakes in Turkey is indicative of the 
solidarity and the friendship that nations in the area must have, and in 
general all nations, in order to proceed in peace (To Vima, 9/9/1999). 
The earthquakes’ relative weight within the initiation of the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement might have been a bit overstated. As also indicated in the official 
statements by Ismail Cem and, especially, George Papandreou; a proven solidarity, 
one nation showed to the other, at a time of great distress , became a force for 
pushing the momentum to the ‘right’ direction (see for instance Gundogdu, 2001). 
Papandreou (2001: 6) accordingly opined that 
Tragedy generated a genuine feeling of human warmth between two peoples 
involved in historical strife. Spontaneous and dramatic acts of fraternity and 
solidarity were expressed between the citizens of Greece and Turkey. These 
acts short-circuited elaborate diplomatic strategies and exerted powerful 
pressure on our governments to move ahead boldly. Our mandate became 
clear. Our peoples desire to live in peace together  
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Yet, the ‘exploitation’ of the earthquake for even noble political causes soon 
started to lose its steam. Overall, it is not the earthquakes that unaided initiated the 
political will for cooperation. Instead, before these natural disasters occurred, the 
political will was already there and  communicated between the two governments. 
However, the help that each nation offered to one another, in turns, invoked in both 
sides of the Aegean a sense of empathy and sympathy. These feelings offered the 
decision makers a historic opportunity to take big steps forward safe in knowledge 
that they now have the support of their people for a rapprochement..   
The third major change that occurred in 1999 and propped up the 
solidification of the rapprochement’s initiation was the lifting of Greek objections 
to Turkey’s EU membership. Such constituted a major change in the traditional 
Greek foreign policy that, to that far, aimed to somehow  impede Turkey’s EU 
prospects. According to Simitis (2005: 75-6) after the Imia/Kardak crisis it became 
clear that there was need for a new strategy in which to re-examine the bilateral-
bipolar nature of the Greek-Turkish relations through new lenses that goes beyond 
the simplistic logic of problem-solving by the means of violence. This new thinking 
was to become an important strategic choice after the 1996 elections in Greece.  
The change of Greek foreign policy’s perspective allowed Turkey to attain a 
candidate status for full membership to the EU, thus fulfilling a time-honoring goal 
of the Turkish state75. According to Tsakonas (2010: 23-24), the Helsinki Summit 
was the outcome of an “ideational change” that occurred in Greece’s foreign policy 
                                                         
75 For instance see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-
turkey_s-candidacy-to-the-eu_br_december-11_-1999-.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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especially regarding the latter’s relations with Turkey. This shift was an outcome 
deriving as much from a more Europeanized Greek foreign policy as from a visibly 
sharp pragmatist turn in the foreign policy making mentality of Greece. As for the 
said pragmatic shift in Greece perception of Turkey, it suggested that “successful 
interconnection of the two states’ interests with legitimate international rules and 
standards –as for example that of European integration- is both feasible and 
realistic.”  
Hence, other than satisfying Turkey’s objectives, the Helsinki Presidential 
Conclusions (for the full text of the conclusions see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm) were extremely satisfactory 
to the goals of the Greek diplomacy as well. On the one hand, the resolution of the 
Cyprus problem was no more a precondition for accession to the EU (paragraph 
9b). On the other hand, if Turkey wanted to become a full member of the EU, she 
should have to solve her problems with Greece (On this issue also see Rumelili, 
2004). Much quoted paragraph 4 of the Conclusions stated that 
… In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and 
urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding 
border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a 
reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The 
European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding 
disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process 
and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of 
Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004… 
The Helsinki Summit made cooperative attitude more appealing not just for 
Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots but also for Greece and the Greek-Cypriots, 
provided that the solution of the Cyprus problem per se was no longer deemed as a 
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precondition for Turkey’s accession, too (Loizides, 2002), (For possible outcomes 
of cooperative non-cooperative policies see Loizides, 2002: 433).  
 Table 7.1. 
 
Action/ 
Event  
Series of 
crises 
Letter from 
Cem to 
Papandreou 
Papandreou’
s letter to 
Cem 
Earthquakes 
in Turkey 
and Greece 
Helsinki 
summit  
Time 1996-1999 May 24, 1999 June 1999 
August –
September 
1999 
December 
1999  
Effect 
Brought the 
two states to 
the brink of 
war 
First step – 
Ice breaking 
Reciprocatio
n, trust-
building  
 Positive 
gestures – 
Positive 
feelings  
Internation
al pressure 
– Positive 
incentives 
for 
cooperatio
n 
 
 
 
7.3.2. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1999 Rapprochement 
The fourth case resembles more to the 1987 Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
as far as the incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement are concerned. The 
series of crises discussed above had alarmed politicians in both states as they made 
clear that Turkey and Greece had to work on their problems in order to avoid an 
armed conflict. Once again the element of threat seems to render two states insecure 
with each other’s potential intentions by creating incentives strong enough to 
convince the political leaders from both sides to decide in favor of a 
rapprochement.  
Other than the threat to national security, it is specific to Turkey that 
Ankara’s willingness to join the European Union must be considered as a critical 
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motive for the rapprochement. Meaning, Turkey had to normalize its state of affairs 
with Greece as this normalization was the only way to secure Greece’s backing of 
Turkey’s bid for full membership.  
Other than these major incentives the domestic politics in Greece (see 
Koliopolos et al, 2010) and Turkey (see Carkoglu, 2000; Hale 2002), as well as the 
financial situation of Greece (Hekimoglou, 2006: 409) and Turkey (Onis, 2003) did 
not provide any considerable incentives for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement.  
 
7.4 Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process 
Similar to the rapprochement of 1930s, normalization of relations between 
Turkey and Greece was supported by the decision-makers and the public in both 
countries, while the motivation was also strong enough to push it further. In the 
succeeding pages, the development of the Greek-Turkish relations from the year 
2000 onwards will be discussed, and the rapprochement process will be broken 
down to its basic components.   
a. Summit level communication 
The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey were meeting quite often, even 
before the beginning of the rapprochement, in the margins of NATO meetings or 
other summit level meetings of various international organizations. Such was the 
Heads of Government of the Countries of South-Eastern Europe summit meeting, 
which took place in 1997 for the first time in Greece. The meeting, among other 
issues, aimed to create those conditions that are needed for the prosperity of the 
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participating nations in a framework of peace, security, good neighborliness and 
stability (UN Documents S/1997/910). Simitis (2005: 89) mentions his meeting 
with the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz during this convention, adding that 
the Turkish Prime Minister insisted on an open dialogue that will include all issues, 
while the former proposed a step-by-step approach. Later on, Simitis concluded that 
meetings between the Prime Ministers became material for Turkish domestic 
opposition to exploit, thus there was almost no room back then for rapprochement. 
Thus, during the future occasions when Simitis met with Turkish Prime 
Ministers (for instance he met again with Yilmaz during the 1998 Heads of 
Government of the Countries of South-Eastern Europe summit meeting in Turkey, 
and with Bulent Ecevit in Istanbul during the OSCE summit meeting), yet, no 
significant progress could be made. Simitis’ strong belief that meetings between 
Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers will be no means fruitful, was the reason why, 
during the first years following the initiation of the rapprochement process, he 
neither accepted any of the several invitations to visit Ankara (Simitis, 2005: 89), 
nor did he extend one such invitation.         
The victory of the Justice and Development party (the AKP) in the 2002 
Turkish national elections became a turning point concerning the summit level 
meetings between Greece and Turkey. Soon after, Simitis communicated through 
diplomatic channels his wish to meet the leader of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
(Simitis, 2005). Erdoğan accepted the invitation and visited Athens on November 
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18, 200276. Erdoğan’s visit to Athens was of great importance, as during the visit he 
was still not in office due to domestic legal obstacles. As Greece was the first out of 
the seven countries of Erdoğan’s tour, the Greek government showed her support to 
the Turkish leader, while leaks by Erdoğan’s associates admitted that Erdoğan was 
very pleased by the Greek invitation (To Vima, 19/11/2002).    
Simitis (2005) states that Erdoğan gave him the impression of a leader who 
was determined to precipitate developments in Greek-Turkish relations. Later on, 
during the Ministerial Council he admitted that he believed Erdoğan was "well-
intentioned and positive"77. However, during their meeting the two Prime Ministers 
did not share views on whether the EU should postpone giving Cyprus full 
candidate status until June 2003 Summit in Thessaloniki78. Before he left Greece 
Erdoğan also met with Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of the opposition party and 
with Mr. Avramopoulos, the mayor of Athens with whom he became friends when 
Erdoğan was they mayor of Istanbul (To Vima, 19/11/2002).   
Erdoğan visited Greece again in late June 200379 during the European 
Council in Thessaloniki. Even though this was not an official visit, it is important to 
note that during his stay Erdoğan visited the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, 
wherein he went to the house Kemal Ataturk was born. This was the first visit of a 
                                                         
76 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ak-party-to-tour-eu-countries-to-rally-support-
2002-11-18 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
77 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=simitis-sees-no-prospect-for-joint-ventures-with-
turkey-2002-11-21 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
78 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-has-surprised-athens-2002-11-20 
(accessed 20/9/2013) 
79 In the meanwhile Simitis and Erdoğan had met in Belgrade  
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Turkish Prime Minister to the house of Kemal Ataturk80. It is also noteworthy that 
the permission for the visit was provided with hesitation due to security concerns. 
The fact that Erdoğan was, finally, permitted to visit Ataturk’s house should be 
interpreted as Greece’s support made available for him, as this visit strengthened 
his profile as a leader who is not at variance with Republican heritage. During the 
Thessaloniki Summit Erdoğan met with Simitis, but there was no progress 
concerning Greek-Turkish issues.     
In 2004 Prime Minister Erdoğan was to make an official visit to Greece, his 
first as the Prime Minister of Turkey, and the first visit of any Turkish Prime 
Minister since Özal’s visit in 1988. His host was the newly elected Greek Prime 
Minister, Kostas Karamanlis. During his visit Erdoğan met with several officials as 
well, such as the initiator of the rapprochement George Papandreou who at that 
time was the leader of the main opposition, the leaders of all opposition parties, the 
president of the Greek Parliament and the President of the State (Ta Nea, 8/6/2004). 
Erdoğan’s official visit to Greece in May 2004 is important for several 
reasons. To begin with, the visit was indicative that Greece’s strategy on Greek-
Turkish relations had not shifted after the government change, at least not 
dramatically81. It was not only the visit which took place, but also the statements 
made by both Erdoğan and Karamanlis that affirmed the persistence of the 
rapprochement spirit. For instance, Karamanlis pointed out that  
We have had good times and bad times. Circumstances, mistakes and short-
                                                         
80 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-returns-satisfied-from-thessaloniki-2003-
06-23 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
81 This issue will be discussed in detail later in this chapter  
 223 
 
sighted choices have brought hardships to both nations and widened the 
divide. Of course, the two sides should not dishonor their past by forgetting 
or distorting what has gone before, but I believe it is time to make a big 
decision. We have to teach future generations that both nations have the 
desire for development and welfare that will benefit all those living on both 
sides of the Aegean82.  
Similarly, Erdoğan stated: 
What we say is that we have to look at the future. Leave the incidents of the 
past to the past. We should keep in mind the generations to come and not 
what we lived. Because we don’t wish for the coming generations to live 
through what we have lived through (To Vima, 8/5/2004). 
Secondly, during Erdoğan’s visit to Athens, the Turkish and Greek Prime 
Ministers had the chance to strengthen their personal relations. The two men had 
met on several occasions in the past, and were known to have a very good rapport 
towards one another (Ker-Lindsay, 2007b). In Athens Karamanlis invited Erdoğan 
to his house, and with their spouses they had dinner which was of private nature83. 
The private dinner lasted for three and a half hours and from the Greek side leaked 
that nothing concerning politics or diplomacy was discussed (To Vima, 7/5/2004). 
Good personal relations between Erdoğan and Karamanlis were also confirmable 
by the fact that, few months later in July 2004, Karamanlis was to participate in 
Erdoğan’s daughter’s wedding ceremony, in fact, as one of the two witnesses.84.   
However, the most important aspect of Erdoğan’s official visit to Athens 
was his short visit to Western Thrace and meeting with people from the minority. 
This visit, which was the first one of the kind since Bayar’s visit 52 years earlier85, 
                                                         
82 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-visit-turns-new-page-in-ties-with-greece-
2004-05-10 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
83 Also the Greek MFA and Turkish Minister Aydin with their spouses attended 
84 http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_263.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013) 
85 In 1967 Demirel had visited Alexandropolis by the Turkish borders 
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had caused concerns to Athens and much discussion as to whether it should take 
place or not. Finally, not only did the visit to Western Thrace take place86, but with 
his attitude Erdoğan eased Greek side’s worries and further strengthened the 
rapprochement spirit. During his visit at the city of Komotini, Erdoğan talked to the 
people who had gathered outside the Turkish Consulate and said “My presence here 
must be a lesson [of friendship] for all people…”, while later on he stated “I'm 
especially addressing my brothers. You will, without doubt, protect your special 
identity. Nobody is telling you to lose or give up your Turkish identity, but 
remember that you are citizens of Greece”87. Comments concerning Erdoğan’s visit 
to Western Thrace by the Greek press were very positive, while they acknowledged 
soothing undertones in Erdoğan’s statements (For Instance, see Ta Nea, 10/5/2004,  
Kathimerini.gr 11/5/2004).  
Another major breakthrough for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement came 
about during Karamanlis’ visit to Turkey in 2008. The visit of a Greek Prime 
Minister to Turkey, a very rare occasion in itself, also verifies the good level of 
bilateral relations and the success of the rapprochement process. It has already been 
mentioned that Simitis, who was the Prime Minister until 2004, had avoided 
visiting Turkey, before and after the initiation of the rapprochement. The hesitation 
of Greek Prime Ministers to visit Turkey, especially after 1974, is explained by the 
public disgrace that would cause an official visit to a country that is seen by the 
                                                         
86 Even though it was labeled as a private visit 
87 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-visit-turns-new-page-in-ties-with-greece-
2004-05-10 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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Greek people as the occupation force of an important part of Hellenism. It is 
therefore not a surprise that last official visit of a Greek Prime Minister to Turkey, 
before the 2008 Karamanlis visit, had taken place 49 years ago by Karamanlis’ 
uncle Konstantinos Karamanlis. Such makes Karamanlis one of the third Greek 
Prime Ministers who have ever paid an official visit to Turkey88. 
According to the Greek press, Karamanlis’ visit to Turkey was originally 
planned for 3 years earlier. However, due to an incident close to the Imia/Kardak 
islets slightly prior to a visit by the Greek Foreign Minister Molyviatis to Turkey, 
which Greece perceived as a planned provocation, he postponed his visit. 
Therefore, during Karamanlis’ visit an unofficial agreement between the Turkish 
and Greek militaries to avoid any confrontation that could initiate an unpleasant 
incident over the Aegean took place (Kathimerini.gr, 24/1/2008)89. A week before 
his visit to Turkey, Karamanlis justified his action during a speech given before the 
Greek Parliament by saying: 
Greece and Turkey have a very long history and a very long difficult 
history. Our relations with Turkey are not straightforward; they have their 
ups and their downs.They have moments of tension and moments of 
abatement. There have been several efforts since the time of Kemal Atatürk 
and Eleftherios Venizelos, some went better some went worse. We follow a 
strategy with the eye to the future and not as a hostage of the past. We are 
looking for a gradual restoration of mutual trust. We are working on the full 
normalization of our bilateral relations, which, of course, presupposes, a 
solution on the Cyprus issue. With these crystal clear thoughts, this return 
visit of mine to Turkey is being planned. There is neither excessive 
optimism nor pessimism. There is realism. There is a sense of duty.90 
                                                         
88 The third one was Venizelos 
89 On the Greek fear of provocation see also http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=why-
all-the-fuss-regarding-karamanlis-visit-to-tuirkey-2008-01-23 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
90 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=unease-marks-backdrop-of-karamanliss-visit-
2008-01-21 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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As both Erdoğan and Karamanlis had recently reelected, the visit raised 
expectations among many who saw this as an opportunity for both leaders to set 
aside a long history of mutual distrust. As it is, Karamanlis’ trip to Turkey did not 
produce any spectacular results; it was, however, satisfactory. Apart from the 
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, the Greek Prime Minister also met with 
the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and the leader of the main opposition party, 
Deniz Baykal91. During his stay Karamanlis visited Ataturk’s Mausoleum, and gave 
a lecture at Bilkent University. As an importance anecdote, he used the France-
Germany example as a model that Greek-Turkish relations could/should follow 
(Kathimerini.gr 25/01/2008). The most important outcome of the meeting was the 
agreement to intensify the exploratory talks, which became less substantive during 
Molyviatis time at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to one meeting every two 
months (Enet.gr, 25/1/2008).       
One of the most important parts of Karamanlis’ official visit to Turkey, at 
least from the Greek perspective, was his visit to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Istanbul. The visit which fell under Karamanlis’ private schedule according to the 
protocol92, offered a chance to the Greek Prime Minister and the Patriarch to 
highlight the constructive role that the Patriarchate could play not only to the 
further improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations but also to EU-Turkey 
                                                         
91 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-pms-landmark-visit-begins-amid-concerns-
2008-01-24 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
92 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-pm-karamanlis-gears-up-for-ankara-plans-
to-pay-private-call-on-fener-patriarchate-2008-01-22 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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relations93. Karamanlis defined the patriarch as “the firm European voice in Turkey, 
despite all adversities and disappointments”, while Bartholomew, the Patriarch, 
stated: 
The patriarchate always aims for the building of harmonious and peaceful 
relations between those living in the same geopolitical area, the peoples of 
Turkey and of Greece, and believes that both can always live peacefully and 
fraternally under the same sky which we hope will never be overshadowed 
by clouds of conflict94. 
The two official visits, plus Erdoğan’s visit as the leader of AKP, that took 
place in the ten years since the initiation of the rapprochement process95, are not 
enough to judge for the completion of the rapprochement process considering the 
extent to which a rapprochement process may demand. However, it should be 
underlined that, unlike the 1988 case, the 1999 rapprochement, especially until 
2004, was a process mainly driven by the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs—but not the Prime Ministers. Indeed, after their first exchange of letters in 
mid-1999, Papandreou and Cem met a number of times on several occasions. The 
relationship they developed, their frequent communication, their willingness for 
collaboration and the support of backchannel Greek-Turkish working groups was 
the driving force behind the rapprochement process. 
                                                         
93 For instance see 
http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/72036/%CE%95%CF%80%CE%AF%CF%83%CE%BA%C
E%B5%CF%88%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7-
%CE%9C%CE%B5%CE%B3%CE%AC%CE%BB%CE%B7-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-
%CE%93%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%82-
%CE%A3%CF%87%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%AE/ (accessed 20/9/2013) 
94 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=bartholomeos-makes-no-mention-of-heybeliada-
seminary-2008-01-26 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
95 Please note that this chapter covers the rapprochement until the end of 2009. Erdogan’s visit to 
Turkey which took place in 2010 is not covered in this paper. 
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b. Signing of agreements   
The decade in aftermath of the initiation of the rapprochement experienced a 
significant increase in the number of bilateral agreements that were signed between 
Turkey and Greece. According to Ganapati96 (2010), Greece and Turkey had, since 
1923 and until 1999, signed a total of 19 bilateral agreements. Of these, 10 were 
signed before and during the first rapprochement and 8 were signed before and 
during the second rapprochement. The only agreement between the two states 
between 1955 and 1999 was the Agreement on International Road Transport signed 
in 1970. It is therefore important to note that, after 1999, Greece and Turkey signed 
33 bilateral agreements, including protocols, memorandums of understanding, 
while they have adopted 24 confidence building measures (Ganapati, 2010: 173).  
The signing of those agreements between Turkey and Greece, which mainly 
concerned issues associated with “low politics”, has been the outcome of the 
cooperative atmosphere that prevailed since the very beginning. It has already been 
mentioned that during their meeting in New York, on June 30, 1999, Papandreou 
and Cem decided to create a group of Turkish and Greek high-ranking officials, 
who would discuss cooperation in six different fields. After the first meetings that 
took place within the final days of July, the Greek and Turkish officials met 
again for a second round in Athens (9 and 10 September 1999) and Ankara (15 and 
16 September 1999), even arranging a follow-up meeting to hold in the late 
October.97 
                                                         
96 Data based on UN Treaty Collection 
97 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-communique-signed-after-the-meeting-of-high-officials-of-the-
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The effectiveness of those meetings became apparent during Papandreou’s 
official visit to Turkey from 19 to 22 January, 2000. Papandreou’s visit, a milestone 
in itself considering that the last visit of a Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
Turkey was in 1962 by Averoff98, bore the fruit with four bilateral agreements 
signed in between the parties (For full text of all four agreements see Greek 
Parliament official record, Plenary session 27/3/2001, www.hellenicparliament.gr). 
Those included a) agreement for cooperation on environment protection which also 
encouraged scientific, legal and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation 
between Greek and Turkish NGOs, b) Cooperation between the Turkish Ministry of 
Interior and the Greek Ministry of Public Order to form a common front against 
illegal trans-border activities, especially terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration. This agreement referred to the exchange of information 
between Greek and Turkish services especially. c) Cooperation on tourism and d) 
agreement for the mutual promotion and protection of investments, which created a 
solid legal framework for the Greek investments in Turkey and vice-versa. 
Papandreou’s visit to Turkey was followed by Cem’s visit to Athens a few 
weeks later. This visit was labeled as historic by the Greek press due to the fact that 
a Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first time made her/his way to Greece 
since 1960. During Cem’s official visit to Athens, Greece and Turkey signed five 
more agreements on February 4. These include99 a) cooperation on the areas of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
foreign-ministries-of-turkey-and-greece_br_september-16_-1999.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
98 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=papandreou-coming-to-ankara-to-sign-four-
agreements-2000-01-19 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
99 For full text of all five agreements see Greek Parliament official record, Plenary session 
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science and technology under the supervision of TUBITAK and the Greek General 
Secretariat for Research and Technology, b) agreement on economic cooperation 
which also included the establishment of common Greek-Turkish financial 
committee (article 5) which would promote and make bilateral economic 
cooperation easier, c) cooperation of customs administration aiming at more 
efficient tax calculation and proper/fair application of customs legislation, d) 
Cultural cooperation, which mainly encouraged cooperation on education, 
including cooperation between universities and exchange of professors and 
teachers, e) agreement on cooperation in maritime transport with an eye on 
strengthening Greek-Turkish cooperation in the maritime field as well as 
contributing to the development of international shipping.  
Although all these agreements were part of low politics, their importance 
should not be undervalued. After all, the two meetings in Athens and Ankara 
constituted the highest level of diplomacy the two states have ever had in history. 
Cem (2001: 183-184) defended the importance of the nine agreements by 
advancing: 
 …We have accomplished in 6 months more than what had been done in 40 
years…The current talks and the nine agreements signed are substantial. All 
are of equal relevance…If what we have already achieved in six months 
were “minor-confidence-building measures” why then they were not 
realized in 40 years? 
Finally, next to the nine agreements, during Papandreou’s visit to Ankara in 
January 2000 the parties concurred with that Greece should provide Turkey with 
technical know-how on EU (acquis) related issues (Heraclides, 2001: 24). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13/3/2001;27/3/2001; 12/6/2001, www.hellenicparliament.gr 
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In the years that followed, Greece and Turkey signed a number of 
agreements that covered cooperation on several issues such as health (signed in 
Athens in September 2005), justice (protocol was signed during Turkish Minister of 
Justice to Athens in June 2005), transportation (highway connecting Greece to 
Istanbul and second bridge over the Evros/Meriç river), agreement for cooperation 
on veterinary issues (signed in November 2000), cooperation on agricultural issues 
(Protocol signed in June 2000 in Ankara), cooperation on plant protection (also 
signed in November 2000),  and emergency relief (protocol for the formation of a 
joint disaster response unit). On top of these agreements, the two countries also 
agreed on two other matters which in the author’s view convey even more 
importance. These are; the Readmission of the Illegal Immigrants Protocol 
(implementation of the Article 8 of the previous agreement concerning fighting 
crime, which was signed in Ankara) and the memorandum encouraging cooperation 
between the Greek Diplomatic Academy and the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s 
Training Centre100 (on Greek-Turkish agreements see Ker-Lindsay, 2007; 
Heraclides 2001). 
In addition, a number of agreements dealing with strengthening economic 
and business cooperation were also signed after 2000, while 24 confidence building 
measures, which mainly concerned military cooperation and tension reduction, 
were signed101.    
                                                         
100 On Greek-Turkish agreements see also http://www.agora.mfa.gr, 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_1_12/06/2005_146941 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
101 Will be discussed in following sections 
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c. Military cooperation 
Military cooperation between Greece and Turkey was a key component of 
the rapprochement process. By the end of the 1990s both countries were 
maintaining strong militaries, while dogfights were a common occurrence over the 
Aegean Sea. Even if such confrontations can be considered superficial, they could 
easily lead to more serious events in case of an accident. Strengthening military 
cooperation could lead to tension reduction over the Aegean, thus minimizing the 
likelihood of incidents that could provoke a crisis or, in general, endanger the 
rapprochement process.  
Military cooperation was closely related to the discussion around confidence 
building measures (CBMs) which were first put on the negotiation table in early 
2000102. The Turkish side insisted on the adoption of a number of military related 
CBMs, while the Greeks believed that the CBMs could also include other areas of 
interest as well. Finally, Greece and Turkey decided to discuss three separate 
categories of CBMs. The first would be measures that had already been agreed in 
the Pappoulis-Yilmaz Memorandum, during the previous rapprochement, in May 
1988 (see previous chapter). These CBMs would be discussed by the Greek and 
Turkish representatives at NATO. The second and third categories included 
measures of tension reduction and good neighborhood respectively, and would be 
                                                         
102 The sentence refers to the period after the initiation of the rapprochement process. Prior to it, 
Greece and Turkey, encouraged by the General Secretary of NATO Javier Solana, had discussed 
CBMs. See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/agreement-reached-by-turkey-and-greece-regarding-the-
confidence-building-measures-in-the-aegean_br_june-5_-1998.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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discussed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (for an analytical review of 
those CBMs see Tsakonas & Ntokos, 2006: 140-1). 
Finally, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-four confidence building 
measures, most of them aiming either to strengthen cooperation between the two 
militaries, across all levels of command and all army branches, or to create the 
conditions for tension reduction over the Aegean Sea. On the first group the two 
states agreed on the CBMs such as; arranging regular visits between chiefs of staff 
(discussed between Babacan and Bakoyanni at Athens in 2007), exchange visits 
between officers of all three branches and visits military academies’ cadets (agreed 
between Papandreou and Cem in late May 2003 in Crete), invite officers to monitor 
other state’s military exercises once a year (one of the first CBMs that Papandreou 
and Cem agreed upon in November 2001), and mutual briefing in relation to the 
planned military exercises (the first agreed CBM in December 2000). A number of 
joint forces or units were also established.   
The second group includes agreements such as establishing a direct line of 
communication between the chiefs of General Staff and the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, expanding the flight moratorium from June 14 to September 14, instead of 
the Two Month (July-August) Moratorium that was arranged by the Papoulias-
Yilmaz memorandum, “red-line” between the combined air operation centers in the 
Turkish city of Eskisehir and the Greek city of Larissa. In addition, a big step 
towards creating a trustful environment appeared with the signing of the Ottawa 
Convention on anti-personnel mines and that of the Olympic Truce (on the CBMs 
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see Tsakonas & Ntokos, 2006; Turkey’s EU annual progress reports from 2000-
2009; press reports during Foreign Ministers’ official visits).    
In total, the CBMs that Turkey and Greece jointly agreed on had a positive 
impact on the rapprochement process. There are at least two incidents that could 
lead to crisis, but, in both of them, tension was rapidly defused through those 
mechanisms that the CBMs had established. The first incident refers to Turkey’s 
plans to proceed with seismic surveys with the “Piri Reis” vessel103. The Greek 
concerns were eased out through multiple phone communications between 
Papandreou and Cem (Ta Nea, 31/5/2001). The second event concerns the tragic 
incident of two fighter jets colliding over the Aegean Sea. In the minutes that 
followed the crash the Greek Chief of Staff Hinofotis called General Özkök, and 
they agreed to land all fighters in order to avoid further unpleasant developments 
(Ta Nea, 24/5/2006).  
 The cooperation between the Turkish and Greek militaries that the CBMs 
encouraged, also allowed for several mutual visit of high-ranking military officers. 
Thus, General Büyükanıt visited Greece two times, one as the Chief of Turkish 
Army (Land Forces) in June 2005 hosted by the Chief of the Hellenic Army 
General Staff Lieutenant General Douvas (To Vima, 22/6/2005), and the other as 
the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2006. During his second visit 
he stated: 
What is important is to isolate the atmosphere that could create crises in the 
Aegean. It is important for deterioration to take place. We will try to 
                                                         
103 It should be stressed out that Piri Reis did not belong to the Turkish republic but to University of 
Izmir 
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accomplish this. Off course two military men cannot solve all the Greek-
Turkish problems. What they can do is to arrange for the politicians a safe 
environment…104  
Similarly, the Greek Admiral Hinofotis paid an official visit to Turkey in 
July 2006 and hosted by General Özkök, only weeks before the latter’s retirement. 
Hinofotis, who was the first Chief of General Staff to visit Turkey after 1974, was 
warmly welcomed in Turkey, while the Turkish media noted that this was the first 
time whereby Turkish military's honor guard played the Greek national anthem105. 
In contrast, there happened a negative event caused by the CBMs. On April 
11, 2004 a group of two Turkish officers and 5 cadets arrived to Athens, following 
an invitation by the Greek Military Academy. The invitation was part of an 
agreement that Cem and Papandreou initially signed on May 26, 2003. Over the 
night ofApril 12, the Turkish group found in their room a half destroyed Turkish 
flag with insults written on it in English. The Turkish group as a result was 
instructed to leave Greece and it did so immediately106. 
d. Economic cooperation 
Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey followed the 
development of Greek-Turkish relations after 1987. As such, although only few 
companies were active across the borders, those business councils that were 
established after Davos, which were discussed in the previous chapter, were still 
active. Nonetheless, relations among business associations deteriorated sharply 
                                                         
104 http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=753598 
105 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-general-hinofotis-hosted-by-turkish-chief-
of-general-staff-ozkok-2006-07-27 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
106 www.nooz.gr 
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after the Öcalan case, echoing the general spirit of mistrust that prevailed among 
the Turkish people. In February 1999, two of the most important Turkish 
businessmen, Rahmi Koc and Sarik Tara, declared that they would inhibit the 
operations of the Greek-Turkish Cooperation Council and boycott Greek products, 
while Mr. Koc, who was the president of the Council resigned from his position. 
Previously, on February 22, Turkish businessmen had sent a letter to the European 
Employers Union accusing Greece of pandering terrorism (Ta Nea, 4/3/1999).  
Even then, by the end of 1999, business relations started to bounce back. 
Notably, the Greek and Turkish business communities always constitute one of the 
main pillars of the rapprochement process. The first official meeting after the 
initiation of the rapprochement between Turkish and Greek businessmen took place 
in Athens in mid-October where it was decided that “workshop groups should be 
founded to develop relations and cooperation between the two countries' business 
communities”107. The Turkish businessman Sarik Tara became the new President of 
the Greek-Turkish Cooperation Council, and was the host of the Papandreou-Cem 
meeting on January 22, 2000, while other important Turkish businessmen and the 
President of the Greek-Turkish Business Cooperation Council, Mr. Koutsikos, also 
attended (Milliyet, 23/1/2000).  
From 2000 onwards economic relations between Greece and Turkey 
significantly increased, while the  cooperation between Turkish and Greek 
businessmen became much more frequent. Collaboration on the business level was 
                                                         
107 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turco-greek-business-meeting-results-positively-
1999-10-14 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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based on a variety of initiatives, which aimed at bringing together businessmen 
from the two sides in order to identify the obstacles on the road towards a more 
intensified cross-border commerce and publicize products (For some important 
initiatives from 2004-2009 see at www.grtrnews.com under economy section). For instance, 
in February 2000, around 150 Greek and Turkish businessmen held a conference in 
Istanbul. In addition, in March 2000, the Greek-Turkish Business Forum was held 
(Ta Nea, 7/3/2000) and sustained its activities incessantly within upcoming years, 
as well. The Forum and other meetings among Greek and Turkish businessmen 
attracted also political interest, extending initiation to various prominent politicians.    
Banking sector was one of the most important links in business cooperation 
between Turkey and Greece during the rapprochement process. From the very early 
stages, banks supported inter-border business by providing funding to those 
businessmen who wanted to conduct business with the other side. During the 
aforementioned Istanbul businessmen conference in March 2000, the Greek and 
Turkish Bank Unions signed a “Principles Paper” with which they agreed upon 6 
points of cooperation (Ta Nea, 16/3/2000). These included exchange of 
information, cooperation in correspondent banking and common issuing of large 
loans. In 2006, the National Bank of Greece became the majority holder of 
Finansbank, acquiring 46% of normal shares and 100% of the latter’s founders’ 
shares (http://www.finansbank.com.tr/en/pdf/announcements/20060818.pdf)108. 
This deal, valued at around $2.8 billion, plus another $2.25billion in 2007, 
                                                         
108 This percentage was later doubled according to the agreement 
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skyrocketed Greek foreign direct investment to Turkey for 2006 and 2007, which 
was until then negligible. From 2004-2008 Greece ranked as the third biggest 
source of FDI in Turkey after Holland and the USA (Kutlay, 2009). Finally, plans to 
establish a Greek-Turkish Bank (Aegean Business Bank - ABB) were put forth 
since 2005109, however, until now they have failed to realize (For more information 
on economic cooperation and its prospects see Liargovas, 2004). 
Apart from the efforts made in the private sector, the political vision to 
support economic cooperation was also strong from the very beginning of the 
rapprochement process. Three of the nine agreements that Cem and Papandreou 
signed in January and February (economic cooperation, protection of investments 
and tourism) aimed at strengthening economic ties and economic interdependence 
between Greece and Turkey. Especially the agreement on economic cooperation 
mentioned a variety of sectors such as; energy, telecommunication and ship 
building, where cooperation between the two states was possible and should be 
encouraged.  
The importance of economic cooperation for the policy-makers was also 
apparent during the two-way official visits. During Erdoğan’s visit to Athens in 
May 2004, an official dinner took place to which many businessmen attended as 
well. During the dinner Karamanlis pinpointed that trade volume between Turkey 
and Greece had reached $1.3 billion, now three times more than what was it in 
1999. He also marked that many Greek enterprises were expanding to Turkey, while 
                                                         
109 http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_582.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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there were 77 investment programs, running at different sectors (To Vima, 
9/5/2004, also for more information on cross border trade and foreign direct 
investments see Papadopoulos, 2009). Likewise, during Karamanlis visit to Turkey, 
the two Prime Ministers attended the Greek-Turkish Business Forum which took 
place at the same time in Istanbul110. During the Forum, Erdoğan stated that “the 
cooperation of businesses, institutions and NGO's are pushing politicians forward to 
cooperate and create common policies. The contribution of the business world is 
especially vital in this partnership”111. Apart from the summit level, business 
cooperation was also encouraged during meetings among Greek and Turkish 
officials, just as in those meetings of the Joint Greek-Turkish Economic Committee 
which brought together ministries in 2002112.  
The most important achievement of the official efforts for economic 
cooperation became realized in December 2003 when the two states agreed upon 
the construction of a pipeline that would run from Komotini to Karacabey, 
connecting the Turkish and Greek natural gas networks and threading a link for the 
transportation of natural gas from Asia to Europe. This project, as extensive as 86.6 
kilometers, forms one of the greatest deals between Greece and Turkey. The 
construction was launched by Karamanlis and Erdoğan at the Greek-Turkish 
borders in July 2005 (To Vima, 3/7/2005), and the same Prime Ministers 
                                                         
110 http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_901.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013) 
111 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greece-turkey-aim-to-strengthen-business-ties-
2008-01-26 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
112 http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=360164 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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inaugurated the operation of the pipe in late 2007 (www.desfa.gr, see press release 
18/11/2007). 
e. Statements made by officials 
Previous to the initiation of the rapprochement, almost all statements by 
Greek and Turkish officials came to put additional tension and friction to the 
already worsened relations between the countries. The best example of such is a 
statement by Pangalos in late September 1997 when he accused the Turks of being 
“thieves, rapists and murderers” on Greek television. The statements of the Greek 
Minister of Foreign Affairs invited immediate reaction from the Turkish media as 
well as the Greek media that is in support of then the opposition party (See for 
instance Milliyet, 26-27-28/9/1997). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
statement accusing Mr. Pangalos of being delusional, a racist and a fascist.113 
Likewise, the Greeks were also reacting to various statements, made by Turkish 
officials, which they found provocative, offensive or threatening114.  
As far as the period following the rapprochement is concerned, official 
statements in general did not play an important part of the process. True, many 
public statements concerning the new era in the Greek-Turkish relations were made 
both by Cem and Papandreou, the initiators of the rapprochement, and later on by 
the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. Nonetheless, these statements were not 
                                                         
113 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-issued-by-the-turkish-foreign-ministry-regarding-the-recent-
calumnies-by-greek-foreign-minister-pangalos-against-turkey_br_january-10_-1998.en.mfa 
(accessed 20/9/2013) 
114 See for example reaction on Ciller’s threats on use of military force Ta Nea, 17/12/1996; Also on 
several occasions, Greek reacted to Turkish threats for annexing the TRNC 
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creating positive developments but rather followed them. In other words, there were 
no such strong statements that would advance the rapprochement a step forward. 
On the other hand, the lack of provocative or insulting statements should itself be 
appreciated as an indicator of the strength of the process specifically if one 
compares the present to the situation in pre-1999 era. Occasionally, however, 
certain portions of the media in both countries did not fail to isolate certain parts of 
statements to be able to present what is left of to the public as a provocation from 
the other side115. 
In this light, there are two official statements that are relevant to the 
rapprochement and should be mentioned here. The first one concerns Erdoğan’s 
first visit to Greece as the leader of AKP in 2002. During his stay in Athens 
Erdoğan stated (To Vima, 19/11/2002): 
We should not perceive Greece as a competitive country anymore. Greece is 
not our opponent…we should continue the cooperation that the great 
Ataturk and Eleftherios Venizelos had started 
The second statement actually refers to the message that Karamanlis wrote 
in the quests’ book after the wreath ceremony at Ataturk’s Mausoleum during his 
official visit to Turkey. As he wrote (Kathimerini, 25/1/2008): 
Kemal Ataturk and Eleftherios Venizelos had the political courage, the will 
and the insight not to let the conflicts and the tragedies of the past become 
an obstacle to the efforts for building a better future of peace and 
cooperation to the benefit of both our peoples.   
Both Erdoğan’s and Karamanlis’ statements provide, once again, strong 
evidence of the 1930s rapprochement’s influence on the Greek-Turkish relations, 
                                                         
115 For example Greek media would regularly present Turkish statements on Cyprus as provocations, 
even though they were just repeating Turkey’s official view on the Cyprus problem 
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meaning how Venizelos’ and Ataturk’s achievements became a reference point for 
future Greek and Turkish political leaders. 
f. Rapprochement’s influence on the societal level  
One of the most characteristic features of the 1999 rapprochement is that it 
also gained traction from different levels of the Greek and the Turkish societies. 
This is partly because of the empathy and sympathy feelings that the earthquakes 
invoked. However, there are other factors to be considered as well. The fourth 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement takes place at the time of globalization, when travel 
and communication across borders is easier than ever before. The rapprochement 
also takes place when civil society is stronger compared to the past, even if not as 
strong in Greece and Turkey as in the rest of the western world. Thus, from 1999 
onwards an impressive number and variety of Greek-Turkish initiatives became 
part of the rapprochement process. If these initiatives are juxtaposed against other 
similar events, it can be easily grasped that the issue under consideration should be 
separated and then discussed under three main categories—that are, quasi official, 
professional, and grassroots cooperation.  
Cooperation between quasi-officials has its roots at the work of American 
scholars and practitioners who engaged key people representing conflicting parties 
in unofficial dialogue, as means of accessing the root causes of the conflict. This 
approach, which is now more commonly known as track-II diplomacy,has been put 
to use since very early stages, but especially in the 1990s in Cyprus, but not 
between Greece and Turkey. Undoubtedly, the most important group of this kind 
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was the Greek-Turkish Forum (the GTF), an initiative that materialized even before 
the initiation of the rapprochement. It did not stop but continued its activities even 
beyond the year of 1999 (for more information see Kotelis, 2006). The Forum acted 
as a backchannel of communication between the two states at a time when no 
official dialogue between the two sides was in place. It was formed by key 
individuals from Turkey and Greece, including academics, retired diplomats, 
advisors to policy-makers and businessmen. The GTF discussed several bilateral 
issues and even communicated some policy proposals to the political leaders.  
A similar, but more institutionalized, approach was the initiation of 
exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece in 2002.The exploratory talks started 
on March 12, 2002. Typically, in each round of discussions the participants were 
two Greeks and two Turks. In the first round, the Turkish team included 
Ambassadors Ugur Ziyal and Deniz Bolukbasi, and the Greek team Ambassador 
Skopelitis and Professor Argiris Fatouros116. The exploratory talks, as they were 
perceived by Athens, were not negotiations, nor a dialogue on all issues 
(Herakleides, 2007: 201). According to Simitis (2005: 102) they merely aimed at 
understanding the real intentions of the other side. Nonetheless, as the talks were 
held behind closed doors and were confidential, there is very little knowledge on 
what discussed or agreed during the meetings. Even though at times the Greek and 
Turkish press mentioned that the sides were close to completing an agreement on 
the territorial waters and the Aegean Sea shelf, these sorts of information have 
                                                         
116 Fatouros had been a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum before  
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never been confirmed officially. During an interview in 2003, Papandreou actually 
denied that there was a secret agreement between Greece and Turkey, but added 
that the exploratory talks were continuing within a positive spirit117.    
Cooperation between professionals covered a large number of initiatives 
that were organized after the initiation of the rapprochement. Apart from the 
meetings among Turkish and Greek businessmen that have already been discussed, 
there were numerous, occasional group meetings. Such were, for example, the 
journalist’s initiative which organized meetings between Greek and Turkish 
journalists in order to discuss how to promote the rapprochement and tone down the 
nationalistic rhetoric in the press (see in detail Kotelis, 2006; also on the change of 
Greek press’ rhetoric see Lazarou, 2009). In addition, a strong basis of cooperation 
transpired in the field of tourism, especially between the business and agents on the 
Turkish Aegean coast and on the Greek islands by it118. Cooperation on tourism 
aimed at increasing the number of Greeks visiting Turkey and vice-versa, and, 
moreover, creating the conditions for strengthening both Turkey’s and Greece’s 
touristic competitiveness119. Disaster-related collaboration is also an interesting 
example that took place among professionals. Apart from the help provided on the 
governmental level, the 1999 earthquakes put forward an opportunity for a number 
of Greek and Turkish teams to cooperate. These include the Radio Amateur 
                                                         
117http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/Document.aspx?d=6&rd=7739474&f=1361&rf=12
93666608&m=3612&rm=22204335&l=2 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
118 See www.grtrnews.com for such initiatives 
119 See for instance the Greek-Turkish protocols on Tourism that were signed between the two 
countries: http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=435812 (accessed 20/9/2013), http://www.skai.gr 
12/11/2006 
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Association of Greece (the RAAG) and their Turkish counterpart, the Turkish 
Amateur Radio Emergency Communication Service (Telsiz ve Radyo Amatorleri 
Cemiyeti - TRAC)120, the Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay, TRCS) the 
Turkish Confederation of Fire Rescue Agencies (Tüm İtfaiye Teşkilleri Birliği), 
Turkish Federation of Search-and-Rescue Associations (Arama-Kurtarma 
Dernekleri Federasyonu) and their Greek counterparts (Ganapati et al, 2010: 167-
168). Equally important initiatives among scientists, teachers or mayors were also 
organized. In June, 2006 economist journalist Bruce Clark coined the term “the 
baklava effect” in order to describe the “sweet” atmosphere that started to prevail 
over the moods of both Greeks and Turks during the organized seminars.121  
Finally, contact and cooperation on the grassroots level has also been quite 
substantial. An important step towards strengthening ties at the grassroots level was 
the establishment of several University departments, especially in Greece, that were 
dealing, in one way or another, with Turkey122. These departments created a new 
generation of Greeks who were eager to know their neighbors better, and above all, 
they were learning the Turkish language. In Turkey, the most significant similar 
effort was the initiation of a master’s diploma on Greek-Turkish relations at Bilgi 
University. Apart from that, there is a variety of other initiatives on cultural issues, 
such as music concerts, fashion exhibitions, book presentations etc, where Turks 
                                                         
120 These two organizations had also cooperated in the past after the 1992 and 1995 earthquakes at 
Erzincan and Dinar respectively. 
121 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4Dcgi/_w_articles_civ_1182736_28/10/2006_202950 (accessed 
20/9/2013) 
122 At the moment there are five such departments in Thessaloniki, Florina, Komotini, Athens and 
Rhodes.  
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Table 7.2. 
 
Rapprochement Process 
  
 
Indicator 
 
Main events 
 
Frequency 
 
Importance 
 
Summit level 
meetings 
Erdoğan’s visit to Athens 
2002 
Erdoğan’s visit to Athens 
2004 
Karamanlis’ visit to  
Turkey 2008 
 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Agreements 
Signed 
 
33 bilateral agreements 
mainly on low-politics 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Military 
cooperation 
Agreement on a variety of 
CBMs Buyukanit’s two 
visits to Greece 
Hinofotis’ visit to Turkey 
in 2006 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Economic 
cooperation 
Various initiatives 
organized by Greek and 
Turkish businessmen, 
significant increase of 
trade volume, important 
agreements signed 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Statements/G
estures 
Several statements made 
by official rather follow 
positive developments 
rather than creating them 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Societal level 
Several initiatives among 
professionals, students, 
artists, journalists etc 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
and Greeks have the opportunity to meet, share views and work together123. In 
addition, internet has offered another option for Greek-Turkish teamwork, web 
                                                         
123 See for instance 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/AuthoritiesAbroad/Europe/Turkey/EmbassyAnkara/el-
GR/Bilateral/Cultural/ (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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pages and internet groups such as “Kalimerhaba” shaped a connection link between 
Turks and Greeks and, thus, support the rapprochement. Cooperation at the 
grassroots level was supported by the Civil Society Development Program, which 
was initiated in 2002 and included an 8 Million Euro budget for two years to 
enhance civic dialogue and empower NGOs in Turkey. Further funding was 
provided by the European Commission to promote cross-border cooperation 
between Greece and Turkey (for more information see Onis and Yilmaz, 2008; for a 
detailed analysis of civil society cooperation between Turkey and Greece see 
Birden and Rumelili, 2009). 
 
7.5. The Future of the Rapprochement 
The current study covers only the first ten years of the rapprochement from 
June 1999 to June 2009. At the end of the process, relations between Greece and 
Turkey improved considerably when compared to the period prior to the 
rapprochement. Even though little process has been achieved as far as the important 
problems still continue to divide two states, Turkey and Greece have reached a level 
of communication that allows for furthering cooperation on many areas. At the 
same time the fear of war has decreased considerably as the Greeks and Turks have 
proven in practice that they are capable of resolving crises fast, without allowing 
further escalation to take place. It is also true that the rapprochement process has 
lost some of its early momentum; however, this was anticipated given the 
prolonged process. 
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Against this backdrop, the immediate future seems quite promising for 
Greek-Turkish relations. In late 2009, the PASOK won the Greek parliamentary 
elections and George Papandreou, who had assumed leadership of the party in 
2004, became the new Greek Prime Minister, while he also took office as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Papandreou proceed to a highly symbolic gesture only 
days after his election, when he decided to visit Turkey in order to attend the 
informal meeting of foreign ministers of South-East European Cooperation Process. 
This was Papandreou’s first trip abroad after his election. During his time in Turkey 
Papandreou visited Ismail Cem’s grave where he left an olive branch, while he also 
met with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan124.  
Moreover, in 2010, Erdoğan paid an official visit to Athens, which is his 
second as Turkey’s Prime Minister. During his visit, Turkey and Greece signed 21 
agreements (including memorandums and joint declarations). Those agreements 
sealed the inauguration of the Greek-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council, and 
covered a number of areas including economic and business cooperation, 
environment, commerce and energy125. The High-Level Cooperation Council was 
planned to have a meeting every year, chaired by the two Prime Ministers and with 
the participation of many ministers126. 
                                                         
124 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=greeces-new-pm-in-turkey-on-1st-foreign-trip-2009-
10-09 (accessed 20/9/2013), see also positive reception by the Turkish press (newspapers covers) at 
http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_1086.shtml 
125 http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?artid=331706&ct=32&pid=2&dt=14/05/2010 (accessed 
20/9/2013) 
126 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-pm-seeks-new-era-with-crisis-hit-greece-
2010-05-14 (accessed 20/9/2013) 
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7.6. Assessment of the 1999 Greek-Turkish Rapprochement 
The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999 along with the 1930s 
rapprochement counts as the only successful effort for normalization of relations 
between Greece and Turkey. The two states managed to maintain friendly relations 
for a long period, while there is a continuous effort for finding new ways to broaden 
cooperation. Of course, and this should be considered the main drawback of the 
process, none of the important issues concerning the Aegean Sea, the minorities or 
Cyprus were solved during the rapprochement. As for the status of Cyprus, the best 
chance for re-unification was lost in April 2004, while a major part of the problem 
has been transferred to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Conditions 
for minorities have certainly improved, but again, part of the problem is transferred 
to the ECHR. Nonetheless, even though the rapprochement process did not lead to 
solution, it was still successful to the extent that it created an environment that will 
at least not easily permit problems to escalate into crises. Furthermore, the process 
allowed for a sincere dialogue to take place on all issues via the exploratory talks 
for the first time. 
 
• Impact of the international system to the national security 
The 1999 rapprochement takes place in a relatively stable and secure 
international environment. It is a fact that both Turkey and Greece needed to deal 
with certain problems in their neighborhood, such as the Kosovo issue, Greece’s 
issues with its northern neighbor FYROM, or Turkey’s growing anxiety towards the 
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situation in Iraq. Nevertheless, none of these problems constituted an imminent or 
direct threat to either Greece’s or Turkey’s national security. In that sense, the 1999 
rapprochement case is similar to the 1988 failed rapprochement as such that in both 
of these cases, the main threat for the parties was the other side and not a third, 
jointly perceived, hostile party. Concisely, the impact of the international system on 
the two states’ national security was fairly minimal.  
 
• State identity 
The negative images that persisted during the 1988 rapprochement 
continued during the 1990s, as well, and even came to prevail over the countries’ 
mood amidst the 1999 rapprochement process. Moreover, as the time went by and 
the problems between Turkey and Greece remained unresolved those negatives 
images crystallized into negative stereotypes. The series of crises that took place 
after the mid-1990s exacerbated those images, so that right before the initiation of 
the rapprochement, Greece and Turkey simply perceived one another as an ‘Other’, 
which risked a potential an armed conflict or even a full scale war.  
A significant remedy to the negative images and stereotypes, at least among 
the Turkish and Greek public opinions, was the two major earthquakes that took 
place in 1999, and the feelings of empathy that they created. The earthquakes 
provided the politicians with the space they needed in order to achieve fast growth 
in the early stages of the rapprochement. As useful as this was it did not lead to a 
change of state identities. On the contrary, that change constituted a much slower 
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process, and it had leisurely started developing before the initiation of the 
rapprochement. The change was not dramatic, it developed slowly, but it was, 
however, positive. The backchannel negotiations, the frequent visits and the overall 
cooperation on several fields, made clear that even though problems remained the 
two countries were capable to discuss their problems in a civilized manner.   
On the Greek side a lot has been written on Greece’s new approach which 
came into complete contrast with the policies followed in the past. The new 
thinking, which largely made the Greek-Turkish rapprochement possible, has been 
the subject of much scholarly discussion on this new pattern of policy’s motives 
and/or effectiveness. In general, most scholars agree that changes in Greek foreign 
policy are part of the Europeanization process (for an extended literature review on 
the Europeanization process of the Greek foreign policy see Stavrides, 2003). 
According to Economides (2005) “…in essence the real Europeanization has 
occurred in the domain of translocation of Greek foreign policy preferences in at 
least two key issue areas, Turkey and Cyprus, into the EU agenda”. 
The change of Greece’s foreign policy is also attributed to the alteration of 
the state’s “agentic culture”, which was possible when the modernizer’s ideas 
became dominant within PASOK. According to Tsakonas (2010: 109-110): 
Driven by an agentic “resolution culture” Greece’s active socialization 
strategy had aimed at linking process on Turkey’s candidacy/membership 
with the resolution of its border dispute with Greece…This had in turn 
provided Greece with a potent negotiating leverage for putting an end to 
what Greece considered as mostly unilateral claims by Turkey against its 
sovereign rights in the Aegean 
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• Costs and benefits equilibrium 
The diplomatic pandemonium that prevailed in the early 2000 led to the 
signing of a number of agreements that were discussed in detail in this chapter. 
Later on, the two states signed more agreements, covering a number of issues. 
Signing of agreements became a crucial part of the process and made it clear that 
cooperation on some issues was beneficial to both Greece and Turkey, thus the cost 
of defecting from cooperation was increasing for both sides. 
The cost of defecting was climbed up as a result of Turkey’s and Greece’s 
overlapping interests at the time when the rapprochement took place. The most 
commonly cited example to make a case for this argument is the link between 
Greek foreign policy and the Kosovo issue, something that by destabilizing the 
Balkans drove Turkey and Greece closer to one another. However, there were other 
urgent issues as well that required Turkey’s and Greece’s closer cooperation to 
disappear. Such were, for example, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, 
illegal immigration and, in general, issues that neighboring countries usually 
manage through joint policies.  
 
• Interdependence 
Economic benefits were also important for both countries. Even though 
Greek-Turkish commerce was also rising before 1999, the improvement continued 
after the initiation of the rapprochement. The volume of Turkish imports and 
exports to Greece for example had increased from $273,8 million in 1994 to $709,8 
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million in 1999 and $897,4 million in 2002 (Evin 2004: 16). Apart from that, 
cooperation among businessmen and enterprises created a dynamic that was 
positive for both sides, and especially for Turkey which benefited by the Greek FDI 
especially after 2006. Finally, number of Greek and Turkish tourists to Turkey and 
Greece respectively increased significantly, from 311.000 in 2001 to 776.000 
people in 2006 (Couloumbis and Kentikelenis, 2007; also on economic cooperation 
see Tsarouhas, 2009). 
Rapid improvement of relations during the first of the rapprochement 
process led to the consolidation of political interdependence (see Couloumbis and 
Kentikelenis, 2007). Overall, interdependence might have not been a primary 
motive for the continuation of the rapprochement, but it must be taken into 
consideration as one of the factors contributing to the rapprochements success. 
 
• Leadership 
Similar to all other previous rapprochement cases, that this study includes, 
the role of political leaders was important to the rapprochement process. However, 
there is a notable difference between the fourth rapprochement case and the other 
three cases. In 1999 the prime ministers did not play an active role, and it was the 
Greek and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, 
that embraced the task of improving the Greek-Turkish relations. The role of agents 
to the initiation of the rapprochement process is clearly acknowledged by 
Heraclides (2007) who correctly notes that the policy makers that took the 
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important decisions towards the improvement of relations with Turkey, were a 
crucial factor, as others would not have taken such decisions had they been in their 
shoes.  
Nonetheless, apart from the role they may have played within the initiation 
of the process, the support of political leaders often came in follow-up to an already 
initiated process of reconciliation, which was nevertheless constitutive of the 
success of the fourth rapprochement period.  This is especially true as far as the first 
years of the rapprochement are concerned, when the process was still fragile, and 
the likelihood of its success highly debatable. Cem and Papandreou took important 
steps within a very small time frame, and hence, provided relatively strong 
foundations for the rapprochement process before much skepticism or criticism had 
the time to develop. The positive developments on the political front were so fast 
that surprised even the people who had started working on improvement of the 
Greek-Turkish relations even before 1999127.    
 
• Depth of the process 
It is clear from Table 7.2 that the 1999 rapprochement was a deep process 
that managed to touch upon all of the indicators that characterize a rapprochement 
process. The signing of bilateral agreements, the meetings among politicians, the 
                                                         
127 This point refers to the information provided by members of the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF), 
who pointed out that improvement in Greek-Turkish relations was so rapid that the Forum, even 
though backchannel, could not keep up to the developments. This information was acquired through 
personal interviews of the author with members of the GTF while he was writing his master’s thesis. 
See Kotelis, 2006 
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improved communication between the Turkish and Greek military high-ranking 
officers are all strong indications to prove that this rapprochement process was 
sufficiently genuine and far from being superficial. Similarly, developments in 
indicators relating to the economic cooperation and societal level show that the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement was supported by the most productive parts of the 
Turkish and Greek populations, such as university students, businessmen, artists, 
local politicians etc. 
The fact that the 1999 rapprochement managed to gain depth and width as a 
process undoubtedly produced positive impact on its own likelihood. A notable 
example that proves this point is the mid-air crash between a Greek and a Turkish 
fighter jet on May 23, 2006, which resulted to the distraction of both planes and the 
death of the Greek pilot. Had this incident occurred before 1999, it was very likely 
that it would have caused a dangerous crisis between Turkey and Greece. However, 
this was not the case in 2006. What played an important role was the direct 
communication between the two Chiefs of Staff, Ozkok and Hinofotis, and, also, 
between the two ministers of foreign affairs, Gul and Bakoyanni. Both of these 
communications were possible thanks to the important progress that rapprochement 
process achieved in terms of military and political cooperation128. 
 
                                                         
128 On the May 23, 2006 incident see for instance, Kathimerini archive on-line 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185085, 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_1_24/05/2006_185083, 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185086, Milliyet Archive on-
line http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/24/son/sonsiy16.asp,    
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• Turning points 
Turning points were an important factor for the 1999 rapprochement process 
but only as far as its initiation was concerned. The Imia/Kardak crisis, the Öcalan 
case, the two earthquakes were all important and unexpected events that forced the 
two countries to seek new ways of normalizing their relations. After the initiation of 
the rapprochement, however, there emerged a lack of turning points that could pose 
an obstacle to the process or prevent its failure. Thus, turning points were not an 
important factor to the success of the fourth rapprochement case.  
 
•   The GRIT strategy 
At the time of the rapprochement’s initiation Turkey and Greece were 
divided by a number of important issues. The two states not only disagreed on the 
possible solution of these problems, but they also did not share a common 
understanding of what these problems were, thus, it was missing from the 
beginning as to what kind of dialogue between the two sides should include if ever 
such a dialogue at some point started. In addition, both Greece and Turkey had 
developed strong arguments in support of their positions deducing them from their 
interpretations of the International Law. Finally, maximalist positions referring to 
each states’ rights were prevalent for an extensive amount of time in both camps 
and  highly assimilated by the Greek and Turkish public opinions. 
All these factors were an obstacle to the commencement of official 
negotiations between Greece and Turkey that would revolve around the real issues 
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between the two countries. Indeed, the efforts from the beginning of the 
rapprochement were focused on finding a new “modus vivendi” between the two 
states, rather than trying to provide a solution to the Greek-Turkish problems. In 
other words, the process was aiming to highlight the commonalities than bringing 
the differences under the spotlighting. As such, any negotiations between the two 
states remained unofficial and did not produce any essential results within the 
period the current chapter study.  
As it can be inferred from this landscape, the fourth rapprochement is 
characterized by the lack of official negotiations, despite the presence of important 
issues that begged for a solution. The successful outcome of the rapprochement was 
not the product of the use of a specific negotiating approach, but rather the decision 
of both states not to discuss the issues that could pose a threat to the good relations.  
 
7.7. Concluding Remarks 
Greece and Turkey have come a long way during the last years, achieving in 
the last decade what seemed to be improbable in the early 1999. The flourishing 
cooperation between them has reached at a point that allows for one to nurse 
moderate optimism as regards to the future of the Greek-Turkish relations. 
However, as long as the problems that divide the two sides remain unresolved, the 
rapprochement process couldn’t be fulfilled. Nor could it constantly persist, 
collapsing at some point under the weight of these problems. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES 
 
  
 
  
 
8.1. Introduction 
The study of each case in the previous chapters clearly shows that 
rapprochement is a complicated process, the success or failure of which depends on 
various factors and events. Even when the rapprochement process concerns the 
same two states, as has been the case in the current study, outcomes may still vary 
greatly. The present chapter undertakes the task of identifying resemblances and 
dissimilarities between the four cases of rapprochement in the Greek-Turkish affairs 
by comparing the information provided in the previous chapters. Firstly, pre-
rapprochement periods will be compared in order to explore if the driving forces of 
the rapprochement present significant similarities and whether the incentives for the 
initiation of the rapprochement influenced the outcome of the process. Secondly, 
the discussion will focus on comparing the rapprochement process itself, including 
each of the rapprochement indicators that were examined in the case studies. The 
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discussion on differences and similarities among the rapprochement process of each 
case study will eventually assess the impact of the eight variable set forth in the 
methodology chapter. 
 
8.2. Cross-case Comparison of Pre-rapprochement Periods 
In the literature review chapter, it was mentioned that the state of affairs 
between states before they enter the rapprochement process is not relevant to 
whether this process should be characterized as a rapprochement or not. While the 
above observation is valid, it should be pointed out that it refers to the starting 
conditions, rather than the process or the politics behind the initiation of the 
rapprochement. For example a rapprochement might follow after a war, or a period 
when the parties are at the brink of war. Contrary to the initial state of affairs, the 
processes preceding the initiation of the rapprochement are not only relevant, but, 
in cases, could also play a role in the success or failure of the process. The 
following part will compare the similarities and differences among the processes 
that prelude the four Greek-Turkish rapprochements discussed in detail in the 
previous chapters. 
 
8.2.1. Comparing the Pre-initiation Periods 
A reading of all four cases indicates that there are specific similarities 
concerning the processes leading to the initiation of the rapprochement. The 
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rapprochements do not just happen. Instead, they are the outcomes of certain 
actions, motivations, and circumstances, all acting together and resulting in the 
commencement of the process. In the following pages, the data from the case 
studies referring to the pre-initiation period will be discussed and coded in a table 
so that direct comparison across cases can be made possible. Specifically, the data 
that will be looked into are the actions leading to the initiation of the rapprochement 
process, the international pressure towards rapprochement, and the security 
concerns that pushed Turkey and Greece towards a rapprochement.   
 Actions leading to the initiation of the rapprochement 
 To begin with, a first look into the tables on each case study (Tables 4.1., 
5.1., 6.1., 7.1.) reveals similarities regarding the actions of political leaders and the 
effects of their actions on the process leading to the rapprochement’s initiation. 
Thus, trust-building efforts, positive gestures and return of those gestures, ice 
breaking attempts, and similar tactics are present in all cases with minor 
differentiations. Likewise, the manifestation of these tactics is also similar across 
cases, with personal correspondence and public speeches being the most common 
channel to communicate one side’s intentions to the other side. In order for the 
analysis to be more comprehensive, the actions of politicians have been divided 
into first step, reciprocation, and ground preparation. 
 In all four cases there was a positive first step made that opened the way 
towards the initiation of the rapprochement. In 1928, it was Venizelos’ speech 
which, apart from stating his willingness to alter the Greek foreign policy strategy, 
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signaled towards Turkey his eagerness to improve relations between the two states, 
while clearly stating that Greece had no territorial claims over Turkey. Venizelos’ 
public speech had a trust-building effect as it assured the Turkish political leaders 
of Greece’s aspirations regarding the Greek-Turkish relations. For the second 
rapprochement the actions and statements of the Turkish ambassador in Athens Enis 
Akaygen, and his confirmations regarding Turkey’s willingness to build good 
relations with Greece had similar effects. Likewise, in 1987 the meeting between 
Andreas Papandreou and another Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Nazmi Akiman, 
served as both a chance for the Greek Prime Minister to gain the trust of the Turkish 
side and as an effort towards the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations. 
During that meeting Papandreou assured Akiman that Greece had no intention to 
engage in an armed conflict with Turkey and that he was ready to change his long 
standing hard line positions towards Turkey129. Finally, in 1999 a first step towards 
trust-building was made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, 
who sent a letter to his Greek counterpart.  
 The commonalities in all of these first steps are many, even though the 
context and prevailing conditions varied considerably. The first step tries to fulfill 
one, or more, of the following three goals. Firstly, the person or state taking the first 
step wants to make its intentions and expectations, concerning the future 
relationship with the other side, clear. As such, first steps are expressions of the 
willingness for further cooperation and a push towards improvement of relations. 
                                                         
129 Interview with Nazmi Akiman 
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Secondly, first steps also aim at exploring the other party’s thoughts on the 
relationship. Hence, the first step is planned in such a way that it “throws the ball” 
to the other side. This is obvious in all cases, apart from the second one where it is 
less clear. For instance, Cem’s letter to Papandreou, apart from expressing his views 
on the Greek-Turkish relations also intended to make Papandreou’s views known. 
Cem had already tried to explore the Greek positions a year earlier with his two 
letters to the Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, however, at that time his ideas were 
not well received. Finally, first steps are sometimes used as a chance to introduce a 
possible roadmap for the solution of the problems, or, a set of principles upon 
which future contacts will be based. 
The actions following the first step, described as reciprocation, are similar to 
the ones discussed for the first step, though they concern the other side. In the first 
rapprochement reciprocation from the Turkish side came through the speech of 
Ismet Inonu in Malatya and also his answer letter to Venizelos. Similarly, in the 
fourth case reciprocation also took the form of personal correspondence in 
Papandreou’s answer to Ismail Cem’s letter, while in the third case, Özal’s 
intentions were conveyed to Andreas Papandreou through the Turkish Ambassador, 
Nazmi Akiman. The only instance of the four cases where reciprocation is not clear 
is the second case. However, in this case the first step was also not as strong as it 
was in the other cases. This inconsistency is explained by the fact that the 1950s' 
rapprochement took place at a time when Greek-Turkish relations were better 
compared to the other three cases.  
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The goals of reciprocal actions are also similar to those of the first step, 
apart from trying to explore the other side’s views, which has already been 
achieved, politicians who reciprocate also make their intentions known to the other 
side and present their own views on the future of the relationship. Together, first 
step and reciprocation contribute decisively to the building of trust between the 
leaders and the states, thus eliminating one main obstacle to the initiation of  
rapprochement.  
Between the first step and reciprocation, during which parties break the ice 
and increase trust, and the initiation of the rapprochement there is a phase when 
both states work together in other to prepare the ground. This phase highly depends 
on the context regarding the form it takes. In the 1930s' case preparing the ground 
for the rapprochement to take place meant that the two parties should engage in 
formal negotiation as the main obstacle to the initiation of the rapprochement were 
the unresolved issues relating to the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty. In the 
second rapprochement, preparing the ground meant to strengthen grassroots 
cooperation and to sign agreements on low-politics issues. In 1987, preparing the 
ground for the rapprochement was longer in duration than the rapprochement 
process itself. Papandreou and Akiman worked together for almost 9 months and 
had several meetings in order to agree on how they would present the process to the 
people, what would be the issues in the agenda etc. Finally, in the fourth case, the 
agreement between Cem and Papandreou to launch a joint committee that would 
discuss low-politics issues was also aiming at preparing the ground. Nonetheless, in 
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this case the big difference was made by the earthquakes, which created positive 
images between the Greek and Turkish peoples and, thus, decisively contributed to 
preparing the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement.    
The discussion regarding the actions of politicians during the pre-
rapprochement period clearly indicates that the steps taken constitute a form of 
GRIT strategy. The first step, reciprocation and preparing the ground were in 
essence a way to gradually reduce tensions between Turkey and Greece so that the 
initiation of the rapprochement would be made possible. The leaders were engaged 
in a situation when one of the parties made a small step, and the other party 
reciprocated with a similar positive gesture. The importance and effectiveness of 
these steps slowly increased until the initiation of the rapprochement between the 
parties was possible. The fact that GRIT strategy was used in all four cases 
indicates that its importance to the initiation of a rapprochement process was high.    
Another major observation deriving from the above discussion on the 
actions of politicians is that in order for a rapprochement process to initiate there 
must be political will for the rapprochement from both governments 
simultaneously. The existence of political will for rapprochement as a precondition 
for its initiation is evident in all four case studies, and it is only after there are pro-
rapprochement governments in both Greece and Turkey that the road for the 
initiation of the process opens. In the 1930s' case it was the rise of Venizelos, while 
in 1950 it was Menderes’ victory that created such conditions. In 1987 and 1999, it 
was the change of Greece’s foreign policy strategy by Andreas Papandreou and 
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George Papandreou respectively that led to Greece and Turkey having pro-
rapprochement governments at the same time.  
Oddly enough, other aspects of domestic politics such as strong 
government, leader popularity, and public opinion support do not play a decisive 
role in the initiation of the rapprochement. There are not consistent data that show a 
causal relationship between the strength of the government, the leader’s popularity, 
and the support of public opinion to the initiation of rapprochement. Ecevit’s 
government in 1999 for example was a stable yet a coalition-based government. 
Likewise, Papandreou in 1988 was much less popular than when he first became 
the Prime Minister in 1981. Moreover, the majority of the Greek public were 
against a Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1988, as was made apparent by the 
demonstrations that followed Özal’s visit to Athens in 1988. 
International pressure and security concerns 
Apart from the purposeful actions of political leaders that aim at creating the 
conditions for the initiation of the rapprochement, other factors beyond the grasp of 
the politicians also influence the initiations of the rapprochement processes. 
Comparison of all four cases clearly indicates that there are two variables, not 
completely irrelevant to each other ,that are most commonly observed across cases. 
These two factors are the international pressure and security concerns.  
In short, international pressure is understood as the motivations for 
rapprochement posed by either foreign powers or the structure of international 
system. These motivations take two forms either as direct demands dictated to 
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Turkey and Greece, or as systemic stimuli creating incentives for rapprochement as 
an answer to increasing security concerns. In the second case, the most notable 
example is the direct pressure from the US and Britain for Greek-Turkish 
cooperation, mostly provided in the form of financial and military aid that gave 
further motivations for the initiation of the rapprochement.. Systemic incentives 
were equally important. Regarding the first rapprochement, the rise of Bulgarian 
irredentism as well as German and Italian revisionism were catalytic for the 
initiation of the process. The last two rapprochements are largely epitomized by the 
role of the EU which offers both systemic incentives and pressure, especially to 
Turkey. The role of the EU became even more substantial after 1998 when Greece 
changed its strategy and used Turkey’s willingness to become a member as a tool 
that would lead the two countries to a closer relationship.   
As far as the issues of security are concerned, one cannot help but notice 
that in three out of the four cases discussed in the current study the willingness for 
rapprochement is amplified by the grounded concern that the alternative to 
rapprochement is armed conflict. In other words, relations between the states are 
such that if they do not try to ender a rapprochement phase, they increase the risk of 
a Greek-Turkish war. Such security concerns are very clear both for the 1988 and 
the 1999 rapprochements. The Aegean crisis in March 1987 made it clear that the 
two states were missing the mechanisms that would allow them to prevent an 
escalation of the crisis. Hence, both countries were risking an armed conflict if they 
failed to normalize their relations or at least create a framework for the solution of 
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crises. Much of the process actually focused on establishing tension reduction 
mechanisms (e.g. CBMs). Similarly, the 1999 rapprochement follows a number of 
crises which had a similar effect. Changes were more prominent to the Greek side 
which, after the Ocalan incident, was faced with harsh criticism not only from 
Turkey but from the international community as well. The immediate result of the 
Ocalan crisis was the removal of the Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos 
and the appointment of George Papandreou who was a moderate politician. In the 
1930s' rapprochement, although there was no crisis, there was always a fear that 
failure of the negotiations could bring Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. 
 
8.2.2. Comparison of the Indicators of the Rapprochement Process  
After exploring the similarities across the cases as far as the period before 
the initiation of the rapprochements is concerned, the following pages will include a 
comparison of the rapprochement process itself. In order for such comparison to be 
as structured as possible, the indicators of the rapprochement process, as they were 
put forth in the literature review chapter, will be examined one by one.  
Summit level meetings  
The comparison of the four rapprochement processes revealed significant 
similarities across cases. All of the four rapprochements share a critical component. 
They were all top-to-bottom processes, meaning that they were the product of 
political decisions taken by the Turkish and Greek political leaders who were 
determined to initiate the rapprochement processes. In the previous pages, it was 
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discussed how specific actions and persistence of political leaders made the 
initiation of each rapprochement case possible. After the initiation of the 
rapprochement, summit-level meetings between Greek and Turkish politicians 
played an important and primary role in the process. As it is apparent in the 
following table (Table. 8.2) frequency of summit-level meetings is high for all the 
cases, while the importance of the meetings varies between medium and high.   
 
 Table 8.1. 
 
 
Summit Level meetings 
 
 Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
October 1930 Venizelos’ visit,   
October 1931 Inonu’s visit, High High 
September 1933 Tsaldaris visit   
Second case 
S. Venizelos’ visit in 1952   
Menderes’ visit to Athens 1952 High High 
King and Queen of Greece visit 
1952 
  
Celal Bayar’s visit to Greece 
1952 
  
Papagos’ visit 1953   
Menderes’ visit 1954   
Third case 
Özal & Papandreou meeting in 
Davos 
  
Özal & Papandreou meeting in 
Brussels 
High Medium 
Özal’s visit to Athens June 13-15 
1988 
  
 
Fourth case 
 
Erdoğan’s visit to Athens 2002 
  
Erdoğan’s visit to Athens 2004 High Medium 
Karamanlis’ visit to  Turkey 
2008 
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Summit-level meetings increased in frequency immediately after each 
initiation. During the pre-rapprochement periods summit-level meetings were much 
more scarce and, most often than not, they took place during international fora. In 
the 1930s' case, there were several official visits, while there were several other 
unofficial ones which further established better communication, and even 
friendship, between Greek and Turkish leaders,. In the second case, official visits 
were even more frequent than during the 1930s. There were, however, no unofficial 
visits. Even so, during the first half of the 1950s the visits included visits made by 
the Heads of States, meaning King Paul’s visit to Turkey and President Bayar’s visit 
to Greece. During the third rapprochement there was only one official visit, nmely 
that of Özal to Athens, but the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers had the chance to 
meet in Davos and Brussels too. The frequency of summit-level meetings is 
considered high considering the virtually non-existent communication in the years 
prior to the rapprochement, The Davos and Brussels meetings were important and 
substantial to the rapprochement process. Finally, despite Simitis’ initial hesitation 
to accept an invitation from Turkey or extend one to his Turkish counterpart, 
summit-level meetings were kept to a satisfying level after 2004.  
Apart from comparing the frequency of summit-level meetings it is more 
imperative to compare their importance for the process, and discuss why their 
effects had been more immediate in some cases than in others. A first glance on 
Table 8.1. shows that the importance of summit-level meetings was higher in the 
first two cases than the last two. Indeed, both in the 1930 and 1950 rapprochements 
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the summit-level meetings were highly essential to the process. The meetings were 
not superficial and the issues discussed led to the deepening of cooperation and the 
rapprochement process. Furthermore, the visits included aspects that transcended 
protocol and served as extra verification of the excellent level the Greek-Turkish 
relations had reached. Bayar’s inspections over Greek military units for instance 
were such events. Finally, more often than not, summit-level meetings during the 
first and second rapprochements offered the opportunity to the public to express 
emphatically their support for the process, and hence, give incentives to the 
political leaders to continue the rapprochement process. 
In the last two rapprochement cases, the impact of summit-level meetings 
on the process was less significant, though not completely trivial. In the 1988 case 
the summit level meetings were the biggest part of the process, and as was 
mentioned, the beginning of the rapprochement coincided with the first meeting 
between Özal and Papandreou. Nevertheless, Özal's official visit to Athens also 
revealed the major obstacles that divided the two states. The two leaders did not 
manage to keep the rapprochement momentum, or transfer their initial enthusiasm 
to the public, or even their own political parties. In the fourth rapprochement case, 
the efforts to keep the rapprochement going was undertaken by the foreign 
ministers rather than the prime ministers, at least until halfway through the process. 
After 2004, the official visits and the summit-level meetings were a new positive 
development but cannot be considered as a major breakthrough for the process. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that both in the third and fourth rapprochement 
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cases, summit-level did not enjoy the mass public support of the first two 
rapprochements. 
Agreements signed  
Signing of agreements was an important part in all the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement processes the current study examines. These agreements included a 
variety of different documents ranging from multiparty international treaties to 
common statements and agreements on low politics issues. The main focus of the 
agreements was to increase security of both Greece and Turkey, either against each 
other or against third states such as Bulgaria. Such was, for example, the utility of 
the Balkan Pact during the first rapprochement, but also of the CBMs in the last two 
rapprochements. In addition, agreements also constitute an effort to expand 
cooperation so that it covers more topics or more areas of social life, but they also 
serve as an effort to solve problems that might exist between Turkey and Greece.  
 In all four cases, the signing of agreements is a common phenomenon. The 
two states sign a number of agreements during all rapprochement processes. Even 
during the short-lived 1988 rapprochement, Turkey and Greece managed to agree 
on a number of ideas even though those ideas were mainly incorporated in the joint 
announcements that followed Papandreou and Özal’s meetings, and did not take the 
form of an officially signed document that would, for instance, go through 
parliamentarian procedures and become Turkish and Greek law. It should also be 
stressed out that, apart from the years covered by the four rapprochement cases, 
there is only a handful of agreements signed between Greece and Turkey. 
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Table 8.2. 
 
 Signing of Agreements 
 Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
June 1930 Economic agreement,   
October 1930 friendship 
agreement, 
High High 
September 1933 Sincerity 
agreement 
  
1934 Balkan Entente   
Second 
case 
Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement in 1953, 
  
Coalition Treaty in 1954, and a 
number of other minor 
agreements 
High High 
    
Third case 
Agreements mainly in form of 
common announcements, 
Papoulias –Yilmaz Memorandum 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
    
    
 
Fourth 
case 
    
33 bilateral agreements mainly 
on low-politics 
High Medium 
     
 
 An important point regarding agreements is that the first rapprochement is 
the only case when the rapprochement was initiated after the two parties signed an 
important agreement that essentially solved the most basic bilateral issue. During 
the years following the initiation, the two countries signed a number of other 
agreements on various issues. However, none of that would have been possible if 
the June 1930 Greek-Turkish Economic Agreement had not preceded. The 1950s' 
rapprochement between Greece and Turkey was similar. Although it did not start 
with an agreement, it took place in a period when the two parties had solved all of 
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the important bilateral issues that could cause serious friction130. The lack of such 
problems ensured a high level of trust between the Greek and Turkish governments, 
and created an environment within which essential and mutually beneficiary 
agreements could be signed. This is how the signing of imperative treaties, such as 
the Balkan Entente of 1934 and the Coalition Treaty of 1954, was made possible. 
The impact of these agreements on the rapprochement process was high as they 
created important bonds between Greece and Turkey and increased substantially the 
benefits of the process.   
 By contrast, the third and fourth rapprochement processes took place at a 
time when the Greek-Turkish relations had been marked by the impact of the 
Cyprus question and great mistrust existed between the two states. The level of 
relations between Turkey and Greece did not allow the signing of important 
agreements similar to those signed during the first two rapprochements. Instead, the 
agreements signed had different objectives. They tried to increase the trust levels 
between the two states, decrease security concerns, and reduce the risk of a future 
crisis. Such was for example the utility of the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum 
signed in 1988. On the other hand, the agreements were efforts to solve small and 
secondary issues between Greece and Turkey and, thus, they served as examples of 
how the rapprochement process was mutually beneficial.   
 
 
                                                         
130 Excluding the Cyprus question, which, however, was not officially raised by the Greek 
government until 1954 and the Greek appeal to the UN 
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Military cooperation  
Cooperation on military issues greatly varied among the four rapprochement 
cases, not only with regard to its importance, but also concerning the forms it took. 
In general, military cooperation mainly appeared in the form of agreements 
concerning military affairs, such as common military action against a state that may 
launch an attack either on Turkey or Greece, exchange of visits between high 
ranking military officers and Chiefs of Staff, joint military exercises, and the 
signing of confidence building measures concerning military issues, or, at least, 
aiming to reduce military tensions.  
In the first rapprochement case, cooperation on military issues mainly 
appeared in the form of guaranteeing agreements, and greatly reflected Greece's and 
Turkey’s concerns regarding the insecurity posed to them by the international 
system. The two states, and later other states in the Balkans, understood very 
quickly that in order to better ensure their safety and independence they had to 
combine their military forces against common enemies, such as Bulgaria. As such, 
even though it was not manifested in a variety of ways, the importance of military 
cooperation during the 1930s was high.  
 The 1950s' rapprochement took place within a much different international 
environment. The beginning of the Cold War not only brought Turkey and Greece 
under the same alliance, but it also tuned both of them into frontline states. As such, 
not only military cooperation reached its highest level, but also it was the most 
important indicator of the second rapprochement. The role of NATO was catalytic 
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because within the NATO framework military cooperation became much more 
institutionalized and included a variety of actions such as joint military exercises, 
meetings among military officials and exchange of visits, consultation on military 
issues and the like.  
During the 1987 rapprochement, the hostile environment and the limited 
time that the rapprochement process lasted did not allow for much cooperation on 
military issues to take place. The efforts of the political leaders focused more on 
tension reduction rather than on other forms of military cooperation such as joint 
exercises or contacts between military staff. Although Papandreou and Özal tried to 
reduce the tension between the Turkish and Greek militaries by creating the sub-
committee on military affairs, the results of the sub-committee's meeting in Athens 
were poor and the influence of military cooperation on the third rapprochement was 
basically non-existent.  
Finally, during the fourth rapprochement, several efforts were made towards 
the strengthening of military cooperation. Such cooperation mainly took the form of 
exchange of visits between the Chiefs of Staff and the signing of several CBMs. 
Similarly, the third case initiatives regarding military cooperation focused on 
tension reduction more than on other aspects. However, this should also be 
attributed to the decreased need for more essential military cooperation, given that 
the Cold War had ended.   
Another important issue that concerns military cooperation between Greece 
and Turkey is the difference in the goals of such cooperation that exists between the 
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first two and the latter two rapprochement cases. In the first two cases the aim of 
military cooperation was mainly to increase safety for both Turkey and Greece 
against third countries (Bulgaria, Italy, Germany, communist countries etc). As far 
as the 1988 and the 1999 rapprochements are concerned, this was hardly the case. 
On the contrary, military cooperation, in the two rapprochement cases that followed 
the eruption of the Cyprus question, basically aimed at reducing the risk of armed 
conflict between Greece and Turkey. 
 
 Table 8.3. 
 
 Military Cooperation 
 Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
Mainly in the form of 
guaranteeing agreements, 
exchanges also take place 
  
    
High High 
    
    
Second case 
Mainly within NATO 
framework, also included 
consultation, joint exercises, 
and meetings among high 
ranking officers  
High High 
Third case 
Sub-committee on military 
issues meeting in Athens from 
March 30 to April 1  
Low  Low 
Fourth case 
Agreement on a variety of 
CBMs Buyukanit’s two visits 
to Greece, Hinofotis’ visit to 
Turkey in 2006  
High Medium 
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Economic cooperation 
Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey never constituted the 
reference point of their relationship. Efforts to improve financial relations and 
improve volume trade were always part of the rapprochement processes. 
Nevertheless, the results of such efforts were not as fruitful as the two states might 
have expected. Across all cases the major ways to strengthen economic cooperation 
between Turkey and Greece were two, a) the signing of bilateral agreements that 
focused on trade and other forms of financial cooperation and b) the efforts to 
institutionalize economic cooperation through the establishment of special 
committees and bureaus. 
During the first rapprochement, the efforts to advance economic cooperation 
was strong, although it never became the major issue in the process. Although, as it 
was pointed out in chapter 4, the main financial benefits were achieved at the 
beginning of the rapprochement with the signing of the June 1930 agreement, 
Greece and Turkey managed to agree on a number of other issues that dealt with 
trade and taxation, hence achieving mutual benefits. Similarly, financial 
cooperation during the second rapprochement did not manage to become the 
highlight of the process. Despite the politicians' agreement that the strengthening of 
economic ties would be one of their main concerns, the most important 
development between 1950 and 1955 was the signing of the commercial agreement 
in November 1953. 
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 Table 8.4. 
 
 Economic Cooperation 
 
Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
Cooperation strengthened, 
agreements signed, foundations 
of institutions (Bureau of 
commerce) 
 
High 
 
Medium 
  
  
  
Second case 
 
 
The most important 
development was the signing of 
the commercial agreement 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
Third case 
 
 
Several committees formed to 
discuss possibilities of 
economic cooperation 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Fourth case 
 
 
 
Various initiatives organized by 
Greek and Turkish 
businessmen, significant 
increase of trade volume, 
important agreements signed 
 
High 
 
High 
 
The third and fourth rapprochement cases are different compared to the first 
two as the strong interest of the private sector in the improvement of the Greek-
Turkish relations is also clearly manifested. Indeed, in both of these cases, 
businessmen were part of the process and were eager to grasp the new opportunities 
that an improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations would bring. In that respect, the 
third rapprochement was a complete failure as it created no such opportunities, 
while any other effort to improve economic cooperation remained superficial. 
Conversely, the fourth case managed to create the conditions for strengthening 
economic ties, and among the rapprochement processes in the current work studies, 
this is the case when economic cooperation played the most important role. Overall, 
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a significant increase in Greek-Turkish trading volume was achieved, while a 
number of important bilateral agreements were signed. 
 Finally, the assumption derived from the comparison of all four cases is 
that economic incentives, although were always part of the process, never really 
were the leading motive behind the rapprochement process nor exhibited the 
potential to become a “game-changer”.    
Statements/Gestures 
The importance of public statements and positive gestures to the initiation of 
the rapprochement was discussed in the previous pages. Those statements and 
gestures were the most significant part of the GRIT strategy Greece and Turkey 
employed in order to engage each other. Positive statements and gestures were also 
frequent after the initiation of the rapprochement, although their importance faded. 
The decrease of their importance is mainly due to the fact that their main function, 
signaling intentions to the other party and trust-building, had already been achieved 
by the initiation of the rapprochement.  
After the initiation of the rapprochement process, public statements were 
used by politicians as a method to signal their intentions to the other side and the 
public opinion. In general, they were used as a tool that would contribute to the 
advance of the rapprochement. It is also important to point out that the first 
rapprochement became a reference point for the rest of the cases and there are 
several public statements mentioning how Turkey and Greece should try and 
improve their relations as they did in the 1930s. 
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During the 1930s' rapprochement, public statements were important. 
Although they were not the driving force behind the process, they were useful to 
certify the excellent relations between the two countries. In retrospect, the strong 
statements of friendship and some important gestures, such as Venizelos 
nomination of Kemal Ataturk for the peace Nobel prize , and the granting of the 
house of Venizelos' wife to the Turkish state in order become the new Turkish 
embassy in Athens, are undeniable proofs of the high cooperation level Greece and 
Turkey achieved the 1930s. The second rapprochement is very similar to the first in 
that political leaders used positive statements and gestures in order to confirm the 
willingness of both the Greek and Turkish sides to improve their vis-a-vis relations.  
The 1988 rapprochement was somewhat different compared to the other 
three cases. The importance of public statements sharply increased, and they 
became one of the main tools Papandreou and Özal used in order to increase public 
support for the rapprochement process, especially the public statements made after 
the summit-level meeting which constituted an effort to convey the cooperative 
spirit that prevailed during the meetings to the Greek and Turkish public. It is also 
quite important that, given the increased tension between Turkey and Greece that 
prevailed at the time the rapprochement took place, unfortunate public statements 
by officials also harmed the process.  
Finally, the fourth rapprochement is not characterized by strong gestures and 
statements that would create advances to the rapprochement process. Some 
statements and gestures were made but, as mentioned earlier, they followed rather 
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than triggered any developments. What must be stressed concerning the fourth 
rapprochement is the considerable change  of public statements when the pre-
rapprochement period and the period following the initiation of the process are 
compared.  Hence, statements like the one made by the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who accused Turks of being thieves and murderers were not repeated after 
the initiation of the rapprochement. 
 
 Table 8.5. 
 
 Statements/Gestures 
 
Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
 
 
 
Several statements confirming 
the good will/atmosphere take 
place, several good will 
gestures from both sides 
 
High 
 
Medium 
  
    
    
Second case 
 
Several positive statements 
and gestures 
 
High 
 
Medium 
Third case 
 
 
Several positive statements 
made by political leaders 
especially after the official 
meetings 
 
High 
 
Medium 
Fourth case 
 
 
 
Several statements made by 
official rather follow positive 
developments rather than 
creating them 
 
High 
 
Low 
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Societal level 
Society’s support to the rapprochement was important to all cases except for 
the third one. Before assessing the role of civil society, an important point that must 
be highlighted is that civil society got stronger as time passed by. Coupled with the 
technological advancements which made cross-border communication and travel 
easier, this strength was translated into a greater variety of initiatives at the societal 
level. So, unlike the first two cases where societal participation was largely limited 
to sports, and elite groups, the fourth rapprochement included a much wider 
spectrum of initiatives, such as internet groups and online communities.  
The comparison of the cases shows that public support encouraged political 
leaders to intensify the rapprochement process and contributed to the deepening of 
the process by including more people from different strata of society, while it 
widened the areas where the rapprochement process focused. A major assumption 
deriving from the study of the four rapprochement cases is that the influence of the 
process on the societal level was mainly influenced by the overall relation between 
the two countries. Society was much more active when the rapprochement took 
place between two friendly countries, as was the case in the 1930s, and much less 
enthusiastic when Turkey and Greece had developed hostile relations, such as in the 
1988 rapprochement. 
The role of the refugees must also be discussed as one of the main societal 
forces that influenced Greek-Turkish rapprochement processes. The role of the 
refugees became clearer before the initiation of the first rapprochement when they 
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strongly opposed the June 1930 Greek-Turkish agreement. The reaction of the 
refugees was not pointed towards the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations 
per se, but rather to the agreement’s provisions, which essentially shattered their 
hopes of ever being compensated.  
 
 Table 8.6. 
 
 Societal level 
 
Main events Frequency Importance 
First case 
 
 
 
Grassroots exchanges, 
support from public opinion 
and media 
  
  
High 
 
High 
  
Second case 
 
 
Communication between 
societies increase 
considerably and cover many 
different activities such as 
sports, education, civil society 
 
High 
 
 
High 
Third case 
 
No major breakthroughs. 
Limited among elites 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Fourth case 
 
Several initiatives among 
professionals, students, 
artists, journalists etc 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
 
8.3. Influence of the Independent Variables 
The literature review chapter introduced and discussed a set of eight 
independent variables which became the main focus of the current study. A 
codebook was constructed in the methodology chapter that further defined those 
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variables and explained what indicators must be looked upon while analyzing the 
case studies. Each of the eight variables was also discussed separately in each 
chapter, with the analysis focusing on the independent variables’ contribution to the 
outcome of each rapprochement case. In the following pages the discussion will 
continue with what might be considered the most important part of this research, 
namely the comparison of each independent variable across cases and the 
disclosure of its explanatory power in regard to the variation on the dependent 
variable.  
In order to make the analysis clearer, it is imperative that a table should be 
introduced first which will include all of the eight independent variables and their 
influence on the dependent variable, case by case. The table follows Kaarbo’s 
(1996: 518) pattern. Influence for each variable is coded with Y (when the variable 
played a role to shaping the outcome of the rapprochement) and N (when the 
variable did not play a role to shaping the outcome of the rapprochement). Again 
following Kaarbo’s design, a variable will overall be considered that caused 
variation on the dependent variable if it has done so in at least 75% of the cases 
(both successful rapprochement and one unsuccessful or both unsuccessful 
rapprochements and one successful)131. The discussion that will follow the table  
 
                                                         
131 It should be mentioned that Kaarbo uses 8 cases in her analysis, and she considers a hypothesis 
supported if the variable was present in 75% (3 out of 4) of the cases with one value on the 
dependent variable and at least 50% (2 out of 4) of the cases with the other value on the dependent 
variable (pp. 515). As this design is impossible to follow exactly due to the limited number of cases 
the current study uses, which is half of Kaarbo’s cases, the overall influence of each independent 
variable will be decided under the criteria mentioned in the text.  
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will contribute significantly to the understanding of each variable’s behavior and 
contribution. 
 
 Table 8.7. 
 
Variable Influence Support Overall support 
Impact of the 
international system 
to the national 
security  
 Successful: 1)  Y    4) N 50% 25% 
 
  
 Unsuccessful: 2) N     3) N 
 
0% 
 
 State identity 
 
 
 Successful: 1)  Y     4) Y 100% 100% 
 
  
 Unsuccessful: 2)  Y   3) Y 
 
100% 
 
 Costs and benefits 
 Equilibrium 
 
 Successful: 1)  Y     4) Y 100%  50% 
 
 
 Unsuccessful: 2)  N  3) N 
 
0% 
 
 Interdependence 
 
 
 Successful: 1)  Y      4) Y 100%  50% 
 
 
 Unsuccessful: 2)  N    3) N 
 
0% 
 
 Leadership 
 
 
 Successful: 1)  Y       4) Y 100% 
 100% 
 
 
 Unsuccessful: 2) Y      3) 
Y 
 
100% 
 
 Depth of process 
 
 
 Successful: 1) Y       4) Y 100% 75% 
 
  
 Unsuccessful: 2) N   3) Y 
 
50% 
 
 Turning points 
 
 
 Successful: 1) N      4) N 0% 
25% 
 
  
 Unsuccessful: 2) Y       3) 
N 
 
50% 
 
 GRIT strategy 
 
 
 Successful: 1) N       4) N 0% 
 0% 
 
  
 Unsuccessful: 2)  N     3) 
N 
 
0% 
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a) The impact of international system on national security 
The low impact of this variable could come as a surprise to many IR 
scholars and especially those who favor structural realism. Some skeptics would 
argue that all the rapprochement cases discussed in the current dissertation took 
place at times when systemic pressure existed and at times when a threat was posed 
on the national security of both Turkey and Greece. A deeper analysis of the cases, 
however, suggests that although systemic pressures existed, they were not a 
sufficient factor for the success of a rapprochement process. It is also important to 
note that what is important for the evaluation was not the presence of a factor, but 
whether this presence leads to the success or failure of the process.    
The overall impact for the first proposition, which concerned the impact of 
the international system on national security, was 25%, translating to observed 
impact on the first case only and no impact on the other three cases. Regarding the 
first two cases, there are few differences as far as the insecurities imposed by the 
system are concerned.. During the 1930s, insecurity was caused by the emergence 
of countries such as Italy or Bulgaria which were either revisionist or irredentist.  In 
the early 1950s insecurity was caused by the emergence of the Cold War and the 
creation of a bipolar system dominated by two antagonistic super-powers. 
Regardless of these differences, it is a fact that for both Greece and Turkey that 
systemic pressures on their national security were strong, and one of the primary 
reasons leading to the initiation of the first two rapprochements.  
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The question to be answered then is why similar impacts on national 
security by the international system did not lead to similar variation on the 
dependent variable. The answer to this question is that, as far as the second case is 
concerned, and in spite of the impact of international system on the national 
security which seemed to positively contribute to the continuation of the 
rapprochement process until at least 1954, other variables proved much stronger 
catalysts, leading to the end of the process. The assumption deriving from the study 
of the 1950-1955's unsuccessful rapprochement is that, in the absence of other 
problems, international system would have provided adequate incentives for the 
continuation of the rapprochement process, as it had done so until 1954. Hence, the 
second rapprochement did not fail because of the absence of systemic pressures on 
Greece's and Turkey’s national security, but in spite of them.  
The third and fourth rapprochement cases must also be looked together due 
to the similarities they present. Both these cases take place in a much more stable 
and secure international system, at least for Greece and Turkey, compared to the 
one prevailing at the time the first two rapprochements took place. Therefore, the 
international system did not play an important role in any of the latter two 
rapprochements. Nonetheless, this is not to say that national security did not play a 
role. Indeed, it did both in 1988 and 1999. However, in these cases the threat to 
national security for Turkey and Greece was caused by the possibility of a Greek-
Turkish armed conflict and not the international system.  
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b) State identity 
State identity was one of the most supported hypotheses, as the analysis 
shows it played a role on all cases (overall impact 100%), impacting the outcome of 
the rapprochement. In the successful cases it was the development of a new positive 
state identity that made the rapprochement processes much easier and smoother. In 
the unsuccessful cases it was the development of competing state identities (1955) 
or the failure to create a new state identity that would allow for the rapprochement 
process to continue (1988). As such, this independent variable behaved across cases 
exactly like the proposition in the literature described. 
As far as the successful cases are concerned, the immediate observation is 
that during the rapprochement process state identities were shaped in such a way so 
that the other side was not considered a threat, or at least  a much lesser threat. 
Especially referring to the fourth rapprochement when the starting conditions were 
far worse compared to the 1930s rapprochement, new state identities included the 
prospect that Turkish and Greek interests were not incompatible by definition, and 
that rapprochement could benefit both states. The development of such a state 
identity, or its considerable strengthening, must be considered as an important 
factor for a rapprochement process at least for the successful cases that were 
discussed.  
Concerning the unsuccessful cases, the pattern is not so clear. During the 
first years of the second rapprochement, Turkish and Greek state identities were not 
much different from the ones formed during the 1930s. Feelings of friendship 
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prevailed between Greeks and Turks, while a shared western and anti-communist 
identity also developed. Nevertheless, those identities changed sharply after 1954, 
when the Cyprus issue surfaced and especially after the 1955 events in Istanbul. 
As far as the third case is concerned, the trauma that the Cyprus issue had 
left on both Greeks and Turks was too resentful and too big to be overcome. As it 
was already pointed out in the sixth chapter, the Turkish military intervention in 
Cyprus had caused much resentment to the Greeks, who after 1974 saw Turkey as 
an occupation force. The existence of enmity and negative images between the two 
societies affected the process in a variety of ways, but most importantly it increased 
political costs for the political leaders who wanted to continue the rapprochement. 
 
c) Costs and benefits equilibrium 
One of the most important observations regarding the costs/benefits/ 
variable is that in all cases, successful and unsuccessful alike, the benefits 
outweighed the costs. Hence, the rapprochement must be understood as a positive 
process that was beneficial to both parties. In general, the rapprochement processes 
offered several benefits to both Greece and Turkey, which mainly had to do with 
bilateral issues, such as for instance the minorities' concerns that were easier to be 
solved while the rapprochement lasted. Similarly, the cost of maintaining good 
relations was low across cases for both states. 
This analysis showed that this independent variable is not a precondition for 
a successful rapprochement, as its overall impact was 50%. Nonetheless, there are 
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important clarifications to be made. Although costs and benefits had a positive 
impact on the rapprochement process, by providing further incentives for its 
continuation, their overall impact should not be exaggerated. Even as far as  the 
successful cases are concerned the impact of costs and benefits was rather limited. 
The benefits that arose from the process provided further motivation to the parties, 
but this was only a fraction compared to the motivation that other variables offered. 
The secondary role of the costs/benefits variable becomes even clearer when 
the unsuccessful cases are examined. Like in the successful cases, the benefits for 
the two parties outweighed the costs in the unsuccessful rapprochements as well. 
However, the benefits’ impact was not possible to prevent the end of the 
rapprochement process. Hence, it becomes clear that this variable played a 
secondary role, as its impact was regulated by other more important factors. 
 
d) Interdependence 
Interdependence should be seen a natural outcome of the rapprochement 
process. As relations between two states normalize and cooperation increases, it is 
highly likely that stronger economic, diplomatic and political ties will develop as 
well. As such, it is more a question of how much interdependence will develop 
rather than if interdependence develops at all. Regarding the four Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement cases, a significant degree of interdependence developed in all cases 
apart from the third case.   
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The behavior of this variable is very similar, if not identical, to the costs and 
benefits equilibrium variable discussed above. It also scored 50% on the overall 
impact, 100% for the successful and 0% for the unsuccessful rapprochement cases.  
This should not come as a surprise as these two variables partly overlap, or at least 
they create similar motives for the continuation of the rapprochement process.  
In the two successful cases, the 1930 and the 1999 rapprochements were a 
factor that contributed to the success of the rapprochement, even though not a 
primary one. On both these cases economic activity and cooperation increased 
significantly, while the prospect for further improvement was apparent, especially 
as far as the fourth case is concerned. Regarding the two unsuccessful cases the 
most interesting case is the 1955 rapprochement, as in 1988 there was no time for 
any interdependence to develop, and, as such, this variable was largely irrelevant. 
In the early 1950s, however, Turkey and Greece were able to improve considerably 
their vis-a vis financial activities. Similarly in the successful cases the two states 
managed to increase trade volume, and they both had reasons to support further 
improvement. Nonetheless, unlike the successful rapprochements, the developing 
interdependence was not a factor that was strong enough to halt the breaking down 
of the rapprochement process. 
In total, as it has already pointed out, interdependence was not a game 
changer either to the successful or the unsuccessful cases. It provided extra 
motivation for the continuation of the rapprochement, but it never constituted a 
game-changer for the rapprochement process.  
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e) Leadership 
Leadership was the second variable, after state identity, that not only proved 
to be a precondition for a successful rapprochement, but it also influenced the 
dependent variable on all four cases, successful and unsuccessful alike. The main 
point regarding leadership that must be stressed out is that all the four Greek-
Turkish rapprochements were, besides their big differences, top to bottom cases. 
Indeed, as it is clear from the discussion earlier in the current chapter, it was the 
political leaders that initiated and significantly contributed to the establishment of 
the process during its first steps. Moreover, at least for three out of four cases, it is 
widely accepted that they are  "Nixon goes to China" moments, meaning that the 
leaders involved were so important to the process, that the process would not be 
have started or continued if they had not been involved.  
As far as the successful cases are concerned, Turkish and Greek political 
leaders played a key role in the success of both the first and the fourth 
rapprochement cases. Many commonalities exist in the ways political leaders 
supported the process and decided to bear the political costs of their decisions. In 
addition, in both cases the architects of the rapprochement process were very active 
early in the process and did a great job in supporting the rapprochement long 
enough so that the process could be well established. Nonetheless, there was also an 
important difference between the two successful cases. On the one hand, regarding 
the first rapprochement, the two leaders that initiated and supported the process 
were the Greek and Turkish prime ministers. On the other hand, the 1999 
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rapprochement was largely made possible due to the work and good will of Ismail 
Cem and George Papandreou, who were at that time serving as the Turkish and 
Greek ministers of foreign affairs respectively. 
The two unsuccessful rapprochement cases also presented several 
similarities, not only between them, but to the successful cases as well. When the 
two unsuccessful cases are compared, the role of political leaders in the initiation 
and support of the process becomes more obvious in the 1988 rapprochement. 
Although, in the early 1950s the political leaders were very active and also very 
supportive of the process, 1988 was the case where leadership became the dominant 
variable influencing the outcome of the rapprochement. Indeed, as was analytically 
described in chapter 6, leaders' actions and process are closely connected. Finally, 
for both the unsuccessful cases, lack of support by the political leaders contributed 
to the failure of the process, although, again the causality is much more 
straightforward in the 1988 case.  
To summarize, the analysis of the cases showed that leaders through their 
actions and supporting behavior can contribute to the success of a rapprochement 
process, while lack or minimum support can lead to a failed rapprochement. 
 
f) Depth of the process 
A major point differentiating the current work from other studies on 
rapprochement is that rapprochement is studied in a longitudinal manner, focusing 
on the post-initiation process rather than on the initiation itself. Hence, a big part of 
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the current research discussed and analyzed  the six indicators of the rapprochement 
process. The assessment parts in the case chapters discussed eloquently each of the 
rapprochement indicators, while a comparison of the indicators across cases was 
included earlier in this chapter. The detailed discussion on the indicators revealed 
that the depth of the process had an overall impact of 75%, influencing the value of 
the dependent variable in both successful and in one of the two unsuccessful cases.  
Contrasting the two successful cases shows significant similarities on the 
ways this variable behaved. Both the 1930 and the 1999 rapprochements concern a 
deep process that managed to heavily impact all of the indicators. High depth 
played a positive role in the successful outcome of these rapprochements by 
providing strong foundations to the process. In both cases, the process was far from 
superficial; it managed to engage people from various spectrums of society and 
included a wide range of actions and events. The connection between depth and 
success of the rapprochement is much clearer in the fourth case where the 
challenges to a successful rapprochement were numerous and more difficult to 
overcome.  
In the early 1950s Greece and Turkey managed to achieve significant 
progress on most of the indicators that the current work looked upon. In that 
respect, the second case was quite similar to the first one. Noticeable advances were 
made on all the indicators, apart from the economic cooperation where progress 
was moderate. Nonetheless, the 1950s' rapprochement failed because, besides the 
high depth, stronger factors were able to cause the termination of the process.  
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Contrary to the other cases, the 1988 rapprochement remained a much more 
superficial process, and apart from the summit-level meetings, which covered most 
of the process, little was achieved concerning the rest of the indicators. Hence, the 
failure of the process must also be attributed to the low depth it reached. The 1988 
case constitutes a typical example of process’ depth importance. The rapprochement 
died out because the process was largely depending on the political leaders, and 
because it failed to expand to the other indicators that could further progress the 
leaders' advancements. 
In total, the comparison of the cases indicated that a deep rapprochement 
process usually leads to a successful rapprochement; however, other variables (in 
the 1950s case a significant turning point) might have a stronger effect and, hence, 
overshadow its impact. Likewise, as was made clear by the 1988 rapprochement, 
when a process remains shallow and superficial, the likelihood of a successful 
process decreases. 
 
g) Turning points 
Turning points caused a change on the value of the dependent variable only 
in one of the four cases. Their overall impact was 25%, which translates to 0% for 
the successful cases and 50% for the unsuccessful cases. This independent variable, 
hence, was not a precondition for a successful rapprochement, at least as far as the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochements were concerned. Nonetheless, there are some very 
crucial points to highlight concerning this variable.  
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To begin with, in all the three cases no impact of turning points on the 
outcome of the rapprochement was observed, meaning that in the 1930s, 1988 and 
the 1999 cases, there were no turning points whatsoever. This means that the 
unchanged value of the dependent variable was not due to the rapprochements 
being resistive to turning points, but rather to the absence of turning points. This is 
a much different observation than the one where turning points would be present in 
all the cases. It is important to understand this difference because the analysis of the 
second case clearly shows how turning points could have a huge impact on the 
outcome of a rapprochement process. 
Looking at the second rapprochement, which took place in the early 1950s, 
a safe assumption is that, in many aspects, it was not much different from the first 
rapprochement. Relations were very friendly, there was political will for 
cooperation; the Turkish and Greek public opinions supported the friendship 
between the two states; there were significant agreements signed and, in general, 
there were many incentives for continuing the rapprochement for both Greece and 
Turkey. The fundamental difference was that a very strong turning point, the 
Cyprus issue, surfaced and it was, on its own, enough to destroy what was 
otherwise a very promising rapprochement process. The second case hence, 
constitutes a clear example of the power turning points have, when they do happen, 
on altering a rapprochement's outcome. 
It is also important to point out that in the three cases that turning points did 
not influence the outcome of the rapprochement process, they did play a role in the 
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initiation of the process. These turning points took exclusively the form of a crisis 
and significantly contributed to a change in attitudes that led to the initiation of the 
rapprochements. For the third case, the March 1987 Aegean Crisis was a decisive 
moment that opened the way leading to Davos. Similarly, the initiation of the fourth 
rapprochement was only made possible by the change of political attitudes which, 
in turn, was caused by the series of crises that unfolded between 1996 and 1999. 
The halt of the negotiations that took place before the initiation of the first 
rapprochement should also be considered as a crisis, although not as strong as the 
two mentioned earlier that contributed to the initiation of the rapprochement. 
 
h) GRIT strategy 
The importance of GRIT strategy to the initiation of all four rapprochement 
cases was highlighted earlier in the current chapter. The idea that GRIT strategy 
during negotiations between two parties increases the likelihood of a successful vis-
a-vis rapprochement belongs to Armstrong who suggested in one of his five 
assumptions that the initial strategy employed by the parties must be consistent with 
the basic GRIT prescriptions. As Armstrong research also looks at the initiation of 
the rapprochement, it is important to point out that his assumption regarding GRIT 
is also verified by the current study. 
Nonetheless, as far as the success of the process is concerned, the current 
study did not make such observations. The independent variable relating to the 
GRIT strategy did not influence the dependent variable in any of the four cases 
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discussed in the current research and, as such, it scored 0% overall. The differences 
in the way this variable behaves, being very important to the initiation but 
unimportant to the process, raises further questions regarding what factors 
determine its behavior. There are two important observations to be made in this 
regard.  
On the one hand, GRIT strategy became a useful tool for the leaders when 
relations were at a very low level. All the first steps and the reciprocation steps took 
place when there was not much room for other types of communication. Similarly, 
GRIT strategy was used in order to make one party’s intentions known and to 
explore the intentions of the other sides, and hence, taking small steps was the 
required strategy. After the initiation of the rapprochement though, the parties had 
already achieved a level of cooperation and understanding and were already 
prepared to take more essential steps in order to further improve their relationship.  
 Another important issue to be pointed out is that Greece and Turkey were 
not engaged in negotiations after the initiation of the rapprochements. They had 
either solved the most important bilateral issues before the initiation of the process, 
as was the case in 1930 and 1950, or they decided to continue with the process 
despite the existence of bilateral issues, as was done in 1999. Even when some 
negotiations took place between Greece and Turkey, such as the 1988 and 1999 
cases, negotiations took place behind closed doors and it is impossible to evaluate 
them. The lack of need for negotiations or the willingness to proceed with 
negotiations, eliminated one of the main areas where GRIT strategy could be used, 
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and, hence, it constitutes this variable which is largely irrelevant to the outcome of 
the rapprochement.   
 
8.4. Concluding Remarks 
The current chapter compared the four cases of Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement that were discussed in the four previous chapters. The comparison 
was divided into three different parts; comparison of the pre-initiation period, 
comparison of the rapprochement process, and, finally, assessment of how each of 
the independent variables faired with regard to the research question. As such, this 
chapter completes the most important part of the discussion that was the central 
topic of the current study. The next, chapter will include a brief overview, some 
final remarks and some ideas on where future research on rapprochement should 
focus on. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  
9.1. Summary 
The current study began with a simple question; “what are the preconditions 
for successful rapprochement”? In order to answer this question, the research 
followed a very specific roadmap. Initially, some conceptual foundations were laid. 
The concept of rapprochement was closely examined and discussed, a working 
definition was provided and the independent variables to be tested were introduced. 
Furthermore, a detailed account of the study’s methodological approach was 
provided and concerns relating to methodological issues were also discussed.  
The study continued with the analysis of the case studies that were chosen 
for examination. Each of these case studies was analyzed mainly on three axes; the 
pre-rapprochement period, including the actions and steps that led to the initiation 
of the rapprochement, the rapprochement process, which was further broken into 
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eight indicators, and the assessment of the influence of each of the independent 
variables to the success or failure of the rapprochement.  
Finally, the comparison chapter provides a comprehensive cross-case 
comparison and arrives at significant conclusions regarding the explanatory power 
of each of the independent variables that were put forth early in the study.  
  
9.2. Main Findings 
The thorough analysis of the case studies and the discussion in the 
comparison chapter revealed some very interesting assumptions that can be drawn 
for each of the independent variables. Variables that are well researched and 
constitute a cornerstone in international politics’ theories did not exhibit strong 
explanatory power as far as the dependent variable is concerned. It is also important 
to note that all but one independent variable, GRIT strategy, influenced the 
outcome of at least one of the cases. 
The realist assumption that systemic pressures on national security are one 
of the profound forces shaping states’ actions and decisions only influenced the 
outcome of the rapprochement process in the first rapprochement case. Regarding 
the early 1950s rapprochement, high pressure from the international system did not 
manage to provide strong incentives for the continuation of the rapprochement. For 
the last two cases, system’s pressure on national security was not very strong even 
before the initiation of the rapprochement. In those cases, Greece and Turkey 
became the major threat to each other’s security.  
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Interdependence and cost/benefit analysis only influenced the outcome of 
the rapprochement in the two successful cases. Overall, both these independent 
variables behaved very similarly across cases. In all four cases, interdependence 
increased after the initiation of the rapprochement and the benefits overweighed the 
costs. Hence, incentives for the continuation of the rapprochement were increased 
by those two variables across cases. Nonetheless, those incentives were not strong 
enough to prevent the failure of the process in the two unsuccessful cases. As far as 
the successful cases are concerned, although interdependence increased and 
significant benefits arose during the rapprochement, the contribution to the success 
of the process was positive but rather limited.   
The urgent question that immediately arises is why those variables did not 
influence the outcome of the rapprochement process. The answer to this question is 
given when one takes a look at the independent variables that did cause variation on 
the dependent variable. The analysis in the previous chapter strongly suggests that 
as far as the rapprochements between Turkey and Greece are concerned, the 
variables that were related to the process of the rapprochement constituted the 
strongest catalyst to the outcome of the process. As such, the formation of a new 
state identity, the efforts of the leaders, and the depth of the process were the main 
independent variables influencing the value of the dependent variable.  
Overall, the discussion on the influence of the independent variables as well 
as the discussion and analysis that was made for every rapprochement case leads to 
one major assumption. Regarding Greece and Turkey, a dyad with long history, 
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unresolved bilateral issues and high levels of mistrust, the biggest obstacle to the 
success of a rapprochement process is not the lack of strong incentives for 
cooperation, either from the benefits that arise, the economic profits that increase or 
the increased security against third states. Similarly, the rapprochement is more 
likely to succeed when the two states actively support the continuation of the 
process either through the actions of the political leaders, the substantiation of the 
process, or the creation of a new cooperative state identity that focuses on the future 
of the relationship rather than on the past. 
  
9.3. The Future of the Relationship 
The historical overview of the Greek-Turkish relations clearly reveals that 
the two states have been enemies longer than they have been allies. Heraclides 
(2004: 67) assesses that from 1901 to 2000 Greece and Turkey have experienced 
seven years of armed conflict, 57 years of strained relations (with and without 
violent outbursts), and only 30 years of cordial relations. The question that comes 
up then is whether Turkey and Greece are predestined by history and geography to 
be enemies. 
The current study answers this question with an emphatic “no”. The 
historical analysis of the Greek-Turkish relations suggests that the two countries 
were able to develop friendly relations and strong cooperation. Important lessons 
can be learnt especially by the first rapprochement, which was the most successful 
case both in terms of developing cooperation and strengthening ties. The analysis of 
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the case suggests that solving the important bilateral issues before the 
rapprochement is one of the keys to success for two reasons. On the one hand lack 
of bilateral issues allows the parties to focus on issues of common interest rather 
than issues where their interests diverge. On the other hand, the existence of 
bilateral issues after the initiation of the rapprochement may trigger situations that 
will pose a threat to the process, hence, making the rapprochement less likely to 
succeed. 
The 1999 rapprochement continues until the present (2013), but 
unfortunately the two countries have not managed to solve their bilateral issues. 
They have just learned to live with them, and cooperate despite them. In order to 
increase the chances for continued good neighborly relations Turkey and Greece 
must sooner or later find a solution to the bilateral issues that divide them.  
 
9.4. Policy Implications 
The current research offers significant lessons to policy makers that either 
aim at initiating a rapprochement process or want to lead a successful 
rapprochement process. Even though the analysis of the case studies suggests that 
actions of leaders were in large case-specific, depending on the special needs of 
each situation, there are some general lessons that may be deducted. 
• Take small yet important steps: Before the initiation of the rapprochement 
the leaders should avoid taking high risks. Small gestures indicating their intentions 
suffice. It is also important that the first step be planned in such a way that it 
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obligates the other party to reveal its intentions. Personal correspondence is the 
simplest way to achieve this goal 
• Solve as many issues as possible before initiation: This point has already 
been discussed at length in the previous pages. Unresolved issues are always points 
of frictions and it is good to be eliminate them from the beginning.  
• Be quick in the early stages: The early stages of the rapprochement 
process must constitute a “shock therapy”. Progress on all indicators must be 
achieved in order to build strong foundations for the process. In particular, the 
discussion on the third case indicates that failure to influence all of 
rapprochement’s indicators constitutes the process vulnerable.     
• Support the process at all times: The deeper the rapprochement becomes 
over time, the less it is dependent on the support and actions of leaders. 
Nonetheless, the leaders must be alert at all times because there may be unexpected 
factors (such as turning points) that will threaten the success of the process.   
 
9.5. Implications for Future Research 
One of the first contributions of the current study was that it created a 
concrete framework for the study of rapprochement processes, including a concrete 
definition which can be used as a guide for selection of new cases. This theoretical 
framework can be used by scholars for the study of other rapprochement cases, for 
both descriptive studies and exploratory research. In addition, the framework that 
was developed by this study can be used in order to test a number of variables, 
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which are not necessarily the same as those the current study chose to test. Finally, 
the framework is not only applicable to cases that are similar to the Turkey- Greece 
dyad, but to all cases of rapprochement,  
Furthermore, the big bulk of the current study concerned testing the eight 
independent variables which were selected after the thorough review of the related 
literature. At the end some assumptions were reached on how each of the 
independent variables influenced the success or failure of the rapprochement 
process. Testing the same variables on other rapprochement cases would offer more 
data, and ultimately could lead to a better understanding of the factors that cause a 
rapprochement process to fail or succeed.  
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